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This dissertation presents three independent chapters that build on the tools of
behavioral economics to study issues related to labor markets in low-income countries
and charitable giving.
In the first chapter, I investigate whether present bias correlates with savings and
job search behavior in a population of low-skill workers in Ethiopia. I conduct a field
experiment with 460 women who begin employment in the ready-made garment in-
dustry. Most are rural-urban migrants without work experience for whom the job
represents a stepping stone into the labor market. Almost all workers plan to use their
jobs to save money and to look for higher-wage employment, but many fall short of
their intentions. I propose self-control problems as a candidate explanation. I elicit a
measure of present bias in a tightly-controlled experiment and match results to high-
frequency survey data that I collect over a period of three months. Present bias is a
significant predictor of job search effort, controlling for liquidity and a broad range of
covariates. Present-biased workers spend 57 percent less time on job search per week.
As a result of reduced search, present-biased workers generate fewer offers and stay
in their jobs significantly longer. In contrast, I find no significant correlation between
present bias and savings behavior. I discuss implications for the design of commitment
devices in this context.
In the second chapter, co-authored with Egon Tripodi, we study incentivized vol-
untary contributions to charitable activities. Motivated by the market for blood dona-
tions in Germany, we consider a setting where different incentives coexist and agents
can choose to donate without receiving monetary compensation. We use a model that
interacts image concerns of agents with intrinsic and extrinsic incentives to donate.
Laboratory results show that a collection system where compensation can be turned
down can improve the efficiency of collection. Image effects and incentive effects do
not crowd each other out. A significant share of donors turn down compensation.
Heterogeneity in treatment effects suggests gender-specific preferences over signaling.
In the third chapter, also co-authoredwith EgonTripodi, we use a field experiment
to study how social image concerns affect pledges to engage in a charitable activity.
We work with two different blood banks and a municipal government in Germany
to offer sign-ups for human whole blood donations. Motivated by a simple signaling
framework, we randomly vary the type of organization to donate to and the visibility of
the pledge to donate. Our setting also provides natural variation in the group of people
that form the “audience” for social image concerns. We find evidence for strong social
image concerns when subjects are asked in public whether they would like to pledge a
donation with a well-known charity. Almost all subjects renege on their pledge, with
no detectable differences between treatments. We discuss avenues for further research
and end on a cautionary note for organizations looking to harness pledges to encourage
individuals to do good.
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Research in psychology and economics over the past decades has uncovered a broad range of
behavioral quirks and phenomena that shape economic decisions in our lives. This disserta-
tion focuses on two such quirks and studies them using experimental methods: The second
chapter of this disseration revisits what might be one of the most commonly-studied be-
havioral phenomena – present bias – and assesses its link with real-world behaviors in the
domains of savings and job search. The third and fourth chapter build on another behavioral
phenomenon: While millions of people engage in charitable activities with private cost and
public benefit, many are more inclined to do so when observed by others. This effect of
social image concerns on charitable giving is well-documented. In joint work with Egon
Tripodi, we focus on two different mechanisms through which social image concerns in
charitable giving could be leveraged to promote good deeds.
To study the link of experimentally-measured present bias with real-world behaviors,
the second chapter combines a lab-in-the-field experiment with high-frequency survey data
from 460 women in Ethiopia’s ready-made garment industry. Most workers in my sample
are recent rural-urban migrants for whom employment in this industry represents the first
formal work experience, a stepping stone into the urban labor market of the capital Addis
Ababa, and an opportunity to accumulate savings.
My results suggest that self-control problems in the form of experimentally-elicited
present bias significantly undermine the ability of workers to use these jobs as such a stepping
stone. I show that present bias is a significant predictor of reduced job search effort over
a period of three months after starting their job. Present-biased workers search less, as a
result generate fewer alternative job offers, and stay at the firm significantly longer. My
results offer the first experimental evidence of a theorized link between present bias and job
search effort. I do not find evidence for a link between present bias and reduced savings.
An immediate implication of my findings is that individuals looking for work might
benefit from policies or devices that commit their future selves tomore search. Whether and
under what conditions such a commitment device can be welfare-improving depends on the
exact welfare criterion, which is particularly difficult to define for on-the-job-search in the
context of this study. The conclusion of the second chapter discusses potential interventions
and sketches paths forward.
1
. Introduction
In the third and fourth chapter, we consider different mechanisms through which social
image concerns in charitable giving could be leveraged to promote good deeds.
In the third chapter, we focus on image concerns as a channel through which a “dual
market”, in which agents can choose whether or not they would like to be paid for a charita-
ble activity, can induce sorting into unpaid contributions. Our interest in the role of social
image in a “dual market” for charitable giving stems from themarket for humanwhole blood
donations in Germany. In most high-income countries, the concern that incentives could
backfire is reflected in tight regulation of how blood donations can be collected. Regulations
typically do not allow for monetary payments to donors. In many regions of Germany, how-
ever, monetary and non-monetary incentives appear to coexist in a “dual market” in which
different blood collectors offer different incentives and prospective donors can choose where
to donate. Donations at the German Red Cross are always unpaid, while donations at hos-
pitals or commercial blood banks are compensated with 20 to 30 euro.
We use a simple theoretical framework and a laboratory experiment to study this dual
market in a stylized environment. Our theoretical framework shows that in a dual market,
a positive fraction of donors will choose to be not paid and that this fraction is bigger when
actions are taken in public. Offering a compensation and letting agents turn down the
compensation lets the collection system leverage the heterogeneity in individual preferences.
This enables efficiency gains in the collection similar to those deriving from self-selection
in third-degree price discrimination.
Our experiment shows that in a dual market, the availability of extrinsic incentives does
not crowd out intrinsic motivations of donors. In fact, giving significantly increases com-
pared to the market design in which donations are not paid. We also find that when given
the option to turn down the compensation, a significant fraction of donors indeed chooses
to do so, though we find only weak evidence that donors turn down incentives more in
public than in private.
In the fourth chapter, we study whether image concerns can encourage pledges to do
good in the future. While the effect of social image on giving has been widely demonstrated,
prosocial actions themselves can often not be made public. One way for individuals to
still benefit from public recognition of their prosocial activities is to demonstrate proof of
contribution ex-post, for example by wearing a lapel pin for blood donors or sharing a picture
of volunteer activity on social media. Charities often recognize donors on publicly-visible
plaques or donor walls. Ex-ante, social pressure can be leveraged by encouraging public
pledges to act charitably in the future. Such pledges are used to rally individuals to contribute
to future charitable activities, for example through public calls for action in online and offline
social networks.
Using the real-world setting and a research design with high ecological validity, we set
out to study how social image concerns affect both the uptake and the fulfillment of pledges
to donate blood. We conduct a field experiment in a the mid-sized German city where
various organizations compete for prospective blood donors.
Our experiment shows that the uptake of pledges is consistent with a theoretical frame-
work in which social image concerns are amplified when subjects care more about being
perceived favorably by a reference group of people and when pledging to donate to a more
socially-desirable organization. We find evidence for social image concerns when subjects
are asked in public whether they would like to pledge a donation with the Red Cross. When
subjects are accompanied by friends and family members, public offers significantly increase
the likelihood of pledging to come to a donation drive. When subjects are not accompa-
2
nied by anyone, but just surrounded by other customers waiting in the municipal service
center, we do not find significant differences between public and private offers. Similarly,
social image concerns do not appear to play a role when subjects are offered to sign up for a
remunerated donation with a commercial blood bank.
At the same time, pledges in our particular context do not appear to induce any ad-
ditional blood donations. Almost all subjects renege on their pledge, with no detectable
differences between treatments. We see the lack of fulfillment in our experiment as an im-
portant starting point for further academic and policy-oriented work, which we discuss in
the conclusion of the fourth chapter.
My choice to embark on a career as an academic economist was always motivated by a
desire to improve the lives of people through research that informs and drives better policy.
As small as the contributions of this dissertation might be, I hope that they are just the
starting point of a wider effort towards this goal.
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In Search of a Better Life:
Self-Control in the Ethiopian Labor Market 2
2.1 Introduction
Many choices in our lives involve costs and benefits spread out over time. Such choices
often suffer from an apparent inconsistency: when we plan for tomorrow, we may decide to
save money and search for better jobs. But when tomorrow arrives, we may instead want to
spend our money and slack off on our job search. This preference for immediate gratification
– present bias – is one of the most robust “anomalies” of intertemporal choice (DellaVigna,
2009; Frederick, Loewenstein, & O’Donoghue, 2002; Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992). This
anomaly can be costly. The poor in particular, with less scope to absorb errors, may suffer
from not following through on their own plans.
Prominent models that rationalize such self-control problems provide two key predic-
tions (Laibson, 1997; O’Donoghue & Rabin, 1999).1 First, individuals with self-control
This chapter formed the basis for my job market paper. I want to thank Michèle Belot and Arthur Schram
for invaluable advice and support. The chapter has benefited from helpful comments by Liang Bai, Kevin Croke,
Anita Glenny, Morgan Hardy, Andrea Ichino, Pamela Jakiela, Gisella Kagy, Philipp Kircher, Peter Kuhn,
David K. Levine, Egon Tripodi, Chris Udry, and seminar audiences at the EUI and IZA Summer School
2018. This study would not have been possible without the outstanding work of my field coordinator Endale
Geberemedehen, my survey team, and the help of Wendemagegn Zewdu. Tewodros Gebrewolde kindly agreed
to serve as local research ethics advisor. Roberto Lescrauwaet and Eyoual Tamrat provided research assistance.
Funding from UK Department for International Development (DFID), the European Commission, the Eu-
ropean University Institute, the Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) and DFID through the GLM-LIC
program, New York University Abu Dhabi, and the World Bank ieConnect for Impact program is gratefully
acknowledged. This study was registered with the AER RCT Registry as #AEARCTR-0002555 and received
IRB approval at NYU Abu Dhabi as protocol #020-2018.
1Alternative models that can rationalize self-control problems include dual-self models by Thaler and She-
frin (1981) and Fudenberg and Levine (2006) or models that focus on temptation by Banerjee andMullainathan
(2010) and Gul and Pesendorfer (2001). While predictions generated for example by Fudenberg and Levine
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problems have characteristic consumption patterns. They consume too little of a good with
immediate costs and future rewards (such as saving money or searching for a job) and too
much of a good with immediate rewards and future costs (such as spending money on con-
sumption or enjoying leisure time). Second, individuals who are aware of their self-control
problems value commitment. They want to improve their welfare by tying their hands.
While the literature has established this demand for commitment in many domains (Ashraf,
Karlan, & Yin, 2006; DellaVigna & Malmendier, 2006; Duflo, Kremer, & Robinson, 2011;
Dupas & Robinson, 2013; Giné, Karlan, & Zinman, 2010; Kaur, Kremer, & Mullainathan,
2015; Thaler & Benartzi, 2004), evidence on the hypothesized link between self-control
problems and the consumption patterns described above is relatively scarce (Castillo, Fer-
raro, Jordan, & Petrie, 2011; Falk et al., 2018; Meier & Sprenger, 2010). This chapter pro-
vides an empirical test of the link between self-control problems and behavior. I conduct
this test in an environment where failure to follow through can have significant negative
consequences.
I use an experiment and high-frequency survey data from 460 women in Ethiopia’s
ready-made garment (RMG) industry to investigate the correlation between present bias
and subsequent choices over savings and job search. I work with an RMG firm in peri-
urban Addis Ababa that hired a large number of all-female workers during the study period
in the spring of 2018. Workers start homogeneous production jobs (such as sewing t-shirts)
without appreciable skill requirements, but with steady hours and the same lowwage approx-
imately equal to the local poverty line. Consistent with a narrative of low-skill industrial
jobs acting as a safety net (Blattman & Dercon, 2018), workers use the jobs as a stepping
stone to a better future in two ways. First, by accumulating assets and then leaving the
job, for example to start a small business or engage in off-the-job search. Second, by fi-
nancing continued on-the-job search for better opportunities. Accordingly, savings and job
search are the two intertemporal decisions that I study. I collect data on these and a broad
range of other covariates using in-person interviews and phone surveys over three months
after workers join the firm. The survey is designed to track workers as they leave their jobs,
which many do. I correlate this survey data with structural estimates of present bias, which
I obtain from a tightly-controlled experiment that I conduct on the day that workers start
their new job.
Three features make this an ideal setting to study the effects of self-control problems.
First, intentions to save money and to look for work are pervasive. All but one worker in
my sample want to save considerable amounts of money, 47 percent in order to build assets
to start their own business. I elicit workers’ predictions of their monthly savings on the day
they start their job. Workers on average expect that they can realistically save one-third of
their wage, but most fall significantly short of their goal. This finding is consistent with
workers overestimating either their future self control or their future efficiency in saving
money (Acland & Levy, 2015; DellaVigna & Malmendier, 2006). On the day they start
their new job, 20 percent of workers are still actively looking for other jobs and another 31
percent would like to search but find it too difficult, costly, or time-consuming. The fractions
of those who search and those whowould have liked to search in any givenweek increase over
the first three months of employment. While various factors can explain intention-behavior
(2006) are similar to the ones presented, I focus on quasi-hyperbolic models for ease of exposition.
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gaps in both domains, the evidence is consistent with self-control problems affecting the
ability of workers to follow through on their intertemporal plans.
Second, self-control problems can be consequential. Saving money and searching for
other jobs are the only ways workers can meaningfully increase future consumption oppor-
tunities while in their jobs. This is because wages at the firm are not only low in absolute
terms, but also do not increase significantly with individual performance or tenure at the
firm. In addition, workers in my sample are poor in absolute terms and relative to their
peers in the same age group in Addis Ababa. This means they have little slack income to
absorb the potential costs of self-control problems.
Third, the setting allows for a clean experimental design. Enrolling workers into the
study as they start their new job provides a relatively homogeneous sample and a clear start-
ing point to study choices over time in a natural environment.
The analysis in this chapter relies on the measurement of potential self-control prob-
lems for each worker in my sample. I use a version of the convex time budget (CTB) task
(Andreoni & Sprenger, 2012). Each worker makes 15 allocations of a large experimental
budget (20 to 40 percent of the monthly wage) over two points in time. By experimentally
varying the timing of the payments and the implied interest rate between both payments I
can recover individual-level measures of present bias along with other parameters of each
worker’s utility function. To implement the task in my setting I closely follow Giné, Gold-
berg, Silverman, and Yang (2017). Workers make their decisions by dividing a number of
beans between two empty dishes that represent the two payoffs. Each of the two dishes is
positioned below a small whiteboard that indicates the exact payoff date and the exchange
rate at which beans are converted into the local currency.
TheCTBmethod aims to addressmethodological problems ofmultiple price list (MPL)
approaches that have been widely used in the literature. MPL approaches often assume lin-
ear utility, which may lead to biased inference when utility is in fact concave (Andersen,
Harrison, Lau, & Rutström, 2008).2 Previous work that correlates experimental estimates
of present bias with actual consumption patterns has relied on the MPL method (Castillo
et al., 2011; Meier & Sprenger, 2010), possibly because it is easier to implement in the field.
Irrespective of whether time preferences are elicited with MPL or CTB, a number of other
confounds may undermine identification of present bias from time-dated payments. Im-
portantly, subjects may exhibit a preference for earlier payments because it is more costly to
obtain the later payment or because there is uncertainty over whether the experimenter will
deliver the payment as promised. Several recent studies that carefully equalize transaction
costs between time-dated payments find little evidence of aggregate present bias (Andersen
et al., 2008; Andreoni & Sprenger, 2012; Augenblick, Niederle, & Sprenger, 2015; Giné et
al., 2017). I take several steps to address this and other potential confounds commonly found
in the literature. One such step is to use Ethiopia’s mobile money system for costless and
precisely-timed experimental payments (Balakrishnan, Haushofer, & Jakiela, 2017). Mea-
2Consider utility from consumption u(ct) at an initial time period t and after a delay of k periods. The
implied discount factor between utility in both periods can be calculated as δu ≈ [u (ct) /u (ct+k)]1/k. MPL
approaches typically infer discount factors in terms of time-dated consumption, not time-dated utility, so that
δc ≈ [ct/ct+k]1/k and it is explicitly or implicitly assumed that u(ct) = ct. If utility is concave, as it is in Holt
and Laury (2002) and Andersen et al. (2008), we will have δc < δu and the implied discount will be biased
upward.
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sures of how well workers understand the experiment, individual-level estimates of present
bias, and aggregate-level estimates of present bias are in line with other recent implemen-
tations of the CTB method. I find that 38 percent of the workers in my sample can be
categorized as present-biased when they start their new job.
To guide the empirical analysis, I present a simple model that interprets employment at
the industrial firm as akin to the safety net of a welfare system. Involuntary transitions are
ruled out and workers are employed at their reservation wage.3 Search increases the proba-
bility of receiving a better wage offer. Workers who expect to leave the firm within a fixed
amount of time have an additional precautionary savings motive to smooth consumption.4
Both search and savings thus represent workers’ self-insurance efforts. To formalize self-
control problems I assume quasi-hyperbolic (β-δ) preferences developed by Laibson (1997)
and O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999), who build on earlier work by Strotz (1955) and Phelps
and Pollak (1968). In the standard exponential discounted utility framework (Samuelson,
1937), every future period is discounted by a constant discount factor δ. In the (β-δ) frame-
work, an additional present bias parameter β allows for higher discounting between the
current and the next period. In the model I assume that if workers are present-biased, they
are not aware of it (naïve). Every period the worker thus assumes that her future self will
not have self-control problems.
The model shows how present bias undermines self-insurance through job search and
savings in intuitive ways. First, an increase in present bias reduces savings and thus the ability
of workers to smooth consumption after leaving the firm. Second, an increase in present bias
reduces the present value of search (DellaVigna & Paserman, 2005). As a corollary, present-
biased workers stay longer at the firm. This illustrates how workers may experience a type
of “behavioral job-lock,” where voluntary turnover is reduced due to self-control problems.5
I provide reduced-form evidence on the predictions of the model. My first set of em-
pirical findings considers the relationship of present bias and savings over the three months
after joining the firm. I do not find that baseline present bias is a statistically significant pre-
dictor of subsequent savings. My preferred specification, which controls for a broad range
of covariates, finds that present-biased workers do save marginally less than workers who
are not categorized as present-biased. This difference is, however, not significant at any con-
ventional level. This holds for both savings in absolute terms and savings relative to self-set
goals set when joining the firm.
This finding is consistent with the literature to the extent that there is little existing
evidence on the relationship between experimentally-elicited measures of present bias and
consumption behavior in line with predictions of the quasi-hyperbolic model. An important
3In my data, 90 percent of transitions over the first four months of employment are voluntary. The wage
at the firm, which is the same for all workers in my sample, is approximately equal to the poverty line. Given
that workers can likely not fulfill minimum nutrition requirements below this wage level, it is improbable that
the wage at the firm is significantly above the reservation wage of workers.
4On the day that they start their new job, 25 percent of workers in my sample report that they plan to leave
within a fixed amount of time. The median expected tenure of these workers is 12 months. After three months
at the firm, 45 percent of workers report that they plan to leave within a fixed amount of time.
5The concept of “job-lock” is typically associated with the finding that employer-provided health insurance
plays an important role in job mobility decisions (Madrian, 1994).
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exception is the work by Meier and Sprenger (2010), who use the MPL method to show
that present-biased individuals are more likely to have credit card debt.6
My second set of results considers the relationship of present bias and job search over
the three months after joining the firm. I find that baseline present bias is an economi-
cally and statistically significant predictor of subsequent job search effort. In my preferred
specification that controls for a broad range of covariates, present-biased workers spend on
average 57 percent less time on job search (37 minutes per week for present-biased workers
compared to 85 minutes for those who are not present-biased). Present-biased workers also
place fewer than half as many phone calls in search for a new job (0.3 per week for present-
biased workers compared to 0.7 those not present-biased). While my analysis focuses on
search intensity, the results also hold on the extensive margin.
As an immediate consequence of less search, present-biased workers stay at the firm
significantly longer. Controlling for the same broad set of covariates as before, the hazard
of leaving the firm is 52 percent as high for present-biased individuals as it is for individuals
who are not present-biased. This effect appears to operate through search effort. Search
effort significantly increases the hazard of leaving the firm. When I include both present bias
and search effort as predictors in a hazards model, baseline present bias loses its predictive
power. Results hold when I restrict my analysis to voluntary departures from the firm and
when using data on tenure from firm personnel records.7 To further confirm themechanism,
I consider data on job search outcomes. Baseline present bias is associated with significantly
fewer job offers.
Because the evidence presented is correlational, I consider potential confounders and
alternative explanations for my findings. First, I show that individual observable character-
istics and environmental factors do not predict experimental responses. Second, I provide
evidence that individual financial wealth and liquidity are unlikely to explain my results.
Randomized cash drops at baseline do not significantly affect responses in an additional
CTB experiment. In addition, I use randomized cash drops to show that – consistent with
existing theoretical and empirical findings – more liquidity causes less search. If individual
liquidity constraints had caused subjects to both appear present-biased and to search less, we
would expect that alleviating these constraints should lead to more search, not less. Third,
I use detailed survey data on work experience, cognitive control, and non-cognitive skills
to show that human capital is unlikely to be an alternative explanation. Fourth, I demon-
strate the limited role of reservation wages in my setting. Fifth, I argue that it is improbable
that workers who are categorized as present-biased systematically under-report search ef-
fort. While it is still possible that my experimental results reflect variation in unobserved
variables that affect job search effort, I argue that self-control problems due to present bias
offer the most parsimonious explanation for my results.
6Falk et al. (2018) use a hypothetical survey measure to provide global evidence of a link between patience
and savings. Ashraf et al. (2006) elicit present bias using hypothetical choices, but do not assess the link with
borrowing or savings. Karlan, Ratan, and Zinman (2014) review the literature and conclude that there is a
“striking lack of empirical evidence” on correlations between present-bias and under-saving (p. 59).
7While the analysis of this chapter focuses on self-reported data, I also collect rich administrative data
from firm personnel records. Workers truthfully report tenure, so the significant correlation between baseline
present bias and the hazard of leaving the firm holds.
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Taken together, this set of results provides the first experimental evidence of the the-
orized link between present bias and job search effort. DellaVigna and Paserman (2005)
formalize how time preferences can affect job search behavior. They test their model in two
large panel datasets from the United States and find a negative correlation between prox-
ies for impatience and search effort during unemployment. In absence of experimentally-
elicited measures of present bias, they proxy impatience with behavior such as health habits,
use of contraceptives, and financial decisions. As they note, these indirect measures may
pick up unobserved individual traits and preferences. My data allows for a more direct test.
With these results the chapter contributes to a growing literature that has introduced in-
sights from behavioral economics into models of job search (DellaVigna, Lindner, Reizer,
& Schmieder, 2017; Paserman, 2008; Spinnewijn, 2015).
An immediate implication of my findings is that individuals looking for work might
benefit from policies or devices that commit their future selves to more search. Whether
and under what conditions such a commitment device can be welfare-improving depends
on the exact welfare criterion, which is not obvious to define when we observe two indi-
vidual choices that are in conflict with each other.8 I discuss implications for the design of
commitment devices in a conclusion.
More broadly the chapter relates to a literature that studies the effects of low-skill in-
dustrial jobs, particularly in the RMG industry, on its workers (Blattman & Dercon, 2018;
Heath & Mobarak, 2014). Most workers in my sample are recent rural-urban migrants for
whom employment at the study firm represents the first formal work experience. My results
suggest that present bias may undermine the ability of workers to use these jobs as a step-
ping stone into the formal labor market of Addis Ababa. This finding complements work
by Atkin (2016), who shows that workers in Mexican maquiladoras took present-biased de-
cisions by choosing short-term gains at work over long-term gains through schooling. It
appears that present bias not only makes workers take low-skill industrial jobs – it also keeps
workers in these jobs.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the empirical setting and provides
descriptive evidence on the job search and savings behavior of workers at the study firm.
Section 2.3 uses this data to motivate a simple theoretical job search model to guide the em-
pirical analysis. Section 2.4 discusses the experimental design and the elicitation of present
bias. Section 2.5 presents results, and Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Setting
Ethiopia is one of the poorest countries in the world. The median person among its popu-
lation of 107.5 million lives on $2.75 per day (adjusted for purchasing power parity) and 68
percent of the population works in the agricultural sector.
8This is particularly the case in the quasi-hyperbolic model that this chapter builds on. In some dual-self
models such as Benhabib and Bisin (2005) or Fudenberg and Levine (2006), the long-run self has the same
short-run preferences as the short-run self, so a welfare criterion is more obvious to define. Bryan, Karlan, and
Nelson (2010) provide a discussion. Bai, Handel, Miguel, and Rao (2017) provide a field test of theoretically-




The Ethiopian economy and labor market are however undergoing rapid change. The
economy grew at an average rate of 10.7 percent annually from 2003 to 2011. In line with
the government’s push for structural transformation and related public investment, employ-
ment has shifted from low-productivity agriculture to services, construction, and tradable
goods. The share of the labor force working in the informal sector more than halved from
50.6 to 22.8 percent between 1999 and 2013 (Seid, Tafesse, & Ali, 2016).
Urbanization is a key part of this transformation, as migrants from rural areas seek
employment and education in the cities. From 2000 to 2014, Ethiopia’s urban population
almost doubled from 9.8 million to 18.4 million (World Bank, 2016). The median age of
people who migrated from rural to urban areas in the last five years is 21 years, 56.4 percent
are female (Central Statistical Agency, 2014). Most migrants come to the capital Addis
Ababa, where overall unemployment is high at 24 percent and unemployment among those
aged 20 to 24 is even higher at 33.2 percent (Central Statistical Agency, 2015).
2.2.1 The Ready-Made Garment Industry in Ethiopia and the Study Firm
Ethiopia’s government is pursuing an ambitious industrialization strategy that aims to make
the country Sub-Saharan Africa’s leader in light manufacturing. The cornerstone of this
strategy is the construction of industrial parks, which aim to attract foreign direct investment
from American, Asian, and European producers of ready-made garments, leather goods,
pharmaceuticals, and agricultural products (Oqubay, 2016). These parks produce exclusively
for export, not for the domestic market.
For the Ethiopian government, the industrial parks with their labor-intensive indus-
tries represent formal employment opportunities for the country’s youth. Given that light
manufacturing firms often prefer to hire women, the parks also represent an opportunity
to increase female labor force participation and empower women by giving them their own
stable income. For international investors, the parks represent one of the lowest-cost man-
ufacturing destinations in the world (Gelb, Meyer, Ramachandran, & Wadhwa, 2017). In
addition to an abundance of labor, Ethiopia has relatively weak labor laws and currently no
minimum wage. Firms pay extremely low wages clustered around the local poverty line.9
They also offer little to no upward mobility, so that the vast majority of workers will not
advance past the level of machine operators. With their stable but extremely low wages
and almost no skill requirements, the firms in Ethiopia’s industrial parks represent what
Blattman and Dercon (2018) call an “industrial safety net.”
For this chapter I work with one such firm, located in Bole Lemi (BL) Industrial Park
in the outskirts Addis Ababa. Appendix Figure 2.D1 locates the industrial park on a map
of Addis Ababa and its surroundings. Inside the park, ten foreign-owned firms produce
garments and leather goods in 20 factory buildings with a total capacity of about 20,000
9In Bole Lemi Industrial Park, where this study is set, entry level wages are about 1,000 birr (US$ 36.30)
per month. The local poverty line is about 958 birr per adult per month. In the Hawassa Industrial Park, the
largest industrial park currently in operation, entry-level wages are set at 750 birr ($US 27.23) per month. The
local poverty line in Hawassa is about 695 birr per adult per month. Poverty lines are based on the official
2015/16 absolute poverty line of 7,184 birr per adult per year, adjusted to current values using the GDP deflator
and adjusted for local prices using the spatial price indices reported in National Planning Commission (2017).
Following the methodology of the National Planning Commission, spatial prices for food and non-food are
weighted using the food share of the poorest quartile of the population (0.525).
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workers. The study firm produces garments for well-known European and North American
brands. The firm has about 3,300 workers, about half of which are machine operators,
who sew and pack the garments. 95 percent of machine operators are female. Hours and
compensation are in line with other firms in this and other industrial parks in Ethiopia.10
Machine operators earn 1,000 birr (US$ 36.30) in the first month, 1,075 birr (US$ 39.00) in
the second month, and 1,150 birr (US$ 41.75) after that. Wage growth and opportunities
for promotion are extremely limited and depend on performance evaluations every three
months.11 In addition to their base salary, workers receive limited team-based productivity
bonuses, subsidized meals, and free transportation to nearby neighborhoods.
I selected this firm because it was planning to hire a large number of production workers
during the study period in the spring of 2018. Job seekers come to the factory gate every
day. About 250 to 500 people apply every month. Out of those, 200 to 400 are hired
(an average of 15 workers per day). This hiring is partly to expand production and partly
to make up for the circa 100 workers who leave every month. Production jobs have no
appreciable skill requirements beyond basic motor skills. The most common reasons for not
being hired are insufficient Amharic language skills, missing documentation, and failure to
meet the minimum education requirements. Due to relatively strict enforcement by the
international brands that have their garments manufactured in the industrial park, child
labor is not common in this context. If applicants are hired, they return on the next day to
begin work.
2.2.2 Workers at the Study Firm
The workers in my sample are exclusively female and tend to be young, low-skill, rural-
urban migrants with little to no previous work experience. As such they represent one of the
most disadvantaged groups in the urban labor market of Addis Ababa. The median worker
has completed primary school while the 75th percentile has completed lower secondary
schooling.12 73 percent of the workers in my sample were not born in Addis Ababa or its
outskirts but moved to the city from rural areas. Out of those, 73 percent report having
moved for the purpose of finding work, another 10 percent in order to find education or
training. The median worker moved 103 months ago. 41 percent have never been employed.
Excluding work as a housemaid, a common job for young female migrants, 75 percent do
not have any formal work experience before joining the firm. Most workers live in the
outskirts of the city around the industrial park (Appendix Figure 2.D1).
With what goals do workers start their jobs? First, saving money is an important goal
for workers joining the firm. While 58 percent of workers report that they did not manage
10Workers have 52.5 hour, six-day workweeks. Hours are Monday through Saturday from 7.30am to
5.30pm with 75 minutes of break time.
11A positive evaluation can increase the salary by 100 birr (US$ 3.63) per month up to a maximum wage of
1,650 birr (US$ 58.05) per month. The firm’s human resource department estimates that out of 100 production
workers, a maximum of five could ever advance to become team leaders, the next higher level of hierarchy on the
factory floor, and even fewer to line supervisors, the group of factory floor managers studied by Macchiavello,
Menzel, Rabbani, and Woodruff (2015).
12Abebe et al. (2016) illustrate how disadvantaged job seekers with low levels of education are. In their
study of urban job seekers in Addis Ababa they show that a worker who has completed secondary schooling is
four time less likely to have formal sector job and seven times less likely to have a permanent job than workers
with a vocational or university degree.
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to save any money in the month before starting employment, all but one respondent report
that they are planning to save money during their time at the firm. 47 percent of those state
that they are planning to save mainly to build assets, for example to start their own busi-
ness. Another 36 percent say that they are planning to save money mainly for precautionary
reasons.
Most workers indeed build up savings over time, however not as much as they hope.
I can compare actual savings over time with a savings goal that workers set when joining
the firm. I elicit workers’ predictions for savings in two ways: The monthly amount that
workers would ideally like to save and the monthly amount that workers think they can
realistically save.13 Panel (a) of Figure 2.1 plots cumulative savings over time compared to
the self-set goal and the amount that workers think they can realistically save. Workers
clearly fall short of both. One month into the job, the median worker has not accumulated
any savings. The mean worker has reached about 53 percent of her ideal monthly savings
goal. After three months at the firm, 68 percent of workers feel that they did not save as
much as they had hoped when they joined, mostly because they spent more than they were
planning (51 percent of those that reported saving less than planned).
Figure .: Job Search, Cumulative Savings, and Survival of Workers During the First
Three Months at the Study Firm
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Notes: Panels (a) and (b) are local polynomial smoothers at the weekly level. Panel (c) plots the Kaplan-Meier
survival estimate for the hazard of leaving the firm at the daily level with a 95 percent confidence interval shaded
in gray. Job search intensity in panel (a) is hours of search over the past seven days. Appendix Figure 2.D2
plots all three dimensions of search effort data (hours, number of phone calls, and subjective intensity) and the
extensive margin of search. In panel (b), “would like to save” plots the self-set savings goal set on the day that
workers join the firm while “will save” refers to the amount that workers think they can realistically save. By
construction both measures are linearly increasing in weeks. For comparison with savings goals, the monthly
wages are 1,000 birr (month 1), 1,1075 birr (month 2), and 1,150 birr (month 3 and all months after that).
Overall, the intention-behavior gap in savings is consistent with workers overestimating
either their future self-control or their future efficiency in saving money. Using adminis-
13Workers in my sample have ambitious savings goals. The median reported goal for saving money on the
job is 500 birr (US$ 18.15) per month, or approximately half the monthly salary. The median worker thinks
that she can realistically save 350 birr (US$ 12.71) per month, or approximately a third of the monthly salary.
Appendix 2.B.2 elaborates on the elicitation of subjective probabilities.
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trative and experimental data, DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006) and Acland and Levy
(2015) show similar overconfidence over future self-control or efficiency for gym attendance.
Second, many workers in my sample see employment at the firm as temporary and use
it to finance search for other opportunities. On the day that they join the firm, 25 percent
of the workers in my sample reports that they are planning to leave within a fixed amount
of time. The median expected tenure of these workers is 12 months. This is reflected in
workers’ job search efforts at the beginning of employment: 20 percent of the sample are
still looking for other opportunities on the day that they join the firm. Of those, 87 percent
report that they are looking for higher-wage jobs. Notably, another 31 percent of the sample
report on the day that they join that they would like to look for work, but they find it too
costly (10 percent of all constrained), time-consuming (31 percent), difficult (20 percent),
or face other binding constraints (39 percent). Panel (b) of Figure 2.1 plots the fraction of
workers who are searching and the fraction of workers who would have liked to search at a
weekly level over the first three month of employment.14
High cost of search is consistent with the results of Abebe et al. (2016) and Franklin
(2017) in a similar context.15 On the job search while at the firm mostly works through
social networks (61 percent of all workers engaged in search), vacancy boards (21 percent),
and job brokers (9 percent). Overall, on the day they join just 49 percent of workers report
that are satisfied and do not currently intent to look for other work. The other 51 percent
appear to use their job at the firm to queue for better alternatives.
Saving money and searching for work appear to be at least partial substitutes for workers
in my sample. As an indication, consider the mean savings goal on the day that workers
join the study firm. Workers who are still looking for other employment report that they
would like to save 499 birr (95% CI: 447 to 552) over the next month. Workers who are
not looking for work report that they would like to save 628 birr (95% CI: 595 to 662) over
the next month.16
In line with the notion that a significant share of workers sees the job as temporary,
turnover from the study firm is high. In my sample, 117 out of 460 workers leave the
firm within the first three months. The earliest departure from the firm comes after 12
days, the median exit occurs after 70 days. Panel (c) of Figure 2.1 plots Kaplan-Meier
survival estimates. 90 percent of departures from the firm are voluntary. Of all the voluntary
departures, 31 percent are due to low pay. The high turnover rate is consistent with previous
14Note that this is refering to on-the-job search only, so it excludes search that happens after leaving the
firm. I also measure search intensity using the number of hours spent searching, the number of phone calls
made in search for work, and a subjective assessment of search intensity. Appendix Figure 2.D2 plots all three
measures as well as the extensive margin of search. The overall pattern similar, except for the subjective intensity
measure which decreases towards the end of the panel.
15Abebe et al. (2016) and Franklin (2017) study search costs in the urban labor market of Addis Ababa
and focus on large travel distances to centrally-located vacancy boards that make search costly. Data from my
(different) sample suggests that cost in terms of time and effort are the most binding constraints and that social
networks, not job boards, are the most common search methods. Appendix Table 2.E1 breaks down reported
reasons for not searching while on the job, though the numbers in later survey waves are too small for meaningful
analysis.
16A similar pattern holds for workers who expect their tenure at the firm to be limited. Workers who do
not see the job as temporary report that they would like to save 620 birr (95% CI: 584 to 656) per month, while




results from the same context (Abebe, Buehren, & Goldstein, 2018; Blattman & Dercon,
2018).
Overall, the descriptive evidence paints a picture of workers who are disadvantaged in
the local labor market and who seek temporary low-wage industrial employment to build
assets or finance continued search for better opportunities. There are quasi no entry barriers
to employment and few involuntary separations, which suggests that firms in this context
represent a safety net, rather than a desirable form of employment.
Importantly, the data above shows that workers are failing to follow through on their
goals of saving money and searching for other opportunities. They fall short of their savings
goals and they report not looking for work because they find it too time consuming or costly.
This indicates that self-control problems may play a role in this context. Notably, both the
savings decision and the search decision involve an intertemporal trade-off between large
immediate costs and future benefits. A large literature has shown that behavior in each
domain can be rationalized using models that allow for time-inconsistent intertemporal
choice (DellaVigna, 2009; DellaVigna & Paserman, 2005; Laibson, Repetto, & Tobacman,
1998; Paserman, 2008). In the next section I present a theoretical framework to help build
intuition for how such time-inconsistent intertemporal choice can affect both decisions.
2.3 Theoretical Framework
Workers in the study setting can increase their future consumption possibilities in two ways:
They can continue to engage in job search and they can use their wage income to save money.
Continued search allows workers to find higher-wage employment. Saving allows workers
to smooth consumption when leaving the job at the firm, for example when they are fired
or if want to become in self-employed.
It is useful to consider both decisions jointly because they can affect each other. If a
worker expects to leave the safety net firm after a year (the median expected tenure reported
by workers in my experiment) she will want to insure herself against expected income losses
in the months leading up to that point. In that case, both search and savings represent self-
insurance efforts. Everything else constant, the relative costs of and returns from search and
savings will affect how much she searches and how much she saves.17
Both the savings decision and the search decision involve an intertemporal trade-off
between immediate costs and future benefits. Given the suggestive evidence on self-control
problems in the previous section, I allow for workers to be time-inconsistent in this trade-off
by using (β-δ) preferences (Laibson, 1997; O’Donoghue & Rabin, 1999).
To guide the interpretation of my reduced-form analysis below, I provide a model that
illustrates how both of these choice problems are affected by their relative costs and by time
preferences, in particular by present bias. I simplify the environment significantly with the
aim of building intuition. My approach rests on the re-interpretation of employment at the
17Note that I focus here on a precautionary savings motive of workers holding the amount of initial wealth
constant, not the relationship of (initial) wealth on search. Initial wealth could increase for example due to a
lump-sum severance pay as in Card, Chetty, and Weber (2007). Lentz and Tranæs (2005) show analytically and
with simulations that job search effort is negatively related to initial wealth under the assumption of additively
separable utility. This is in line with empirical results, e.g. in Algan, Chéron, Hairault, and Langot (2003) and
Bloemen and Stancanelli (2001).
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RMG firm as akin to the safety net of a welfare system. This follows directly from the anec-
dotal evidence presented above, where involuntary separations are rare and many workers
continue to search for higher-wage opportunities from the day they start employment at
the firm.
2.3.1 Job Search and Savings with Present-Biased Preferences
In this section I provide a discrete-time, partial-equilibrium job search model with endoge-
nous savings that builds on the framework of Lentz and Tranæs (2005) and Card et al.
(2007). DellaVigna et al. (2017) present a version of this framework that allows for hy-
perbolic time preferences (Laibson, 1997; O’Donoghue & Rabin, 1999) to affect both job
search behavior (DellaVigna & Paserman, 2005) and endogenous savings.
For tractability reasons, I follow the previous literature in making several key simpli-
fications: First, wages are exogenously fixed. The distribution of wages in the economy
is exogenous to the worker and workers are currently employed at their reservation wage.
This assumption reflects the fact that the study firm employs all production workers at the
same wage near subsistence income levels. Given that workers can likely not fulfill mini-
mum nutrition requirements below this wage level, it is improbable that their wages reflect
a reservation wage. The assumption is also in line with empirical evidence, including in
my data below, that reservation wages play a limited role in job search (Schmieder, von
Wachter, & Bender, 2016) and are not significantly affected by time preferences (DellaVi-
gna & Paserman, 2005; Krueger & Mueller, 2016). Second, once a worker finds a new job,
she will stay in this job indefinitely. Third, utility is separable in consumption and search
effort. If search costs were monetary and entered a concave utility function, the marginal
costs of search would decrease with consumption. To ease interpretation I want to abstract
from this case, which is discussed in detail by Lentz and Tranæs (2005). Fourth, if workers
are present-biased with discount factor β < 1, I assume that they are naïve about it. Ev-
ery period, each worker assumes that her future self will be an exponential discounter with
β = 1. Workers overly optimistic predictions of savings over the course of employment,
reported in the previous section, can be interpreted as evidence of such naïve. While there
is substantial evidence for naïveté in the literature, including from the widespread lack of
commitment (Laibson, 2015), it is more likely that most individuals are neither fully naïve
nor fully sophisticated (O’Donoghue & Rabin, 2001). Importantly, unlike individuals who
are (partly) sophisticated about their present-bias, naïve individuals will not demand any
commitment devices to help them overcome their present-bias.
2.3.1.1 Setup
Consider a worker with finite planning horizon who in each period t chooses assets in the
next period At+1 as well as contemporaneous job search effort st ∈ [0, 1], which represents
the probability of receiving a job offer at the end of the current period and thus having a
new job in t + 1. Search costs k(st) are twice continuously differentiable and convex with
k′(st) > 0, k′(st) < 0, k(0) = 0, and k′(0) = 0. Flow utility in each period is u(ct)−k(st),
where ct is the period consumption and utility from consumption u(ct) is strictly concave.
Income yt comes from a wage wt paid at the safety net firm or an outside option w̃ > wt in
a different job. Once a worker has found and accepted another job at w̃, the search choice
becomes mute. The path of wages at the firm {wt}t=1,...,T is exogenous and reflects the
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firm’s fixed pay scale which depends on tenure. In each period workers can accumulate or
run down assetsAt, which earn a returnR and are constrained byAt ⩾ −L. The per-period
budget constraint is thus yt − ct = At+11+R −At.
2.3.1.2 Value Functions
The formulation of the dynamic programming problem follows DellaVigna et al. (2017), so
my exposition here is brief. A worker without present bias who is on her job at the safety net
firm chooses st and asset level At+1, which implicitly defines consumption ct. Her value
function is
V Ft (At) = max
st∈[0,1];At+1≥−L





t+1(At+1) + (1− st)V Ft+1 (At+1)
]
, (2.1)
where δ is the regular per-period discount factor. V O is the value of an outside job oppor-
tunity in period t given by
V Ot (At) = max
At+1>0
u (ct) + δV
O
t+1(At+1). (2.2)
The maximization of equations (2.1) and (2.2) is subject to the common budget constraint




and liquidity constraint At ⩾ −L for all t. The maximization in V Ot is a well-behaved
sequence problem as the objective is concave, continuous, and the constraint is compact.18
As noted by Lentz and Tranæs (2005), V Ft could theoretically be convex, though they show
in simulations that nonconcavity never arises. I will follow Card et al. (2007) in simply
assuming concavity.
A worker on her job at the safety net firm chooses st to maximize expected utility.
Substituting the budget constraint into (2.1), the first-order condition for optimal search
intensity of a worker without present bias s∗ is
c′ (s∗t (At+1)) = δ
[
V Ot+1(At+1)− V Ft+1(At+1)
]
. (2.4)
Intuitively, the optimal level of search effort equates the marginal costs of search effort with
the marginal gain from search, given by the difference between the value of the outside
option and the value of remaining at the safety net firm. The right-hand side of (2.4) is the
net value of the outside option.
Compare this to a naïve present-biased worker who is on her job at the safety net firm.
She faces the value function
V F,nt (At) = max
st∈[0,1];At+1≥−L





t+1(At+1) + (1− st)V Ft+1 (At+1)
]
(2.5)
18As is shown, for example, in Adda and Cooper (2003), Chapter 2.3.
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where the additional parameter β ≤ 1 allows for the worker to be present-biased between
the current period and the future. Recall that I assume naïveté, so that continuation values
V Ft+1 and V Ot+1 above are equivalent to those of the exponential discounters in (2.1) and
(2.2), respectively. Intuitively, the naïve present-biased worker assumes in every period that
in the next period she will discount the future only by the factor δ. The naïve present-biased
worker who found another opportunity faces the value function
V O,nt (At) = max
At+1>0
u (ct) + βδV
O
t+1(At+1). (2.6)
The first-order condition for optimal search intensity of present-biased workers sn∗
given budget constraint (2.3) and value function (2.5) is now
k′ (sn∗t (At+1)) = βδ
[
V Ot+1(At+1)− V Ft+1(At+1)
]
. (2.7)
Due to equivalent continuation values I can directly compare search effort with and
without present bias by combining first order equations (2.4) and (2.7):
β k′ (s∗t (At+1)) = k
′ (sn∗t (At+1)) . (2.8)
We can now see that search effort is strictly increasing in β due to assumed convexity of the
search cost function k(st).
It is difficult to fully characterize the model with search and savings analytically.19 I
thus obtain key predictions numerically.
2.3.2 Simulations
To simulate the model from the previous section I make additional functional form assump-
tions described in Appendix 2.A.1. Parameters are set based on survey data from my exper-
iment, which I present in more detail below.
Before discussing the main results it is worth noting that in the framework presented
above, workers at the safety net firm do not have a savings motive if they believe that they
will never leave the firm. Recall that involuntary transitions are ruled out, so workers will
simply continue to consume their wage indefinitely. While they will continue to invest in
search as the value of being at the firm decreases relative to the value of being in another
higher-wage job (compare first order condition 2.7), they will not accumulate any assets.
Consider instead the case where I exogenously impose that workers leave after one year,
which is equivalent to the median expected tenure that workers in my experiment report on
the day that they join the firm. I assume that after leaving income falls to the median pre-
employment income reported in my data. In that case, workers have precautionary savings
motive that leads them to reduce consumption and accumulate savings towards the end of
their expected tenure. Figure 2.A1 in Appendix 2.A.2 plots the optimal paths of search
19DellaVigna and Paserman (2005) characterize the relationship of impatience and search effort in a model
without savings, where agents choose the reservation wage and search effort. Endogenizing savings leads to a
significantly more complicated setup. One simplification that helps to characterize the model analytically is to
change the timing so that successful job search in period t leads to a new job in the same period. This is the
approach in Lentz and Tranæs (2005) and Card et al. (2007).
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effort and asset accumulation and the implied paths of consumption and turnover for both
cases.
To see how workers use both search and savings as insurance mechanisms, it is instruc-
tive to look at substitution between search and savings. Following Paserman (2008) and
DellaVigna et al. (2017) I simulate the model allowing for heterogeneity in search costs
with six different worker types who have costs {ψj}j=1,...,6 where 0 < ψ1 < ... < ψ6. I
focus on the assumption of finite tenure at the firm, so that the asset choice is not mute. We
can see from Figure 2.A3 that types with low search costs search more (plotted on the right
y-axis) and save less (plotted on the left y-axis). Intuitively, workers adjust the use of both
insurance mechanisms in response to their relative costs.
Figure .: How Present Bias Affects Job Search, Asset Accumulation, and Survival (Sim-









































































Notes: Finite refers to simulations in which workers know that they will leave the safety net firm after one year,
which is equivalent to the median expected tenure in my survey data. Infinite refers to simulations in which
workers assume that they never need to leave the safety net firm, so they do not have a precautionary savings
motive. Panels (a) and (b) represent the sum of search effort and assets over all simulated periods. Parameter
values as given in text. Figure 2.A1 in Appendix 2.A.2 illustrates the optimal paths of job search and assets and
implied consumption and survival for the case of no present bias (β = 1).
I focus on comparative statics with respect to present bias β. In the framework presented
above, both present bias β and the exponential discount parameter δ affect search effort
and savings in qualitatively similar ways because they both reduce the present value of the
benefits of search and the benefits of saving.20 Unlike exponential discounting, present bias
leads to suboptimal decisions because workers today will under-invest in search and savings
because they erroneously expect to search and save more tomorrow. This undermines self-
insurance efforts of workers.
First, I examine the relationship of asset accumulation and present bias (Figure 2.2,
panel a). As explained above, workers who plan to stay at the firm indefinitely do not have
a savings motive and thus do not accumulate any assets. Under the assumption of finite
tenure, workers do accumulate assets. The simulations illustrate that assets are increasing in
20Appendix Figure 2.A2 illustrates the relative magnitudes with simulations that also vary the discount
factor.
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β. Lower asset accumulation due to present bias reduces the ability of workers to smooth
consumption after leaving the firm. This suggests that there is scope for a welfare-improving
intervention that helps present-biased workers save.
Prediction 1 (Present Bias and Savings): Asset accumulation is increasing in β.
Next, I consider the relationship of job search effort and present bias. Panel (b) of Fig-
ure 2.2 plots total job search effort by present bias β. As can be seen from the comparison of
first order conditions of workers with and without present bias (equation 2.8), search effort
is strictly increasing in β. An increase in present bias reduces the present value of search.
This effect is identical to the finding of DellaVigna and Paserman (2005).
Prediction 2 (Present Bias and Search): Search effort is increasing in β.
Finally, I turn to survival rates that are implied by worker choices of optimal job search
effort and savings (Figure 2.2, panel b). Prediction 3 follows as a direct corollary from Pre-
diction 2 because the probability of leaving the safety net firm depends on the probability
of receiving an alternative wage offer and thus directly on search effort s.
Prediction 3 (Present Bias and Turnover): The survival rate at the safety net firm is de-
creasing in β.
In the next section, I present data on these three predictions that I collected from a
sample of workers who join a firm in Ethiopia’s RMG industry. I then present results of an
intervention designed to alleviate self-control problems in savings due to present bias.
2.4 Experimental Design
2.4.1 Description of Data Collection
For data collection I cooperate with a garment manufacturing firm described in Section 2.2
above. The study firm is typical of the low-skill, low-wage, export-oriented manufactur-
ing industry that can be found in many parts of the developing world. It is located in an
industrial park in a peri-urban area of Addis Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia.
Data on a random sample of 460 workers who start employment at the firm is col-
lected in three steps: First, I conduct an in-person baseline survey and a lab-in-the-field
experiment to elicit individual time preferences on the day that workers join the study firm.
Second, I track individual behavior with a high-frequency phone survey. Third, I conduct
an in-person endline survey after the conclusion of the panel. The survey is set up to track
workers if they leave the firm. I combine my own data with firm administrative records on
tenure and basic demographic data on 238 pure control workers who are randomized out of
study participation.21
Women looking for employment as production workers come to the factory gate of
the study firm every day. At the end of each day, I draw a random sample from all job




seekers who are hired by the firm on that day. No other criteria are used for inclusion in
the study. Appendix Appendix 2.B.1.1 provides details on the randomization procedure.
On the next day, the hired candidates return to the firm to begin employment. Informed
consent, baseline interview, and time preference elicitation are administered through in-
person interviews on the morning of the second day immediately before candidates are
assigned to a production line.22 As part of the baseline interview, I also collect detailed data
on employment histories, subjective expectations over search and savings behavior, and a
battery of tests for cognitive and non-cognitive skills. Appendix Sections 2.B.2 and 2.B.3
summarize. Baseline interviews are conducted every day from March to July 2018. On
average the team of enumerators conducts 7 baseline interviews per day and 29 per week.
Baseline interviews last 85 minutes on average.
In the three months after the baseline, enumerators call respondents every 14 days to
collect data on consumption expenditures and savings, job search behavior, job search out-
comes, transitions to other jobs (if any), and measures of psychological well-being. Phone
surveys are practical in the local context because all workers have a mobile phone and be-
cause they allowme to track subjects even if they leave the firm. The same approach has been
used successfully in a similar setting by Abebe et al. (2016) and Franklin (2017). Phone calls
last 7.5 minutes on average. After three months, enumerators conduct another in-person
endline interview. All interviews are conducted in Amharic and Oromiffa using computer-
assisted personal interviewing (CAPI). Appendix Appendix 2.B.1.2 gives a detailed descrip-
tion of survey protocols.
Attrition from the phone survey is relatively low. The second follow up call after one
month reaches 437 out of 460 or 95 percent of all respondents. The fourth call after two
months reaches 331 out of 460 or 72 percent of all respondents. Enumerators stay reason-
ably well on schedule: At the first follow-up, 93 percent of calls are within 4 days of the
scheduled interview day. At the fourth call after two months, 85.5 percent of calls are within
four days of the scheduled interview day. Appendix Figure 2.D3 illustrates.
2.4.2 Experimental Elicitation of Time Preferences
I estimate time preferences over money for each respondent using an adapted version of
the CTB task by Andreoni and Sprenger (2012). Each subject is asked to allocate an ex-
perimental budget m > 0 between an amount ct available at an earlier time t and another
amount ct+k available after a delay k > 0, i.e. paid out at point t + k. Let (1 + r) be the
simple gross interest rate to be paid over period k. This means that subjects maximize utility
subject to the experimental budget constraint (1+r)ct+ct+k = m. Let the unit of time be
days since the experiment and all monetary amounts be measured in experimental tokens.
The CTB method aims to address methodological problems of MPL approaches, which
frequently rely on the assumption of linear utility and may lead to biased estimates of time
preferences when utility is in fact concave. Importantly, the CTB method lends itself to
structural estimation of aggregate and individual-level (β-δ) time preference parameters.
Given functional form assumptions, the discounting parameter δ can be identified from
22Given that I work closely with the firm, I take a number of precautions to maximize privacy and confiden-
tiality of the respondents. This includes selecting a random subset of workers to be interviewed at home instead
of at the factory. Appendix Appendix 2.B.1.3 elaborates.
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variation in the interest rate r and delay k while present bias β can be identified from varia-
tion in the timing of the earlier payout t. Appendix 2.C provides details on the estimation
technique.
Irrespective of whether time preferences are elicited using MPL or CTB approaches,
a number of confounds may undermine identification of preference parameters from time-
dated payments. One important concern relates to real or perceived transaction costs of
receiving payments in the future versus receiving payments today. Subjects may exhibit
a preference for earlier payments because it is more costly to obtain the later payment or
because of uncertainty over whether the experimenter will deliver the payment as promised.
Several recent studies that carefully equalize transaction costs between time-dated payments
find little evidence of aggregate present bias (Andersen et al., 2008; Andreoni & Sprenger,
2012; Augenblick et al., 2015; Giné et al., 2017). I take several steps to carefully equalize
transaction that I discuss in more detail below.
A second potential confound relates to the assumption of time-invariant utility of exper-
imental subjects. Even if transaction costs are equalized between two time-dated payments,
experimental subjects may simply have have preferences that change over time (Halevy,
2015; Janssens, Kramer, & Swart, 2017). One way to rationalize such time-varying prefer-
ences are economic conditions outside of the experiment, in particular liquidity constraints
on the part of subjects (Dean & Sautmann, 2016). I argue that liquidity are unlikely to be a
driver of my experimental results in 2.5.3. I show that a randomized cash drop between the
baseline and the endline of the experiment does not affect estimated present bias at endline.
In addition, all results below control for measures of baseline liquidity and access to finance.
A third and related concern is whether choices over time-dated monetary payments can
identify time preferences over consumption (Augenblick et al., 2015; Cubitt & Read, 2007).
If experimental subjects can borrow (save) at amarket interest rate that is lower (higher) than
the experimental interest rate between earlier and later payments, subjects could allocate
their whole budget to the later (earlier) period and arbitrage between the experiment and
the market. Such arbitrage likely requires highly sophisticated subjects.23 Augenblick et
al. (2015) overcome arbitrage concerns in the monetary domain by using the CTB method
with a real-effort laboratory task and time-dated effort allocations. They find that aggregate
present bias is limited for preferences over time-dated effort, but significant for preferences
over time-dated monetary payments. While relatively limited access to capital markets in
my context combined with the fact that most time-dated allocations in my data are interior
solutions suggests that arbitrage concerns are not first order, I do acknowledge this as a
limitation of my study.24
23In a carefully designed laboratory experiment, Coller andWilliams (1999) assess the arbitrage argument by
providing information about market interest rates. They show that some subjects attempt to exploit arbitrage
opportunities between the laboratory experiment and the market, but that they either do not know outside
opportunities or fail to determine the correct market rate.
24Similar to Augenblick et al. (2015) I also elicit time preferences over real effort by asking subjects to
allocate an amount of work at the factory between an earlier and a later point in time. I use a design that builds
on Carvalho, Meier, and Wang (2016), where I vary the length of the shorter work assignment and the time
by which it needs to be accomplished while holding the delay between earlier and later assignment constant.
Results are omitted here because the study firm did not let me implement an incentivized version of this task
and all decisions are purely hypothetical. (No deception was involved because the wording of the question was
adapted in due time to reflect the hypothetical nature of the task.)
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2.4.2.1 Implementation of CTB Task in the Field
I follow the procedures of Giné et al. (2017) to implement the CTB method in the field.
Respondents allocate 20 tokens in the form of beans between two empty dishes that repre-
sent the two payoffs. Each of the two dishes is positioned below a small whiteboard that
indicates the exact payoff date and an exchange rate at which beans can be converted into
birr.25
I vary the initial payment date t and delay between earlier and later payment k, so that
each subject faces three choice sets (t, k) ∈ [(1, 14) , (1, 28) , (15, 14)]. Within each choice
set, a bean on the earlier dish is always worth 10 birr. A bean on the later dish is worth
10 × (1 + r) birr, where r ∈ [0.10, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, 1.00]. This implies that experimental
stakes are large. Subjects can receive between 200 and 400 birr (US$7.26 to US$14.52), or
20 to 40 percent of their monthly starting salary.
2.4.2.2 Experimental Protocol
The CTB task is administered as part of the baseline survey and again as part of the endline
survey. In this paper I focus on the baseline results. The CTB task is administered towards
the middle of the survey questionnaire. This was done so that the enumerator can build
trust with the respondent while at the same time minimizing respondent fatigue. The order
in which respondents are presented with the CTB choice sets is randomized while the ex-
change rate for beans on the later dish always increases in each set. As in Giné et al. (2017),
enumerators administer a set of unrelated question from the baseline survey between each
choice set to reduce the chance that respondents attempt to be consistent between sets.
At the beginning of the CTB task, the enumerator explains the task to the respondent.
Respondents are required to pass three questions that test their understanding. The re-
spondent then practices one allocation that will not be implemented. The enumerator also
informs the respondent that there is a 50 percent chance that one allocation (with earlier
and later payouts) is implemented, determined by a coin flip at the end of the experiment.
At the beginning of each choice set, the enumerator uses one of the whiteboards to provide
an overview of the value of beans in each of the five decisions in the set. At the beginning
of each allocation decision, the enumerator wipes the whiteboards and writes down the pay-
ment date and the exchange value of one bean at the top of each board. The enumerator
then asks the respondent to allocate all 20 beans to the two dishes. Care was taken to use
neutral language and not lead respondents away from corner solutions. Once the respon-
dent has made her allocation, the enumerator calculates the total monetary value on each
dish and writes it on the whiteboard next to it. The respondents is asked if she is satisfied
with the allocation and is given the opportunity to revise as many times as she likes. For each
revised decision the enumerator re-calculates the total monetary amount and again writes it
on the board. Once the respondent is satisfied, the enumerator records the decision in the
survey software. The software confirms both the number of beans and the total monetary
amounts. The coin flip and draw of the payoff-relevant decision are done at the end of the
25Respondents use the same beans and dishes for various other parts of the baseline survey before the CTB
task (see Appendix Appendix 2.B.2). Extensive piloting over several weeks before the study confirmed that
respondents found this a natural and easily-comprehensible way to allocate a budget.
23
. In Search of a Better Life: Self-Control in the Ethiopian Labor Market
survey. Appendix Appendix 2.B.1.1 gives details. Appendix Figure 2.C1 shows a picture
of the allocation decision.
2.4.2.3 Experimental Payments
To obtain unbiased time preference estimates it is critical to equalize real and perceived
transaction costs between the earlier and the later time frame. This is particularly true in the
setting of this study because respondents are not subjects from a laboratory pool that have a
relationship with the experimenter, but a highly mobile and disadvantaged population who
may not have full confidence in experimental payments being delivered on time or delivered
at all. I take several steps to equalize transaction costs and reduce uncertainty over whether
and how payments are delivered.
First, I rely on mobile money payments to respondent cell phones using CBEbirr, a
system operated by Commercial Bank of Ethiopia (CBE), the country’s largest bank. The
system is similar to Kenya’s popular M-Pesa system and allows users to receive and transfer
money and to purchase goods and services using simple text messages. Transfers are imme-
diate and can be precisely timed. Users can withdraw money from any CBE branch or one
of many authorized CBEbirr agents. CBE is a well-known and widely-trusted institution,
even in more rural areas. All subjects in the study had phones that supported CBEbirr.26
This equalizes and minimizes costs of receiving and accessing the payments. Mobile money
has previously been used for experimental payments from a laboratory CTB task by Balakr-
ishnan et al. (2017).
Second, I follow Andersen et al. (2008) and Giné et al. (2017) in prioritizing symmetry
of payments over the opportunity to pay subjects immediately. Even though mobile money
payments allow for truly immediate payments as in Balakrishnan et al. (2017), making the
earlier payment while enumerators are still physically present with the respondents could
favor the earlier over the later allocations if respondents do not have full confidence in the
later payment being delivered as promised. I instead choose to make the earliest payment on
the next day before noon. While the front-end delay equalizes perceived or real transaction
costs, it comes at the cost of not being able to study present bias with respect to truly im-
mediate consumption. It is likely that the small delay attenuates any present bias.27 Given
that present bias is a key input to my empirical analysis, I prefer this more conservative ap-
proach over one that increases my ability to detect present bias at the risk of undermining
identification.
Third, I follow previous implementations of the CTB task (Andreoni & Sprenger, 2012)
in making sure that both experimental payments always happen on the same day of the week.
This avoids differential weekday effects between sooner and later payments. Subjects know
that all payments are made before noon.
26Even though all respondents could receive payments, 4 percent of respondents who won the coin flip
preferred to receive their payments using hawala, a widely-used money transfer system that is more comparable
to a money order. There are several formal and informal hawala operators in Ethiopia. For the small number
of cases in which subjects did not want to receive their payments through CBEbirr, we sent formal hawala
payments through CBE. Dropping these observations from the analysis does not affect results.
27This is indeed one of they key findings of Balakrishnan et al. (2017). Using a CTB task in a laboratory
experiment in Nairobi, they find evidence of present bias over money when payments are truly immediate.
When payments are slightly delayed until the end of the day, they do not observe aggregate present bias.
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Fourth, respondents who win the payout are given a written confirmation or voucher
that repeats the payment amounts, payment times and dates, and information on how the
payment is delivered. This information serves to reduce the cognitive costs of keeping track
of payments.28 It is is printed on high-quality paper with a watermark of the principal in-
vestigator’s university, signed by the principal investigator and the enumerator, and includes
the private cell phone number of the survey coordinator. Similar to Andreoni and Sprenger
(2012), who include a business card of one of the authors and encourage student subjects to
reach out to if the payment is not delivered, we encourage subjects to reach out to us should
there be any problems with the payment. This is intended to increase trust in the study team
and confidence that the payment will be delivered. Appendix Appendix 2.C.3 provides an
English translation of the confirmation.
2.4.2.4 Results of Time Preference Elicitation
While aggregate time preferences are not the focus of this study, it is useful to consider
aggregate results in order to check if subjects understood the task and to compare results
with the existing literature. Figure 2.3 shows the mean fraction of beans allocated to the
earlier dish for each experimental interest rate r, separately by front-end delay t and delay
between earlier and later allocation k. Error bars indicate the standard error clustered at the
individual level.
Figure .: Fraction of Experimental Budget Allocated to Earlier, by Front-End Delay t
and Delay Between Earlier and Later k
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It is clear that in all three choice sets subjects on average respond to the increase in
interest rate in line with the law of demand. As the interest rate increases and the price of
28Both Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) and Balakrishnan et al. (2017) take such steps to reduce the cognitive
transaction costs that may result from keeping track of future payments. Haushofer (2015) explores theoretically
how the cognitive cost of keeping track may explain stylized facts of temporal discounting in the literature.
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consumption later decreases, subjects monotonically decrease the share of beans allocated to
earlier. Appendix Appendix 2.C.4 assesses individual consistency with the law of demand,
which compares favorably to previous experiments in the literature. For a given interest rate
subjects increase the share of beans allocated to earlier as the delay between earlier and later
increases. Appendix Table 2.C1 presents an overview of all subject allocations, including
the percentage of corner solutions, for each of the choice sets and each interest rate.
Panel (a) of Figure 2.3 suggests that there is no evidence for aggregate present bias.
When comparing the two choice sets with delay k = 14 and different front-end delay
t, one would expect present-biased subjects to allocate a larger fraction of their budget to
earlier when t = 1. On aggregate this does not appear to be the case.
For a more rigorous test of aggregate present-bias I follow the parametric assumptions
of Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) and Augenblick et al. (2015) to structurally estimate ag-
gregate time preference parameters. I assume constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility
and, in line with the previous literature, make varying assumptions about background con-
sumption. Appendix Appendix 2.C.5 provides a detailed discussion of identification and
estimation via maximum likelihood. Appendix Table 2.C2 presents parameter estimates re-
covered through non-linear combinations of regressions coefficients from a two-limit Tobit.
(β-δ) parameters are precisely estimated and relatively stable across the three assumptions
over background consumption, while estimated CRRA curvature varies more strongly with
background consumption assumptions. Assuming no background consumption, I estimate
present bias β̂ = 1.006 (SE 0.018) and weekly discounting δ̂ = 0.959 (SE 0.008). Utility
is concave but with relatively limited curvature at α̂ = 0.886 (SE 0.006). This suggests that
money is reasonably fungible between payment dates.
Importantly, in all specifications I fail to reject the null hypothesis of β = 1. Overall,
aggregate parametric results for time preference and utility curvature closely mirror previous
estimates by Andreoni and Sprenger (2012), Augenblick et al. (2015), Balakrishnan et al.
(2017), and Giné et al. (2017).
Having established that subject choices are consistent with the law of demand and that
parametric estimates of aggregate time preferences are in line with the literature, I can now
turn to individual-level time preference estimates. I use the same parametric assumptions
as for the aggregate estimates to estimate two-limit Tobit regressions for each subject. As
before, I make three different assumptions about background consumption. Table 2.1 sum-
marizes the distribution of parameter estimates for individual-level discount parameter δ̂i,
present-bias parameter β̂i, andCRRA curvature α̂i. Appendix Figure 2.C4 plots the correla-
tion of present bias and discounting for all three assumptions over background consumption.
As in Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) for ease of exposition I focus the rest of my analysis
on the assumption of no background consumption (Table 2.1, panel a).
First, the estimation strategy appears to produce reasonable parameter estimates for
most subjects, though 21.32 percent of β̂i estimates fall out of the range of [0.75, 1.5]. While
this share of extreme values is larger than comparable estimates in the literature based on
laboratory subjects, it is in line with previous work from the field. Using a different estima-
tion strategy and time preferences over work effort, Andreoni, Callen, Hussain, Khan, and
Sprenger (2017) find that 20.3 percent of their sample has β̂i estimates fall out of this range.
For the remainder of this chapter, I follow Andreoni et al. (2017) in trimming extreme
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Table .: Individual-Level Time Preference Parameter Estimates from Two-Limit Tobit,
by Assumptions About Background Consumption
Parameter N Mean 5th pctl 50th pctl 95th pctl Min Max
Panel (a) No background consumption ω1 = ω2 = 0
Present bias β̂i 406 1.235 0.581 1.011 1.791 0.018 24.554
Discount factor δ̂i 406 1.076 0.769 0.972 1.408 0.196 22.569
CRRA curvature α̂i 406 0.645 -0.159 0.825 0.984 -7.677 6.042
Panel (b) Sample average background consumption ω1 = ω2 = c
Present bias β̂i 404 1.389 0.654 1.017 1.618 0.004 108.916
Discount factor δ̂i 404 1.023 0.791 0.988 1.212 0.194 6.625
CRRA curvature α̂i 404 0.430 -0.372 0.641 0.922 -13.751 1.640
Panel (c) Individaul background consumption ω1 = ω2 = ci
Present bias β̂i 404 1.13 0.611 1.017 1.631 0.008 12.99
Discount factor δ̂i 404 1.05 0.797 0.987 1.247 0.235 20.48
CRRA curvature α̂i 405 0.382 -0.523 0.659 0.944 -34.027 2.108
Notes: Table shows individual-level maximum likelihood estimates of Equation (17) using separate two-limit
Tobit models. The three panels reflect different assumptions about background consumption at each point in
time (see Equation (13) for details) and correspond to columns (1) to (3) of aggregate estimates presented in
Appendix Table 2.C2. Panel (a) assumes no background consumption (ω1 = ω2 = 0). Panel (b) assumes
that background consumption is constant and set at the sample average daily consumption expenditure in the
seven days before the baseline survey (ω1 = ω2 = c). Panel (c) assumes that background consumption is
constant and set at the individual daily consumption expenditure in the seven days before the baseline survey
(ω1 = ω2 = ci). Appendix Figure 2.C4 provides a scatter plot of βi and δi for the three different assumptions.
estimates. I trim the top and bottom 5 percent of the sample.29
Second, it is worth noting that in line with the aggregate estimates, the individual-level
parameter indicate that neither the mean subject nor the median subject are present-biased.
CRRA utility curvature for the median subject is different from 1, but relatively close to
linear. This differs from previous experimental estimates that do not use the CTB method,
which find significantly more curvature Andersen et al. (2008), but is in line with previous
estimates based on the CTB method (Andreoni & Sprenger, 2012; Augenblick et al., 2015).
While there is no theoretical reason for using a binary measure of present bias, most of
the literature has done so because experimental results did not permit parameter estimation
(Ashraf et al., 2006; Meier & Sprenger, 2010). To compare my estimates with existing
work and facilitate presentation of results, I will define an indicator for present bias, which
takes the value 1 if β̂i < 1 and 0 otherwise. I find that 37.8 percent of all subjects are
present-biased. This share is in line with proportions reported in the literature.30
29This is more conservative than Andreoni et al. (2017), who trim the top and bottom 1 percent of their
sample.
30Augenblick et al. (2015) report that 33 percent of subjects have β̂i < 0.99. In my data, 36.5 percent of
subjects have β̂i < 0.99.
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2.5 Empirical Analysis
2.5.1 Sample Description and Comparison to National Household Survey
Table 2.2 reports baseline means and standard errors on the random sample of 460 workers
(column 2). It also reports selected demographic data from firm personnel records on the
workers that were randomized out of the sample (column 1). On the three observable char-
acteristics available, workers that were randomized out of participation are not significantly
different from workers who participated in the study.
As reported in more detail in Section 2.2 above, workers in the sample are exclusively
female and tend to be young, low-skill, rural-urban migrants with little to no previous work
experience. Table 2.2 presents a comparison of the study sample with household survey data
from women in the same age range in Addis Ababa (column 3), the wider population of
Addis Ababa (column 4) and Ethiopia (column 5) based on the 2015-16 ESS. The ESS is
representative for Addis Ababa and at the national level.31 Compared with women in the
same age range in Addis Ababa, workers in the study sample have less education (completed
6th grade versus completed 10th grade), fewer are married (19 percent versus 30 percent),
and slightly fewer identify as Ethiopian Orthodox (73 percent versus 77 percent).
In terms of living standards measured by consumption and asset ownership (Table 2.2,
panel b), the study sample is poorer than women in the same age range in Addis Ababa.
Workers in the sample spend 129.88 birr (US$ 4.72) per person per week on food consump-
tion, compared to 158.03 birr (US$ 5.74) for the average women in the same age range in
Addis Ababa and 149.39 birr (US$ 5.23) for the average person in Addis Ababa. For com-
parison, the local food poverty line in Addis Ababa is 109.66 birr (US$ 3.98) per person per
week.32 Workers in the study sample also live in households that are notably poorer in assets
as measured by a simple additive index. Appendix 2.B.4 provides details on household asset
data in my sample.
2.5.2 Correlations of Present Bias with Savings and Job Search
Results are presented in three subsections that follow the predictions derived from the the-
oretical framework in Section 2.3. Each subsection includes a range of robustness checks.
In a fourth subsection I discuss alternative explanations.33
31I use publicly available microdata from the World Bank’s Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS)
program (Central Statistical Agency and World Bank, 2017). While sampling methods and survey protocols
are inherently different from my survey, I aimed to harmonize concepts across survey instruments. The age
range of the study population and for column 6 of Table 2.2 is 18 to 31.
32For further comparison, total average consumption expenditures at the national level in the 2015-16 ESS
was 246.16 birr per person (US$ 8.94). Food consumption from the 2015-16 ESS is adjusted for inflation using
the national GDP deflator. Recall period in both survey instruments is seven days. The ESS food aggregate is
adjusted by adult equivalent household size. The poverty line is based on the official 2015/16 food poverty line
of 3,772 birr per adult equivalent per year, adjusted to current values using the GDP deflator and adjusted for
local prices using the spatial food price indices reported in National Planning Commission (2017).
33I filed a pre-analysis plan (PAP) with the AER RCT Registry (#AEARCTR-0002555) after piloting the
survey instrument and before any data was collected. The current chapter deviates from the PAP in several
ways. The PAP was build on the assumption of having daily attendance and productivity data. The firm could
unfortunately not provide in time for the analysis. The PAP excluded savings and focused on correlations of
present bias with job search effort and labor supply. The current chapter does not consider the administrative
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Table .: Baseline Summary Statistics and Comparison to National Household Survey










(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel (a) Personal background
Age 21.44 21.41 24.31 28.20 23.09
(0.226) (0.117) (0.333) (0.733) (0.217)
% female 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.56 0.47
- - - (0.013) (0.006)
Education (respondent) 8.16 8.17 10.30 6.52 2.33
(0.135) (0.243) (0.496) (0.298) (0.078)
% married 0.16 0.19 0.30 0.25 0.26
(0.028) (0.018) (0.033) (0.012) (0.003)
% Ethiopian Orthodox faith 0.73 0.77 0.55 0.30
(0.021) (0.050) (0.038) (0.016)
Panel (b) Living standards
Food consumption (past 7 days) 129.88 158.03 149.39 103.95
(6.885) (14.21) (11.701) (2.662)
Non-food consumption (past 7 days) 147.93
(9.997)
Asset index (household) 4.07 8.70 8.45 1.72
(0.145) (0.417) (0.353) (0.069)
Asset index (self ) 1.12
(0.077)
Savings (3 month recall) 384.09
(39.582)
Savings (would like per month) 603.01
(14.885)
Savings (will likely per month) 355.10
(8.729)
N 238 460 183 1,188 27,990
Population represented (using weights) 658,336 4,507,503 117,437,134
Notes: Column 1 presents administrative data from firm personnel records for the group of workers who were
randomized out of participation in the study. Columns 3 to 5 present data from the 2015-16 Ethiopian Socioe-
conomic Survey (ESS) collected as part of the World Bank’s Living Standards Measurement Survey program.
Column 3 refers to women aged 18 to 31, the age range of the study population. ESS data is weighted and
stratified using the provided survey weights. The ESS is representative for Addis Ababa and at the national
level. While data in all columns of the table is measured using the same concepts, comparisons between my
survey and the ESS should be seen as indicative due to different sampling methods and survey protocols. Food
consumption in ESS adjusted for inflation using the national GDP deflator. Recall period for consumption
expenditures is seven days both in my survey and in the ESS. The ESS food aggregate is adjusted by adult
equivalent household size, while the food aggregate in my survey is per capita. Comparison with non-food data
not shown because of differences in survey instrument. Asset index is an additive index of 13 ESS households
assets that best predict nominal total household consumption at the national level. Appendix Appendix 2.B.4
for details.
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Simple correlations between present bias and the outcome of interest may be biased if
present bias is correlated with omitted individual characteristics such as work experience, liq-
uidity, cognitive, and non-cognitive factors that may affect the outcome of interest. There-
fore I try to control for a wide range of individual differences. I include controls in four
groups, measured in the baseline interview when workers join the firm: Personal characteris-
tics and human capital, liquidity and access to finance, cognitive control, and non-cognitive
skills and stress.
Personal characteristics include respondent age, an indicator for respondent marital sta-
tus, an indicator for whether the respondent has children, an indicator of whether the re-
spondent is a rural-urban migrant, a set of indicators for the respondent’s mother tongue
and religion, an indicator for whether the respondent has a working spouse, and indicators
for the highest education level of the worker. Access to finance includes an indicator for
whether the respondent holds any savings at baseline and indicators for how difficult the
respondent would find it to take out a small loan to cover an emergency. Cognitive control
governs impulse control and affects how well individuals can formulate, maintain, and ex-
ecute plans and goals. I measure cognitive control with a fully-incentivized spatial Stroop
task that respondents complete on a tablet computer. Non-cognitive skills and stress are
measured with scores on three psychological scales: Generalized Self-Efficacy, Locus of
Control, and the Perceived Stress Scale.
Appendix 2.B provides details on the survey and explains the construction of these vari-
ables. Summary statistics on all variables used in the empirical analysis are presented in
Appendix Table 2.E2.
2.5.2.1 Present Bias and Savings
Prediction 1 states that asset accumulation is increasing in present bias parameter β. Hold-
ing everything else constant, present-biased workers should save less. We can use data from
the baseline CTB experiment and follow-up surveys for a reduced-form test of this predic-
tion.
Data on savings per week is a non-negative response variable with a continuous distri-
bution over strictly positive values and most observations at a corner of zero. To take this
into account, I model the participation decision and the quantity decision jointly in a latent
regression model, estimated using Tobit (Wooldridge, 2010). I pool observations from all
follow-up calls and include dummies for each panel wave. To ease interpretation of results,
I use a binary measure of present bias, which takes the value 1 if β̂i < 1 and 0 otherwise.
The estimation problem can be written as




′Xi + ϵi,t (2.9)
where for each subject i in period t, Yi,t is the amount of money saved over a seven-day
period, 1{β̂i<1} is an indicator for whether subjects are present-biased in the baseline CTB
experiment, δ̂ is the discounting parameter from the baseline CTB experiment, 1{t=0,..,8}
data but instead includes self-reported savings in the analysis. The full administrative data is analyzed in a
companion paper (Hardy et al., 2018).
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are indicators for each survey wave, Xi is a vector of respondent observable characteristics
and indicators for the enumerator who administered the survey, and ϵ is the error term
clustered at the individual level.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.3 present maximum likelihood estimates of Equation (2.9)
with and without controlling for the full set of baseline covariates. I report coefficient esti-
mates, which in the Tobit model give the marginal effect of each independent variable on
the expected value of the latent variable.
Table .: Savings, Temptation Goods Expenditures, and Present Bias (Regression Coef-
ficient Estimates and Robust Standard Errors)
Savings Tempt. goods exp.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit
Baseline β̂i < 1 -86.20 -25.91 13.85 0.670
(58.089) (41.836) (15.158) (16.063)
Baseline δ̂i 445.7 84.99 -30.72 -39.16
(342.470) (212.468) (89.965) (101.663)
Survey wave dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Enumerator dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Personal characteristics No Yes No Yes
Baseline liquidity No Yes No Yes
Cognitive control No Yes No Yes
Non-cognitive ability and stress No Yes No Yes
N 1901 1832 2102 2028
Notes: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at individual
level. Time preference parameters trimmed at 5th and 95th percentile. Controls for personal characteristics are
age, marital status, religion, mother tongue, education, number of children, whether or not respondent moved
from a rural area, whether respondent has a working spouse. Controls for baseline liquidity are amount of
savings held when starting employment and easy of obtaining credit assessed on a 4 point Likert scale. Control
for cognitive control is the final score achieved in the baseline Stroop task. Controls for non-cognitive control
and stress are baseline score on theGeneral Self-Efficacy scale, baseline locus of control index, and baseline score
on the Perceived Stress Scale (PSS-4). Appendix 2.B provides details on survey protocols and the measurement
of control variables. Appendix Figure 2.D4 plots average marginal effects of the present bias indicator in column
(2) and (4).
Baseline present-bias appears to reduce savings in line with the theoretical prediction,
though the effects are small and not statistically significant at any conventional level. This
is true irrespective of whether or not I control for the full set of baseline characteristics. To
assess the economic significance of the coefficient one can calculate the average marginal
effect of present bias on the expected value of savings. Holding all else constant and using
coefficient estimates from column (2) that includes the full set of baseline covariates, present-
biased individuals save about 7.7 percent less per week than time-consistent individuals. The
predicted savings per week of present-biased individuals is 83.58 birr (US$2.93) compared
to 90.57 birr (US$ 3.26) for time-consistent individuals, an insignificant difference of 6.99
birr, χ2(1, N = 1, 832) = 0.39, p = 0.533. Panel (a) of Appendix Figure 2.D4 illustrates.
While the theoretical prediction only speaks to the causal link between present bias
and savings, it is instructive to also consider consumption expenditure. In particular I con-
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sider the amount of consumption expenditures devoted to what Banerjee and Mullainathan
(2010) call “temptation goods,” that is goods that yield utility in the present as opposed to
the future. The surveys collect consumption expenditure data on various categories of goods:
food, alcoholic beverages, phone credit, transportation, clothing and shoes, soaps, cosmet-
ics and beauty products, and gifts and donations. I categorize alcoholic beverages, clothing
and shoes, and cosmetics and beauty products as temptation goods and use the sum as an
alternative dependent variable of Equation (2.9).34
Table 2.3 columns 3 and 4 present Tobit coefficient estimates. After controlling for
baseline covariates, I find no relationship between baseline present-bias and spending on
temptation goods. Using the average marginal effect of present bias on the unconditional
expected value of temptation good spending, I find an insignificant difference of 0.4 birr
per week, χ2(1, N = 2, 028) = 0.00, p = 0.967. Panel (b) of Appendix Figure 2.D4
illustrates.
Results remain qualitatively unchanged under a range of different specifications. First, I
replicate the analysis above using β̂i as continuous variable instead of an indicator of present
bias. Appendix Table 2.E3 and Table 2.E4 provide coefficient estimates for savings and
temptation goods spending, respectively. Second, I consider only the extensive margin,
i.e. the decision to accumulate any savings or spend any money on temptation goods in
any given week. I estimate Equation (2.9) using a probit model; Appendix Table 2.E5
presents estimated average marginal effects. The direction of effects remains unchanged
and estimates remain statistically insignificant at any conventional level.
Present Bias and Search
Prediction 2 states that search effort is increasing in present bias parameter β. Holding ev-
erything else constant, present-biased workers should search for work less intensively. For
a reduced form test of this prediction I use data from the baseline CTB experiment and my
follow-up surveys. Over the whole panel of 3,041 observations, individuals report looking
for work in 520 periods (390 on the job search, 130 job search while unemployed). For those
520 observations, I have detailed data on job search effort in three dimensions: Hours spent
looking for work, phone calls made in order to look for work, and a subjective assessment
of search intensity on a three-point scale (“not very intensively”; “intensively”; “very inten-
sively”).35 Like for all high-frequency data in my panel, the recall period for these three
measures is seven days.
Like savings data, data on job search intensity comes in the form of non-negative re-
sponse variables with continuous distributions over strictly positive values and most obser-
vations at a corner of zero. To take this into account, I model the participation decision
and the quantity decision jointly in a latent regression model, estimated using Tobit. I pool
observations from all follow-up calls and include dummies for each panel wave. To ease
interpretation of results, I use a binary measure of present bias, which takes the value 1 if
β̂i < 1 and 0 otherwise.
34This result remains qualitatively unchanged when using the share of total consumption expenditures de-
voted to this group of goods (not shown).




The estimation problem can be written as




′Xi + ϵi,t (2.10)
where for each subject i in period t, Y is measured job search effort, 1{β̂i<1} is an indicator
for whether subjects are present-biased in the baseline CTB experiment, δ̂ is the discounting
parameter from the baselineCTB experiment, 1{t=0,..,8} are indicators for each survey wave,
Xi is a vector of respondent observable characteristics and indicators for the enumerator who
administered the survey, and ϵ is the error term clustered at the individual level. Table 2.4
presents maximum likelihood estimates of Equation (2.10) with and without controlling for
the full set of baseline covariates. As before, I report Tobit coefficient estimates.
Table .: Job Search Effort and Present Bias (Regression Coefficient Estimates and Ro-
bust Standard Errors)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Calls Calls Hours Hours Subjective Subjective
Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit
Baseline β̂i < 1 -2.287∗∗ -2.963∗∗∗ -4.479∗∗ -6.130∗∗∗ -0.0149 -0.0224
(1.016) (0.950) (1.965) (1.894) (0.148) (0.143)
Baseline δ̂i 12.22∗∗ 12.41∗∗∗ 22.12∗∗ 22.28∗∗∗ 0.685 0.401
(5.067) (4.216) (9.621) (8.593) (0.768) (0.675)
Survey wave dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Enumerator dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Personal characteristics No Yes No Yes No Yes
Baseline liquidity No Yes No Yes No Yes
Cognitive ability No Yes No Yes No Yes
Non-cognitive ability and stress No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 2008 1939 2008 1939 325 320
Log likelihood -1263 -1166 -1555 -1467 -361 -327
Notes: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at individual
level. Time preference parameters trimmed at 5th and 95th percentile. Controls for personal characteristics are
age, marital status, religion, mother tongue, education, number of children, whether or not respondent moved
from a rural area, whether respondent has a working spouse. Controls for baseline liquidity are amount of
savings held when starting employment and easy of obtaining credit assessed on a 4 point Likert scale. Control
for cognitive control is the final score achieved in the baseline Stroop task. Controls for non-cognitive control
and stress are baseline score on theGeneral Self-Efficacy scale, baseline locus of control index, and baseline score
on the Perceived Stress Scale (PSS-4). Appendix 2.B provides details on survey protocols and the measurement
of control variables. Figure 2.D5 plots average marginal effects of the present bias indicator in column (2), (4),
and (6).
I find that baseline estimates of present bias (as well as individual discounting) are sta-
tistically and economically significant predictors of subsequent job search behavior. In line
with prediction 1, present-biased individuals spend significantly fewer hours looking for
work and make significantly fewer phone calls. While the sign on the subjective assessment
of search intensity is also in line with the prediction, I cannot reject a null effect at any
conventional level of significance.
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To assess the magnitude of the coefficients I calculate the average marginal effects
(average partial effects) of present bias on the expected value of the observed outcome.36
All else constant, present-biased individuals make on average 0.32 calls per week while
time-consistent individuals make 0.68 calls per week, a significant difference of 0.36 calls,
χ2(1, N = 1, 939) = 9.87, p = 0.0017. Present-biased individuals spend on average
37.2 minutes on search, compared to 84.6 minutes for time-consistent individuals, a sig-
nificant difference of 47.4 minutes, χ2(1, N = 1, 939) = 10.51, p = 0.0012. Finally,
present-biased individuals report a subjective intensity of search of 1.62 on a three-point
scale from 1 (“not very intensively”) to 3 (“very intensively”), while time-consistent individ-
uals report an intensity of 1.6, an insignificant difference of 0.02, χ2(1, N = 320) = 0.02,
p = 0.8757.37 Appendix Figure 2.D5 illustrates the average marginal effects for all three
outcome variables.
Results are robust to different specifications. First, I replicate the analysis with β̂i as
continuous variable instead of an indicator of present bias. Results remain qualitatively
unchanged (Appendix Table 2.E6). β̂i remains a significant predictor of search intensity
measured in the number of calls and the time spent per week, though I am marginally less
powered to detect effects. The results also hold on the extensive margin. Second, I consider
only the extensive margin and abstract from search intensity. I estimate Equation (2.10) us-
ing a probit model for the decision to look for week in any given week. Appendix Table 2.E7
presents results. All else constant, present-biased individuals have a 11.86 percent predicted
probability of looking for work, while time-consistent individuals a 20.66 percent predicted
probability, a significant difference of 8.8 percentage points, χ2(1, N = 1, 919) = 8.84,
p = 0.0029.
Even though the theoretical framework is silent on the outcomes of job search, it is
instructive to assess empirically whether the negative correlation between present bias and
search effort also holds for the relationship between present bias and search outcomes. I
focus on two outcome measures from my panel data: The number of offers generated by
individuals who search and an indicator for voluntary departures from the firm.38 The esti-
mation problem can be written as





′Xi + ϵi,t (2.11)
36For each observation, I calculate the difference in expected values at both values of the present-bias in-
dicator while keeping all other covariates unchanged. The average difference over all observations gives the
average marginal effect. Wooldridge (2010) provides an exposition of how to estimate average marginal effects
of binary variables in a Tobit model.
37Alternatively, one can calculate the average marginal effect of present bias conditional on individuals
searching for work: Present-biased individuals who search make 3.04 calls while time-consistent individuals
who search make 3.54 calls, a significant difference of 0.5 calls, χ2(1, N = 1, 939) = 10.15, p = 0.0014.
Similarly, present-biased individuals who search spend 338.4 minutes per week, compared to 402.6 minutes
for time-consistent individuals, a significant difference of 64.2 minutes per week, χ2(1, N = 1, 939) = 10.89,
p = 0.001.
38While the survey also asked for wages of job offers generated through search, respondents only reported
wages for 65 offers.
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where for each subject i in period t, Y is one of two search outcomes, 1{β̂i<1} is an indicator
for whether subjects are present-biased (with β̂ < 1) in the baseline CTB experiment, δ̂ is
the discounting parameter from the baseline CTB experiment, Ci,t is the number of calls
made in search of a job in the same period,Hi,t is the number of hours spent on job search
in the same period, Ii,t and IIi,t are indicators for (very) high job search intensity in the
same period based on a subjective assessment, 1{t=0,..,8} are indicators for each survey wave,
Xi is a vector of baseline controls, and ϵ is the error term clustered at the individual level. I
estimate Equation (2.11) separately for each of two outcome measures. When the outcome
variable is the number of offers generated in the same period, I use a Poisson regression.
When the outcome variable is an indicator for a voluntary departure in the same period, I
use a probit model. Appendix Table 2.E8 presents maximum likelihood estimates with the
same set of controls as in Table 2.4. For the probit model I report average marginal effects.
For the poisson model I report incidence-rate ratio estimates.
Two results are worth highlighting. First, baseline present bias is associated with fewer
job offers generated. This relationship, however, only significant when controlling for job
search effort in the same period. Second, present-biased subjects are significantly more
likely to depart from the firm voluntarily. This relationship holds when controlling for
contemporaneous job search effort.
Present Bias and Turnover
Prediction 3 states that the survival rate at the firm is decreasing in present bias β. In the
theoretical framework, this is because the probability of leaving the firm depends on the
probability of receiving an alternative wage offer, and thus directly on search effort. Given
that present bias undermines search, present-biased individuals should exhibit a higher rate
of survival at the firm.
As a first step, I graphically assess exit rates from the firm. I estimate separate Kaplan-
Meier survival functions for present-biased workers with β̂ < 1 and time-consistent workers
with β̂ ≥ 1 (Figure 2.4). Visual inspection of the survival estimates suggests that present-
biased workers have a higher rate of survival at the firm in line with prediction 3.
For a more rigorous test that controls for other covariates, I use the Cox (1972) partial
likelihood method for the proportional hazard model. Consider the hazard that worker i
leaves the firm after t days of work as
hi,t =h0(t) exp
(




where h0(t) is the baseline hazard, 1{β̂i<1} is an indicator for whether subjects are present-
biased (with β̂ < 1) in the baseline CTB experiment, δ̂ is the discounting parameter from
the baseline CTB experiment, Ci,t is the number of calls made in search of a job in the
same period, Hi,t is the number of hours spent on job search in the same period, and Xi is
a vector of baseline controls. I do not include subjective assessments of job search intensity
due to the small number of observations. The main focus of the analysis is parameter γ1,
which measures the correlation of baseline present bias with the hazard of leaving the firm
after t days.
Table 2.5 presents maximum likelihood estimates of the exponentiated coefficients (haz-
ard ratios) from Equation (2.12). Columns 1 and 2 only include time preference parameters
35
. In Search of a Better Life: Self-Control in the Ethiopian Labor Market

























0 20 40 60 80 100
Days since joining study firm
β < 1
β >= 1
Notes: Shaded area shows 90 percent pointwise confidence band.
with and without the same set of controls as above, columns 3 and 4 examine the role of sav-
ings and job search in isolation. Columns 5 and 6 combine time preferences and job search
effort. My preferred specification for a reduced-form test of prediction 3 is presented in
column 2.
In line with the theoretical prediction, present-biased individuals have a lower hazard
of leaving the firm. The result is statistically significant and economically large. All else
equal, the risk of leaving the firm is 52.3 percent as high for present-biased individuals as
it is for individuals who are not present-biased. If this effect operates through search effort,
as it does in the theoretical framework, we would expect increased search effort to lead to a
higher hazard of leaving the firm. We would also expect that the effect of present bias on the
hazard of leaving should be less pronounced when controlling for search effort. Both appear
to be the case. Search effort measured in hours and in the number of phone calls indeed
significantly increases the hazard of leaving the firm (column 4). One more phone call per
week increases the hazard of leaving the firm by 20.1 percent. When including both time
preferences and search effort, the coefficient on baseline present bias becomes insignificant.
2.5.3 Alternative Explanations
The analysis above already included a number of robustness checks and showed that results
are robust to the inclusion of a broad range of observable characteristics. In this section, I
discuss alternative explanations.
2.5.3.1 Do Individual Characteristics, Liquidity, and Environmental Factors Explain
Experimental Responses?
A focus of this study was to elicit time preferences in a tightly-controlled experiment that
eliminates confounders commonly found in the literature (see discussion in Section 2.4.2).
Nevertheless, the correlations presented above may be biased if experimental responses are
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Table .: Hazard of Leaving the Firm (Cox Hazard Ratios and Robust Standard Errors)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Baseline β̂i < 1 0.554∗∗ 0.516∗∗∗ 0.815 0.741
(0.129) (0.124) (0.228) (0.236)
Baseline δ̂i 18.162∗∗∗ 9.907∗∗ 3.743 2.104
(18.353) (11.485) (4.592) (3.195)
Search effort, last 7 days (hours) 1.060∗∗∗ 1.078∗∗∗ 1.076∗∗∗ 1.105∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.018) (0.009) (0.016)
Search effort, last 7 days (# calls) 1.191∗∗∗ 1.206∗∗∗ 1.183∗∗∗ 1.182∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.041) (0.026) (0.043)
Enumerator dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Personal characteristics No Yes No Yes No Yes
Baseline liquidity No Yes No Yes No Yes
Cognitive ability No Yes No Yes No Yes
Non-cognitive ability and stress No Yes No Yes No No
N 1830 1767 2267 2195 1792 1732
Notes: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Table shows exponentiated coefficients. Robust standard errors
in parentheses, clustered at individual level. Time preference parameters trimmed at 5th and 95th percentile.
Subjective assessments of job search effort are not included as independent variable due to the small number of
observations. Controls for personal characteristics are age, marital status, religion, mother tongue, education,
number of children, whether or not respondent moved from a rural area, whether respondent has a working
spouse. Controls for baseline liquidity are amount of savings held when starting employment and easy of
obtaining credit assessed on a 4 point Likert scale. Control for cognitive control is the final score achieved
in the baseline Stroop task. Controls for non-cognitive control and stress are baseline score on the General
Self-Efficacy scale, baseline locus of control index, and baseline score on the Perceived Stress Scale (PSS-4).
Appendix 2.B provides details on survey protocols and the measurement of control variables.
systematically driven by personal characteristics, liquidity,39 or environmental factors out-
side the experiment. To assess if this is the case, I regress an indicator for estimated present
bias (β̂i < 1) and the estimated present bias parameter β̂i on a range of observable charac-
teristics.
Appendix Table 2.E9 presents regression coefficient estimates from probit and ordinary
least squares (OLS) regressions. I find that estimates of present bias are not significantly
predicted by most personal observable characteristics. Importantly, neither human capital
measured by previous work experience and education, nor access to finance predict estimated
present bias.40
39Cassidy (2018) uses the MPL approach to show that present bias elicited from poor subjects may in fact
represent a rational, time-consistent response to liquidity constraints.
40Two additional empirical findings are worth highlighting. First, respondent age is negatively correlated
with the estimated present bias parameter β̂, but not a significant predictor of an indicator of present bias. This
stands in contrast to Meier and Sprenger (2010), who find that age is a negative predictor of a present bias
indicator. Second, higher cognitive control as measured by the spatial Stroop-like task is a significant positive
predictor of the estimated present bias parameter β̂. This is consistent with findings in a recent literature that has
investigated the link between cognitive control, or bandwidth more generally, and time preferences (Haushofer
& Fehr, 2014; Mani, Mullainathan, Shafir, & Zhao, 2013; Schilbach, Schofield, & Mullainathan, 2016).
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In addition to the correlations presented here, I can use randomized experimental pay-
outs from the baseline experiment to assess whether liquidity drive time preference estimates
from the endline experiment three months later. Recall that in the CTB experiment, in-
dividuals have a 50 percent chance of winning their payouts, determined with a coin flip
at the end of the experiment. At 20 to 40 percent of the monthly wage, experimental pay-
offs represent a large cash drop that provides exogenous variation to liquidity. I regress an
indicator for estimated endline present bias (β̂i < 1) and the estimated endline present
bias parameter β̂i on an indicator of whether respondents won their experimental payout at
baseline and a range of observable characteristics.
I do not find evidence that experimental responses at endline change as a result of win-
ning the sizable experimental payout at baseline. Appendix Table 2.E10 presents regression
coefficient estimates from probit and OLS regressions. While the results indicate that liq-
uidity do not appear to have affected endline present bias, individual liquidity three months
after the beginning of the study is likely different than at the beginning of the study.
2.5.3.2 Does Liquidity Explain Search Effort?
In the previous subsection, I provided evidence that individual liquidity does not appear to
explain experimental responses. In this subsection, I assess whether financial wealth and
liquidity affects search effort.
While my theoretical framework holds initial wealth constant, the effect of liquid sav-
ings on search effort is theoretically ambiguous. Lentz and Tranæs (2005) show analytically
and with simulations that job search effort is negatively related to initial wealth under the
assumption of additively separable utility. This negative relationship is consistent with em-
pirical results in which unemployment spells are positively correlated with initial wealth
holdings, e.g. in Algan et al. (2003) and Bloemen and Stancanelli (2001). In my con-
text, however, it is also possible to imagine that liquidity-constrained individuals are not
able engage in costly search. If liquidity-constrained subjects were to appear more present-
biased, as in Cassidy (2018) but in contrast to the evidence presented above, and if liquidity-
constrained subjects also searched less, this would explain the correlational patterns that I
find above.
I can assess the link between liquidity and search using randomized experimental pay-
outs from the baseline CTB experiment. I do so in two steps. I first show that subjects who
won the experimental payouts and those who did not appear balanced on observable char-
acteristics (Appendix Table 2.E11). There is no significant difference between both groups,
except that slightly more participants who are native Oromiffa speakers won the coin flip.
In a second step, I use the same latent regression model as in Equation (2.10) to study
the correlation of present bias and search effort, but add an indicator for whether the subject
won or lost the coin flip. Given that participants appear balanced on observables, I interpret
the coefficient estimate for this indicator as the causal effect of experimental payouts on
search. Appendix Table 2.E12 presents maximum likelihood estimates of Equation (2.10)
with and without controlling for the full set of baseline covariates. As before, I report Tobit
coefficient estimates.
Two findings are worth highlighting. First, winning the experimental payouts causes
significantly less search. Second, the significant negative correlation between measured
present bias and search effort holds up. The results are consistent with a negative relationship
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between liquidity and search effort. Subjects withmore liquidity search less. Taken together,
this suggests that liquidity constraints are unlikely to explain my results above.
2.5.3.3 Does Human Capital Explain Search Effort?
Individuals tend to choose job search effort in response to economic incentives. In particular,
job search effort has been found to increase in the expected returns to search (Christensen,
Lentz, Mortensen, Neumann, & Werwatz, 2005). As a result, one would expect that work-
ers with higher earnings potential, i.e. larger human capital, are more likely to search or
search more intensively. While I already showed that proxies of human capital do not ap-
pear to predict measured present bias, it is worth investigating more explicitly if measures
of human capital are positively correlated with search effort.
I run a Tobit regression of job search effort (measured in number of calls and time
spent on search) on respondent age, an indicator for whether the individual has any formal
work experience, a set of indicators for the highest education level completed, and measures
of cognitive control and non-cognitive skills.41 Appendix Table 2.E13 provides regression
coefficient estimates. Age, which I control for in all results above, is the only significant pre-
dictor of search effort. Without controlling for cognitive control and non-cognitive skills,
education is a significant predictor of job search only for those individuals who have com-
pleted more than grade 10 schooling.
2.5.3.4 The Role of Reservation Wages
My theoretical and empirical analysis so far has abstracted from workers’ reservation wage
choices. In the model of DellaVigna and Paserman (2005), individuals with a higher (expo-
nential) discount factor set a higher reservation wage while present bias should essentially
be orthogonal to the reservation wage. My data allows for a reduced-form test of this pre-
diction. At each round of the panel, I record self-reported reservation wages using a similar
question to the one used by Krueger and Mueller (2016) and in the May 1976 US Current
Population Survey.42
Appendix Table 2.E14 reports coefficient estimates from an OLS regression of log self-
reported reservation wage on baseline time preference parameters and the same set of con-
trols as before. Neither present bias nor the estimated discount parameter are significant
predictors of reservation wages. The findings are in line with the empirical results of DellaV-
igna and Paserman (2005) and Krueger and Mueller (2016), who do not find evidence that
time preferences affect the choice of the reservation wage. This indicates that the reservation
wage choice is unlikely to play a large role in the context of this study.
41Abebe et al. (2016) report that young job seekers in Addis Ababa may find it hard to signal their skills
and, as a result, firms often use criteria such as whether workers have any previous work experience.
42The question text, translated from Amharic, was: “Suppose someone offered you a job today. What is the
lowest monthly pay after taxes that you would accept for the type of work you were looking for?” The question
in the 1976 CPS was: “What is the lowest wage or salary you would accept (before deductions) for this type of
work?.”
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2.5.3.5 Reliability of Self-Reported Data on Search Intensity
The analysis above hinges on self-reported data on job search effort. The little existing work
that analyzes high-frequency data on job search behavior either uses self-reported survey
data similar to mine (Faberman, Mueller, Şahin, & Topa, 2017; Krueger & Mueller, 2016),
observational data under highly controlled conditions (Belot, Kircher, & Muller, 2018) or
administrative data from online job boards (Faberman & Kudlyak, 2018). In the setting
of my study, self-reported data is the only feasible option. It is worth asking if this data is
reliable.
First, it is important to note that if questions on job search intensity are affected by
experimenter demand or Hawthorne effects, these effects would only confound my results
if they are systematically correlated with results from the experimental elicitation of time
preferences. Experimenter demand effects occur when respondents systematically alter their
answers based on what they believe constitutes desirable or appropriate behavior (Zizzo,
2010). Neither the individuals participating in the experiment nor the team that implements
the survey is aware of the research questions. All throughout the experiment, I take care to
not provide cues to the respondents. Overall, it is not obvious why individuals categorized
as present-biased would report systematically lower job search intensity.
Second, because individuals likely find it difficult to exactly quantify how much they
look for work in a given week, I use three different measures of intensity (Cronbach’s α
= 0.733). I show results separately for each dimension. Results also hold when using an
aggregate measure of all three dimensions generated from factor analysis where I retain the
first factor.43 While all threemeasures likely suffer frommeasurement error, it is improbable
that this measurement error is systematically correlated with results from the experimental
elicitation of time preferences.
Third, the results on turnover do not require self-reported data on search. Firm person-
nel records indicate that workers truthfully report tenure. It is not clear how the results on
tenure could be rationalized in the absence of a search channel.
Taken together, it appears unlikely that systematic biases in search intensity data are a
significant driver of the results presented above.
2.6 Conclusion
Policymakers in Ethiopia and other low-income countries have promoted labor-intensive
light manufacturing as an opportunity to generate a large number of formal employment
opportunities. For the low-skill rural-urban migrants in this study, industrial work repre-
sents a stepping stone into the formal labor market of Addis Ababa. My results suggest
that self-control problems in the form of present bias significantly undermine the ability of
workers to use these jobs as such a stepping stone.
I show that present bias is a significant predictor of reduced job search effort over a
period of three months after starting a low-skill industrial job in peri-urban Addis Ababa.
Present-biased workers search less and – as a result – generate fewer alternative job offers,
and stay at the firm significantly longer. My results offer the first experimental evidence of
43Not shown, results available upon request.
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a theorized link between present bias and job search effort. I do not find evidence for a link
between present bias and reduced savings.
An immediate implication of my findings is that individuals looking for work might
benefit from policies or devices that commit their future selves to more search. Whether
and under what conditions such a commitment device can be welfare-improving depends on
the exact welfare criterion, which is not obvious to define when we observe two individual
choices that are in conflict with each other. It is particularly difficult in the context of this
study, where individuals likely have imperfect information about their own future efficiency
in searching for work. It is easy to imagine how individuals could under-estimate how
physically and mentally demanding their new job will be and thus over-estimate how easy
it will be for them to set aside time to search for alternatives.44
What could a potential commitment device for job search look like? For a discussion,
it is useful to consider the difference between hard commitment devices, which involve real
economic costs, and soft commitment devices, which mainly work through psychological
costs (Bryan et al., 2010). Search effort is hard to monitor directly in the study context, so it
is difficult to imagine how the market could provide a hard commitment device that directly
contracts on workers’ search effort or search outcomes. Through focus group interviews with
workers in my sample, I identified three feasible alternatives.45
A first option would be a soft commitment device in the form of a personal plan for
job search. With such a plan, workers could formalize intentions for search and possibly
set individual rules for how much to search, when to search, and how to search. This plan
could be implemented through a small notebook that workers can carry. This type of soft
commitment device builds on a recent literature in economics and psychology, which has
found that prompting people to form concrete implementation plans can increase follow-
through (Beshears, Milkman, & Schwartzstein, 2016; Milkman, Beshears, Choi, Laibson,
& Madrian, 2011).46 Abel, Burger, Carranza, and Piraino (2017) show that prompting
unemployed South African job seekers to make a plan increases the number of applications
and diversified search strategies. Because the plan is unenforced, it avoids the challenge of
monitoring search effort. Three months after starting their job, 96 percent of individuals in
my sample indicated that they would be interested in such a planning device. 74 percent
indicated a positive willingness to pay in an unincentivized question.47
A second alternative would be a soft and informal commitment device that operates
through social pressure in small groups of women. Individuals indicated that beyond social
pressure, they would benefit from exchanging knowledge about search in smaller groups.
In the context of savings, Kast, Meier, and Pomeranz (2018) test the impact of peer groups
with publicly-announced goals and peer monitoring on individual savings. They find large
effects on the number of deposits and the savings balance of individuals. 95 percent of
44A related design challenge derives from the balance between flexibility and commitment (Amador, Wern-
ing, & Angeletos, 2006). For example, an individual taking up a commitment savings plan could demand
a provision to withdraw from the contract in case of a medical emergency. The conditions for flexibility are
difficult to specify in the context of this study.
45Detailed notes are available upon request.
46See Bénabou and Tirole (2004) for a theoretical perspective from economics on how unenforced personal
plans can serve as a commitment device.
47In a companion paper, we implemented a plan that aimed at increasing worker savings, not search. We
provide a full evaluation in Hardy et al. (2018).
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individuals in my sample indicated their interest in such groups, 69 percent indicated a
positive (unincentivized) willingness to pay.
A third option would be a hard and formal commitment device that operates through
advance payments to a job broker. 9 percent of workers currently rely on job brokers to assist
with search. A formal commitment device could involve an upfront payment to a broker or
a fixed fraction of the monthly wage to be paid to job broker. 58 percent of individuals in
my sample indicated their interest in such an arrangement.
Overall, my results suggest several avenues for future work. First, future research could
use exogenous variation to establish a causal link between present-biased preferences and
job search effort. A field experiment that tests potential commitment devices for job search,
building on the list above, is a natural starting point. This will require addressing diffi-
cult questions around welfare implications. Second, the study of commitment prompts the
question of whether workers are aware of their self-control problems or not. The empirical
analysis above did not consider to what extent workers are aware of their own self-control
problems. Third, the null result on savings behavior merits further analysis.
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2.A Appendix: Theoretical Framework
2.A.1 Functional Form Specification
To simulate the model from Section 2.3, I make additional functional form assumptions
in line with the previous literature. As in Paserman (2008) and DellaVigna et al. (2017) I
use search costs of the form k(s) = ψs1+γ/(1 + γ) with γ > 0, where γ determines the
convexity of the cost function and ψ is a scaling parameter.48 ψ is equivalent to the cost of
obtaining the outside option job with probability one. I set the curvature parameter of the
search cost function γ = 0.4, taken from Paserman (2008).
I assume that workers exhibit CRRA and derive utility from consumption in the form
of u(ct) = log(ct).
I use survey data from my experiment to calibrate the remaining parameters of the
model. Income at t = 0 before joining the safety net firm is set equal to the median cash
income of 458 birr (US$16.61).49 Wages at the safety net firm then follow the wage regime
of the firm in my experiment: Workers receive 1,000 birr (US$ 36.30) in the first month,
1,075 birr (US$ 39.02) in the second month, and 1,150 birr (US$ 36.30) in all months after
that. The income of workers who leave the firm after 12 months drops back the the pre-
employment level of 458 birr. The outside option wage w̃ is set to equal to 1,835 birr (US$
66.61), the median wage offer generated by workers after joining the experimental firm.
One period in my simulation represents 15 days. The discount factor δ is based on
aggregate estimates from a CTB experiment with workers in my sample, conducted on
the day before they start their job. My preferred estimate for discounting over 15 days is
δ̂ = 0.92 (SE 0.008). Assets pay a 15-day return of 0.003 based on the Ethiopian deposit
interest rate of 7 percent per year.
48As noted by DellaVigna et al. (2017), γ is equal to the elasticity of search effort with respect to the net
value of employment. To see this denote
[
V Ot+1(At+1)− V Ft+1(At+1)
]
= Φ. Using the first order condition
with respect to search effort (2.4), rewrite c′(s∗) = Φ. Plugging in the cost function above, we obtain s∗ =
(Φ/ψ)1/γ .
49The median wage income over the four weeks before joining the firm is 0 birr. 458 birr is the total cash
income including transfers from family members and friends.
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2.A.2 Additional Simulation Results
Figure .A: Optimal Path of Search and Assets (Panels a and b) and Implied Consump-
tion and Survival (Panels c and d)
























































































Notes: Assuming exponential discounting (β = 1). Other parameters are set as described in the text.
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Figure .A: How Discounting and Present Bias Affect Job Search, Asset Accumulation,
















































































Notes: Simulation results for the “finite” case in which workers know that they will leave the safety net firm after
one year, which is equivalent to the median expected tenure in my survey data. Panels (a) and (b) represent the
sum of search effort and assets over all simulated periods. Parameter values as given in text.
Figure .A: How Search Cost Affects Search Effort and Asset Accumulation (Simulation
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Notes: Sum of search effort and assets over all simulated periods. Based on simulations allowing for heterogene-
ity in job search costs and assuming finite tenure at the firm of one year.
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Randomization is done using a combination of Excel spreadsheets in the survey office, ad-
hoc randomization by the survey software, and a coin flip by the respondent.
Sample selection: Every evening, the field coordinator receives a list with names and
contact information of the workers that were hired on that day and that are scheduled to
return on the next day to begin employment. This list is entered into an Excel spreadsheet
and shuffled in random order using the built-in random number generator. The random
order defines whether respondents are approached for an interview at the factory, an inter-
view at home, or are part of a control group that is not interviewed. The randomized list is
distributed to all enumerators via email and hard copy. In one case the enumerator did not
comply with the survey assignment and the observation was dropped.
Survey and time preference order: The questionnaire modules were administered in the
same order to reduce complexity for the enumerator. The three sets of the CTB experiment
are presented in random order based on a random number generated by the survey software.
Incentives from time preference elicitation: Subjects have a 50 percent chance of re-
ceiving one out of the 15 CTB allocations that they make. Whether or not respondents
win is determined using a coin flip at the end of the experiment. The coin is thrown by the
respondent under supervision of the enumerator. This was done to maximize transparency
for respondents. If respondents win the coin flip, they are asked to make a draw from
a bowl with folded cards numbered 1 to 15 that represent the choices of the experiment.
Enumerators then enter the drawn number into the survey software.
2.B.1.2 Survey Protocols
Each respondent is randomly assigned to one of 15 enumerators, all but three of which
female. Randomization to enumerators is done using the document described in the previ-
ous section. All enumerators have several years of work experience in data collection with
the Ethiopian Development Research Institute (EDRI) or the Ethiopian Central Statis-
tics Agency (CSA). The survey field coordinator and I conducted six days of study-specific
training with all enumerators. In addition, all enumerators conduct training interviews with
real respondents for one week. This data is discarded and enumerators are brought back for
another day of training and feedback. Care is taken to minimize observer bias and enumera-
tors do not know the specific hypotheses being tested. Training materials are available from
the author upon request.
Each respondent is paired with the same enumerator throughout the study to maximize
trust and reduce attrition. Informed consent, all interviews, and the time preference elicita-
tion are administered in Amharic or Oromiffa, the most commonly spoken local languages.
67 percent of respondents in the sample report Amharic as their mother tongue, another
20 percent report Oromiffa as their first language. All workers at the firm are required to
speak Amharic, but 4.8 percent of the sample still prefer to conduct interviews in Oromiffa.
Enumerators are trained in both and are instructed to refuse consent if workers are not
comfortable in either of the two languages.
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All survey questions were carefully translated from English to Amharic. Where avail-
able, the translation was compared to official translations of survey instruments by the CSA.
The survey team discussed each question in English and Amharic as a group to make sure
that the meaning is correctly translated and understood by all team members. In addition,
an Amharic native speaker who was not involved in the study reviewed the translations.
Data for the baseline survey, time preference elicitation, treatments, high-frequency
phone survey, and endline survey is collected using CAPI with Android tablets running
Open Data Kit / SurveyCTO. The interview GPS location and a randomly-selected 10-
second audio segment of each interview are recorded for auditing purposes.
The data presented in this chapter was collected from March 27 to September 28, 2018.
In-person interviews are conducted seven days a week, Monday through Saturday at the firm
and on Sunday in the homes of respondents. On average, the team of enumerators conducts
7 baseline interviews per day and 29 per week. Phone interviews are conducted every day,
mostly in the evening when workers have returned from work. On average, enumerators
conduct 108 phone interviews per week.
2.B.1.3 Ensuring Confidentiality
Workers may fear retaliation by the firm for example if they report that they are not planning
to stay for long or that they dislike the working conditions. They may also feel the need
to respond in a way that is socially or otherwise desirable. In addition to addressing these
concerns during the informed consent procedures, I take a number of precautions to alleviate
these concerns and maximize respondent privacy.
First, I select a random subset of workers to be interviewed at home instead of at the
factory. These interviews follow the exact same protocol as the interviews in the factory,
but they happen on Sundays in the privacy of the respondent’s home or a safe space in the
community. If workers systematically conceal the truth in work-related questions during
interviews at the factory, interviews at home should give me a sense of the size and sign of
the bias. Similarly, if workers interviewed at home systematically conceal the truth in per-
sonal questions (for example about intra-household allocation decisions or gender norms),
interviews at the factory should help me assess the bias.
Second, the physical interview location is chosen to maximize privacy. In the factory,
baseline interviews are conducted in a cafeteria not visible to other firm staff. For interviews
at home, enumerators offer to meet respondents on the property of the local church – a
location that is commonly seen as a safe space in the community.
Third, the team of enumerators is instructed to keep their distance from firm manage-
ment. When working on factory premises, enumerators wear ID badges that identify them
as not belonging to the firm.
2.B.2 Elicitation of Subjective Expectations
Throughout the survey when asking subjects to assess various quantities and subjective ex-
pectations I use beans as visual aids. Delavande, Giné, and McKenzie (2011) review studies
that have used such visual aids and discuss advantages and disadvantages of various methods.
In particular, I follow Delavande and Kohler (2009) in explicitly linking beans to probabil-
ities.
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My instructions read: “I want to ask you one question about the chance or likelihood that a
certain event is going to happen. There are 10 beans in the bowl [show bowl]. I would like you
to choose some beans out of these 10 beans and put them in the empty bowl to express what you
think the likelihood or chance is of a specific event happening. One bean represents one chance out
of 10. If you do not put any beans in the bowl, it means you are sure that the event will NOT
happen. As you add beans, it means that you think the likelihood that the event happens increases.
For example, if you put one or two beans, it means you think the event is not likely to happen, but
it is still possible. If you put 5 beans, it means that it is just as likely it happens as it does not happen
(fifty-fifty). If you pick 6 beans, it means the event is slightly more likely to happen than not to
happen. If you put 10 beans in the plate, it means you are sure the event will happen. There is not
a right or wrong answer, I just want to know what you think”.
I use their method when asking respondents to assess the probability of reaching their
self-set savings goal or their subjective job finding probabilities.
2.B.3 Measures of Self-Regulation, Stress, and Well-being
To measure constructs in the areas of self-regulation and stress, I use measures validated
as part of the Science of Behavior Change (SOBC) framework.50 In particular, I build
on Esopo et al. (2018), who have adapted and validated psychological scales that measure
self-efficacy and executive control with laboratory subjects in Kenya.
2.B.3.1 Cognitive Control
Cognitive control – sometimes called executive control – is a broad construct in cognitive
neuroscience that refers to the processes that organize information for goal-driven decision-
making (Mackie, Van Dam, & Fan, 2013). Cognitive control affects how well we can
control our impulses and our working memory, and how well we can formulate, maintain,
and execute plans and goals. From the viewpoint of economics, Mullainathan and Shafir
(2013) see cognitive control as one key component of what they call “bandwidth,” that is
the mental capacity required to engage in what is sometimes termed “System 2” thinking.
In contrast to quick and intuitive System 1 thinking, decision-making under System 2 is
“slow, forgetful, deliberate, and costly but typically produces more unbiased and accurate
results” (Schilbach et al., 2016, pg. 435). Esopo et al. (2018) provide a summary recent
contributions in economics.
The context of the study, goal-directed behavior of workers that engage in physically
demanding and repetitive industrial work with long hours, suggests that bandwidth is an
important factor to take into account.
To measure cognitive control I adapt a Stroop-like arrows task for use in the field (Baldo,
Shimamura, & Prinzmetal, 1998). Closely following Esopo et al. (2018), subjects are shown
red and blue arrows and must press a gray rectangle either in the same direction of the
arrow when it is red or the opposite direction direction of the arrow when it is blue. Arrow
direction (left or right) and color (red or blue) are randomized. This task is preferable over
50SOBC is a large US National Institutes of Health (NIH) program, which aims to improve our understand-
ing of behavior change across a broad range of (mostly health-related) behaviors. SOBC maintains a measures
repository at scienceofbehaviorchange.org/measures.
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measures that use numbers because it does not require literacy. Subjects complete 20 arrows
as quickly as possible on an Android tablet computer that is also used to administer the
survey questionnaire. Figure 2.D1 illustrates the tablet screen during the test.
Figure .D: Example Screen of Cognitive Control Measure (Red Arrow: Touch Same
Side)
I define correct answers per second as measure of executive control. The task is fully
incentivized. Subjects are given 3 birr per correct answer. 1 birr is subtracted per second.
The minimum payoff is 0 birr. Figure 2.D2 plots the distribution of scores.
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Stroop task: Number of correct arrows per second
2.B.3.2 Perceived Self-Efficacy
Perceived self-efficacy broadly refers to an individuals belief in his or her own ability to
perform well in a specific situation (Bandura, 1997). I hypothesize that self-efficacy could
affect the ability of study participants to follow through on their plans. Esopo et al. (2018)
review recent evidence that low measures of self-efficacy are correlated with low adherence
to exercise regimes and health behaviors.
To measure perceived self-efficacy, I use an adapted version of the General Self-Efficacy
(GSE) scale (Schwarzer & Jerusalem, 1995), which is designed to “assess a general sense of
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perceived self-efficacy with the aim in mind to predict coping with daily hassles as well as
adaptation after experiencing all kinds of stressful life events.” I use the 12-item scale from
the SOBC repository. Responses are anchored on a four-point scale with responses ranging
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree). The final score is calculated by adding all
items, which yields a scale with a range from 12 to 48.
The GSE scale has been successfully used in across different cultural contexts (Luszczyn-
ska, Scholz, & Schwarzer, 2005), but to the best of my knowledge not in Ethiopia. I trans-
lated and back-translated the English scale to Amharic and piloted it with a focus group
before deployment in the baseline survey. Figure 2.D3 plots the distribution of scores.
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General Self-Efficacy Scale (GSE): Aggregate Score
2.B.3.3 Locus of Control
Locus of control is a concept from personality psychology. Individuals with strong internal
locus of control tend to believe that events in their lives are based on their own decisions,
actions, and behaviors. People with an external locus of control believe that events in their
life are beyond their control.
Locus of control has been hypothesized to affect job search behavior. Locus of control
could impact an individual’s subjective assessment of her own ability to influence job search
outcomes (Caliendo, Cobb-Clark, & Uhlendorff, 2015; Falk, Huffman, & Sunde, 2006a,
2006b; McGee & McGee, 2016). To measure locus of control, I use five items from the
Internality, Powerful Others, andChance (IPC) scale developed by Levenson (1981), which
is commonly used in applied work. Responses are anchored on a four-point scale ranging
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree). The final score is calculated by adding all
items, which yields a scale with a range from 5 to 20.
As with the GSE scale, I translated and back-translated the English scale to Amharic
and piloted it with a focus group before deployment in the baseline survey. Figure 2.D4
plots the distribution of scores.
2.B.3.4 Physical Health
To measure physical health, I rely on self-reported ability to perform “activities of daily
living” (ADL). ADL scales are a widely used to measure health in various domains in devel-
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oping and developed countries, originally by clinicians to assess fitness for work, eligibility
for disability insurance, or claims for accidents and injuries (McDowell, 2006), and more
recently in development program evaluation (Thomas & Strauss, 2007).
ADL scales are preferably over measures that are endogenous to the labor supply de-
cision such as sick days, but come with all the problems of self-reported scales including
different interpretation of questions by respondents, endogeneity of self-perceived health to
the work experience of respondents, and potential experimenter demand effects.
I create an additive scale of four ADL measures used by Blattman and Dercon (2018) in
context of Ethiopian manufacturing workers: walk for 2 kilometers, work outside on your
feet for a full day, carry a 20 liter carton of water for 20 meters, and standing at a workbench
for 8 hours. Each of the four measures is scored on a four-point scale from 1 (unable) to 4
(easily).
2.B.3.5 Psychological Well-Being
There is evidence that the psychological consequences of poverty can lead to stress and
negative affect, which in turn can influence decision-making (Haushofer & Fehr, 2014). To
assess if stress and negative affect – feeling unhappy or anxious – are potentially confounding
my results, I use two measures.
To measure stress, I follow Haushofer and Shapiro (2016) and use the Perceived Stress
Scale by Cohen, Kamarck, and Mermelstein (1983). While their original scale contains
14 items, I use the same four items as Haushofer and Shapiro (2016). Respondents are
asked how often they felt in certain ways. Answers are anchored on a five-point scale with
responses ranging from 0 (never) to 4 (very often). The final score is calculated by adding
all items, which yields a scale with a range from 0 to 16.
Tomeasure happiness and life satisfaction, I use Cantril’s Self-Anchoring Scale (Cantril,
1965), which is commonly used in applied work and global opinion surveys such as Gallup’s
World Poll (Kahneman & Deaton, 2010). The scale asks respondents to imagine a staircase
or ladder with numbered steps, where the top of the ladder represents the best possible or
happiest possible life. Respondents are then asked to place themselves on one step of the
ladder (“The top of the ladder represents the best possible life for you, and the bottom of
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the ladder represents the worst possible life for you. On which step of the ladder would you
say you personally feel you stand nowadays?”) In the survey, enumerators show respondents
a picture of a ladder on the tablet to aid visualization.
Figure 2.D5 plots the distribution of scores for all three measures.
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2.B.4 Construction of Other Survey Measures
Assets: Asset indices are commonly used in welfare and poverty analyses. They are par-
ticularly useful to assess living standards in settings where expenditure and income data
is absent or unreliable. This is often the case in urban or peri-urban areas like the study
setting, where consumption expenditures may be underreported because consumption hap-
pens outside the household. To construct an index of household and individual assets, I take
three steps. First, I use data from the 2015-2016 ESS to identify 13 assets that best predict
nominal total household consumption expenditures. I do this using dominance analysis, an
approach sometimes used in psychology that calculates the marginal contribution of each
independent variable in predicting an outcome by testing all possible combinations of in-
dependent variables (Budescu, 1993). I identify the following household assets: shelf for
storing goods, energy saving stove, kerosene stove, sofa set, refrigerator, electric stove, elec-
tric mitad (an appliance to prepare injera bread), radio, television, CD/DVD player, satellite
dish, wristwatch, and water pump. Second, I ask each respondent for the number of these
assets owned by the household where the respondent sleeps and the number of these assets
owned by the respondent. I use the exact question phrasing of the LSMS survey. Third, I
calculate two additive indices of all assets: One for assets owned by the household where
the respondent sleeps and one for the respondent herself. Additive indices are attractive due
to their simplicity. Filmer and Scott (2012) show that under most conditions the method
of aggregation does not significantly affect household rankings.
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2.C Appendix: Time Preference Elicitation and Estimation
2.C.1 Implementation in the Field
Figure .C: Convex Time Budget Implementation
(a) Picture of Training Interview
(b) Illustration of Whiteboards
Earlier (tomorrow) Later (2 weeks)
1 bean = 10 birr 1 bean = 20 birr
18 x 10 = 180 birr 2 x 20 = 40 birr
Notes: The picture in panel (a) is taken during the training week of the enumerator pictured; data from this
respondent was not used. This decision shows choice set (1, 14) with interest rate r = 1.00. In this case, the
respondent chose to allocate 18 beans to the earlier dish and 2 beans to the later dish.
2.C.2 Selected Experimental Instructions
I provide English translations of key experimental instructions. These are read by the enu-
merator to the respondent from a tablet screen. The tablet screen shows both the English
and the Amharic version, so enumerators can go over the text with respondents. Amharic
originals are available upon request.
Introduction
For the next part of our conversation, I would like to ask you to make 15 different decision
about how to divide money between two different dates: “earlier” and “later”. The money will be
represented with beans. I will give you a bowl with 20 beans and ask you to divide the beans
between two dishes: one that represents the earlier date and one that represents the later date. The
beans that you allocate to “later” will always be worth more than the beans you allocate to “earlier”.
It’s important that you listen carefully to understand how this exercise works, because you will
make decisions about real money. At the end of our conversation, we will flip a coin to decide
if you will be paid out one of the decisions. If you win the coin flip, we will have a lottery in
which you draw one of the 15 decisions that you made. We will then send you the earlier and later
payments for the decision that you draw. You will get each payment exactly on the date specified,
not earlier. We will send you the money to your cell phone as CBE Birr payment [a payment system
by Commercial Bank of Ethiopia]. After you received the text message you can redeem the money
at any CBE branch or any CBE Birr agent. I will now give you an example so that you can better
understand the exercise.
Example and Comprehension Check
Let’s look at an example together. In this example, the earlier dish represents the amount of
money you would like to get tomorrow. The later dish represents the amount you would like to get
in 4 weeks. For each dish, I wrote how much one bean is worth. On the earlier dish for money
tomorrow, one bean is worth 10 birr. On the later dish for money in 4 weeks, one bean is worth
15 birr.
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You can put any number of beans on the earlier dish and on the later dish, but you must use all
of your beans. If you decide to put all 20 beans on the earlier dish, this means that you would like
to get 200 birr tomorrow and nothing in 4 weeks. If you put 10 beans on the earlier dish and 10
beans on the later dish, this means that you would like to get 100 birr tomorrow (10 beans x 10
birr per bean = 100 birr) and 150 birr in 4 weeks. Notice that beans on the later dish are always
worth more than beans on the earlier dish, so putting beans on the later dish means you would get
more money in total. If you decide to put all 20 beans on the later dish, this means that you would
like to get nothing tomorrow, and wait 4 weeks to get 300 birr (20 x 15 birr per bean = 300 birr).
After you put your beans on the two dishes, I will write down the total amount of money you
would get at each time. If you are not happy with the amounts, you can take beans again and
change your mind. We can do this as often as you like until you are happy.
Let’s try it out. Please go ahead and divide up the 20 beans between the two dishes. Remember
you don’t need to put all beans on one dish, but you can divide them up between earlier and later
as you like.
[ENUMERATOR: Let participant allocate beans. Calculate total in each dish, write on
board. Read out to participant.]
Would you be happy with these amounts tomorrow and in 4 weeks?
[ENUMERATOR: Revise if necessary]
Remember this was just an example. Wewill now go through 15 such decisions between earlier
and later. In these 15 decisions, I will change when the earlier dish will be paid out and when the
later dish will be paid out. For each combination of earlier and later, I will increase how much one
bean in the later dish is worth. At the end of our conversation, we will flip a coin to see if you will
receive one of your decisions in the form of two payments.
Do you understand everything so far?
[ENUMERATOR checkpoint. You must ask the following three questions]
Please explain to me when you would get paid the amount on each dish, should you win the
coin flip.
Suppose that you put beans on both dishes and win the coin flip, how many payments will you
receive?
Please explain to me how much one bean is worth on each dish.
[The respondent needs to answer all three of these questions correctly. If not, please go back and
explain again]
Did the respondent correctly answer al questions?
Thank you for listening to my explanations. Let’s get started now with your decisions.
Please keep in mind that this is not a test. There are no right or wrong answers. However, it
is important to keep in mind that you make decisions over a substantial amount of real money. If
you win the coin flip at the end of our conversation, we will pay out one of your decisions. Each
of the 15 decision has the same chance of being chosen, so you should think carefully about each of
them.
The 15 decisions are done interactively using the beans and the whiteboards. The tablet
computer aids the enumerator by visualizing the decision. After illustrating the setup of
the white boards, the survey software asks for the final number of beans allocated. Before
moving to the next decision, the survey software calculates the total amounts and asks the
enumerator to confirm that these were correctly indicated on the white board.
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Figure .C: Screenshots of Survey Software During CTB Task
(a) Setup of Dishes and Whiteboards (b) Confirmation of Decision
2.C.3 Payment Confirmation
This shows an English translation of the payment confirmation that subjects receive if they
win the coin flip of the CTB experiment. Subjects only receive the original in Amharic. This
confirmation is indented to increase confidence in the payment being delivered and reduce
the cognitive costs of keeping track. It is printed on high-quality paper with a European
University Institute watermark.
Payment Confirmation
As part of our academic study, you made several decisions about whether you would prefer amounts
of money earlier or later. Because you won the coin flip at the end of our conversation, you receive
the following two amounts:
Earlier payment: Later Payment:
[Two large boxes with amount and date for each of the payments]
On the date indicated for each of the payments (but not earlier), you will receive the money to
your cell phone as CBEbirr payment. We will send this payment to you before 12 noon on the
day indicated. CBEbirr is a payment system by Commercial Bank of Ethiopia. You will receive
an SMS from the CBEbirr payment system by the date specified above. The SMS will contain
the amount of money that you will receive. The sender will be [survey coordinator name] and
the sending phone number will be [survey coordinator phone number]. After you received the text
message you can redeem the money at any CBE branch or any CBEbirr agent. When you go to the
bank or the CBEbirr agent, please do not forget to bring your Kebele ID and your cell phone with
the CBEbirr text message.
If you have any questions, please contact the study coordinator [name] at [coordinator cell phone
number].
Recipient name: [subject name]
Date: [date]
SignatureEnumerator [signed] Signature LeadResearcher [signed]
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2.C.4 Consistency and Comparison with Random Choice
Consistency with the law of demand in the CTB experiment can serve as an indicator of
whether subjects understood the instructions of the experiment. This is particularly true
because the subject pool has relatively lower numeracy and literacy skills than student labo-
ratory subjects.
The average allocations summarized in Table 2.C1 below and visual inspection of Fig-
ure 2.3 indicate that on aggregate subject decisions are consistent with the law of demand.
As the interest rate increases and the price of consumption later decreases, subjects mono-
tonically decrease the share of beans allocated to earlier.
Table .C: Baseline CTB Allocations to Later (in Ethiopian birr), by Front-End Delay
t, Delay k, and Interest Rate r
Percentiles
t k 1 + r Mean Std. dev. 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th Fraction atcorner
1 14 1.10 122.24 64.87 0.00 88.00 132.00 165.00 214.50 0.10
1 14 1.25 160.30 69.59 62.50 125.00 175.00 212.50 250.00 0.15
1 14 1.50 218.72 76.00 120.00 180.00 225.00 285.00 300.00 0.23
1 14 1.75 272.64 83.24 175.00 245.00 297.50 350.00 350.00 0.27
1 14 2.00 336.14 87.46 220.00 300.00 380.00 400.00 400.00 0.43
1 28 1.10 112.79 69.76 0.00 55.00 121.00 165.00 209.00 0.10
1 28 1.25 147.48 76.73 0.00 112.50 162.50 200.00 250.00 0.13
1 28 1.50 201.21 87.37 75.00 150.00 225.00 270.00 300.00 0.19
1 28 1.75 251.00 100.61 105.00 210.00 280.00 332.50 350.00 0.23
1 28 2.00 314.19 105.49 180.00 280.00 360.00 400.00 400.00 0.37
15 14 1.10 125.37 61.59 0.00 110.00 132.00 165.00 220.00 0.10
15 14 1.25 159.87 68.37 62.50 125.00 175.00 200.00 250.00 0.15
15 14 1.50 215.95 75.33 120.00 180.00 225.00 270.00 300.00 0.20
15 14 1.75 270.32 84.14 175.00 227.50 280.00 350.00 350.00 0.28
15 14 2.00 327.33 96.83 200.00 300.00 360.00 400.00 400.00 0.42
Notes: Data from all 460 subjects in the baseline survey at t = 0.
I follow Giné et al. (2017) in quantifying adherence to the law of demand at the indi-
vidual level. In each of the three choice sets (t, k) ∈ [(1, 14) , (1, 28) , (15, 14)], subjects
make five decisions over the same dates but with increasing interest rates. These five deci-
sions can be grouped in four pairs of experimental interest rates between earlier and later
where r′ < r′′. In each of these four pairs, subjects should allocate weakly more money
to later under r′′ than under r′. With 460 subjects in the baseline CTB task, the data has
4× 3× 460 = 5, 520 such interest rate pairs. Out of those, only 463 (8.4 percent) are not
consistent with the law of demand. The median deviation is one bean. This compares favor-
ably to 81 percent of pairs in Giné et al. (2017) and suggests that subjects largely understood
the experiment.
Finally, one can compare the number of pairs that are consistent with the law of demand
to simulated data in which subjects choose allocations randomly (drawn from a uniform
distribution). Figure 2.C3 plots the number of pairs in which subjects allocate weakly more
money to later under r′′ than under r′ for simulated and real baseline data. The comparison
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suggests that subjects in my experiment indeed made choices that are significantly more
consistent than random chance.
Figure .C: Histogram for Consistency with Law of Demand, Subject Decisions Com-
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Simulated data Subject data
Notes: In each of three choice sets, subject make five decisions over the same dates but with increasing interest
rates. This results four interest rate pairs where r′ < r′′. In total, I can compare 3 × 4 = 12 decisions per
subjects. The figure plots the number of those decisions that are consistent with the law of demand, such that
subjects allocate weakly more money to later under r′′ than under r′. Simulated data assumes that for each
decision subjects simply allocate their budget based on a random from a uniform distribution.
58
2.C. Appendix: Time Preference Elicitation and Estimation
2.C.5 Theoretical Framework for Parameter Estimation
In this subsection, I outline a simple theoretical framework to estimate time preference
parameters based on the CTB experiment. I replicate the approach and parametric assump-
tions of Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) and Augenblick et al. (2015).
In the lab-in-the-field CTB experiment, each subject chooses to allocate an experimen-
tal budgetm > 0 between an amount ct available at an earlier time t and a another amount
ct+k available after a delay k > 0, i.e. paid out at point t + k. Let (1 + r) be the simple
gross interest rate to be paid over period k. The unit of time are days since the experiment.
All monetary amounts are measured in experimental tokens.
Experimental subjects maximize an additively separable utility function with quasi hy-
perbolic (β-δ) preferences (Laibson, 1997; O’Donoghue & Rabin, 1999) in the form:
U(ct, ct+k) = u(ct − ωt) + β1t=0δku(ct+k − ωt+k) (13)
where β is the parameter of present bias, 1t=0 is an indicator that is 1 when the earlier
payoff is realized in period 0, and δ is the long-run discounting parameter. With β = 1 the
framework nests the standard exponential discounting model. ωt and ωt+k are Stone-Geary
(Geary, 1950; Stone, 1954) background consumption or subsistence consumption levels at
each point in time. Subjects maximize (13) subject to their experimental budget constraint
(1 + r)ct + ct+k = m. (14)
The first order conditions for ct and ct+k yield the familiar intertemporal Euler equation
that must be satisfied by the optimal allocation (c∗t , c∗t+k)
u′(ct − ωt)
β1t=0δku′(ct+k − ωt+k)
= (1 + r). (15)
I assume constant CRRA utility in the form u(c) = 1/αcα or, equivalently, u(c) =































ln (1 + r) (17)
where (ct − ωt) / (ct+k − ωt+k) > 0 by assumption so that the log-transformation is well-
defined.
When including an additive error term, Euler equation (17) can be estimated by regres-
sion at the level of each subject or in aggregate over all experimental subjects. Because the
consumption ratios on the left-hand side are censored by corner solutions, estimation by
two-limit Tobit is more appropriate than OLS.
Again following Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) but slightly changing their notation,
assume each subject imakes herP budget decisions j = 1, 2, ..., P . The estimation problem
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= γ1 1t=0 + γ2 k + γ3 ln (1 + r) + ϵij (18)







= γ1 1t=0 + γ2 k + γ3 ln (1 + r) + ϵi (19)
By estimating (19) for each subject iwe can obtain the individual-level parameters of interest
from non-linear combinations
β̂i = exp (γ̂1/γ̂3)
δ̂i = exp (γ̂2/γ̂3)
α̂i = (1/γ̂3) + 1
with standard errors from the delta method.
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2.C.6 Additional Estimation Results
Table .C: Aggregate Time Preference and CRRA Curvature Estimates (Coefficient
Estimates and Standard Errors)
(1) (2) (3)
Tobit Tobit Tobit
Present bias β̂ 1.006 1.008 1.002
(0.018) (0.013) (0.014)
Discounting δ̂ 0.959 0.977 0.976
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
CRRA curvature α̂ 0.886 0.677 0.734
(0.006) (0.011) (0.012)
H0 : β = 1 .119 .338 .0301
p-value .73 .561 .862
H0 : δ = 1 23.3 12.4 11.9
p-value 1.39e-06 .000424 .000562
Log likelihood -17173 -10439 -11902
N 6899 6899 6858
N (uncensored) 4832 4832 4832
Clusters 460 460 459
Notes: Table shows maximum likelihood estimates of Equation (17) using a two-limit Tobit model over the
whole sample. Standard errors are clustered at individual level. The three models differ in their assumptions
about background consumption at each point in time (see Equation (13) for details). Model (1) assumes no
background consumption (ω1 = ω2 = 0). Model (2) assumes that background consumption is constant and set
at the sample average daily consumption expenditure in the seven days before the baseline survey (ω1 = ω2 =
c). Model (3) assumes that background consumption is constant and set at the individual daily consumption
expenditure in the seven days before the baseline survey (ω1 = ω2 = ci).
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Figure .C: Comparison of Individual-Level Parameter Estimates Using Two-Limit To-
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All estimates from two-limit tobit model. Green markers: zero background consumption;
red markers: sample average background consumption; blue markers: individually-reported background consumption.
(baseline)
Comparison of individual-level parameter estimates
Notes: Figure shows maximum likelihood estimates of Equation (17) using a two-limit Tobit model at the
individual level. Each dot represents one estimate. Different colors represent different assumptions about back-
ground consumption: Green markers: assumed zero background consumption; red markers: using the sample
average consumption expenditure as background consumption; blue markers: using individually-reported con-
sumption expenditure as background consumption. Sample size differs from the full 460 subjects due to failure
of the MLE to converge.
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Figure .D: Locations of Survey Firm and Respondent Households
Notes: Study firm is located in Bole Lemi Industrial Park, highlighted in light blue. Travel time from the
industrial park to Addis Ababa city center is about 45 minutes to 1 hour, depending on means of transportation
and traffic conditions. Yellow dots represent worker households. The more workers live in one locations, the
darker the color of the dot.
Sources: Base map data by OpenStreetMap, used under ODbL. Map tiles by Stamen Design, used under
Creative Commons CC BY 3.0.
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(b) Temptation good expenditures/week (birr)
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Notes: Plots show the expected value of the observed outcome, based on columns (2) and (4) of Table 2.3. Thin
bars indicate 90 percent confidence intervals. AME indicates the average marginal effect for discrete change in
present bias indicator, i.e. the difference between the two plotted values.
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Figure .D: Expected Value of Search Effort, by Present Bias Indicator
(a) Number of calls
0.68
0.32

































































Notes: Plots show the expected value of the observed outcome, based on columns (2), (4), and (6) of Table 2.4.
Subjective search intensity is measured on a three-point scale (1 – “not very intensively”; 2 – “intensively”; 3
– “very intensively”). Thin bars indicate 90 percent confidence intervals. AME indicates the average marginal
effect for discrete change in present bias indicator, i.e. the difference between the two plotted values.
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Table .E: On the Job Search and Reasons for Not Searching (Fractions of Sample)
Baseline Week 2 Week 4 Week 6 Week 8 Week 10 Week 12 Week 14 Endline
Searching for work 0.20 0.10 0.12 0.12 0.16 0.14 0.13 0.15 0.14
Would like to search 0.31 0.31 0.33 0.35 0.31 0.31 0.37 0.33 0.33
It takes too much time 0.10 0.13 0.17 0.17 0.14 0.17 0.18 0.15 0.12
It costs too much money 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
I don’t know how/where to look 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.04
Other constraints 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.15 0.13 0.11 0.17 0.15 0.16
Not searching 0.49 0.60 0.55 0.53 0.53 0.55 0.49 0.53 0.52
N 460 425 394 321 275 237 209 163 153
Note: The numbers in this table represent workers who are searching while on their job at the study firm, so the
decreasing sample size reflects both workers leaving the firm as well as attrition from the panel. Approximately
90 percent of the reasons given as answers under “Other constraints” relate to health problems. To avoid
averaging, survey weeks here refer to survey waves of the panel, not the calendar date that the surveys were
conducted. Appendix Figure 2.D3 compares scheduled and actual survey dates.
Table .E: Summary Statistics of Baseline Observable Characteristics
Variable N Mean Percentiles Min Max
5th 25th 50th 75th 95th
Panel (a) Personal characteristics
Age 460 21.41 18 20 21 23 26 18 31
Married (indicator) 460 0.19 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
Has children (indicator) 460 0.06 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
Has a working spouse (indicator) 460 0.73 0 0 1 1 1 0 1
Rural-urban migrant (indicator) 460 0.67 0 0 1 1 1 0 1
Mother tongue: Amharic (indicator) 460 0.20 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
Mother tongue: Oromiffa (indicator) 460 0.38 0 0 0 1 1 0 1
Religion: Ethiopian Orthodox (indicator) 460 0.73 0 0 1 1 1 0 1
Religion: Muslim (indicator) 460 0.15 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
Education: Has completed 8th grade (indicator) 460 0.17 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
Education: Has completed 10th grade (indicator) 460 0.34 0 0 0 1 1 0 1
Panel (b) Consumption expenditures and savings
Consumption expenditures: Food 460 141.77 0 0 100 200 500 0 1,200
Consumption expenditures: Non-food 460 147.93 10 36.5 70 155 575 0 1,680
Consumption expenditures: Temptation goods 460 77.96 0 0 20 50 364 0 1,600
Savings 460 469.59 0 0 0 300 2,350 0 30,000
Panel (c) Liquidity and access to finance
Has bank account (indicator) 460 0.70 0 0 1 1 1 0 1
Ease of obtaining credit (4-point Likert scale) 460 2.24 1 1 2 3 4 1 4
Panel (d) Cognitive control, non-cognitive skills, stress
Stroop task score 460 0.43 0.18 0.31 0.42 0.54 0.70 0.10 0.89
Generalized Self-Efficacy index 460 34.50 28 32 34 37 41 23 45
Locus of Control index 460 15.59 12 14 16 17 19 7 20
Perceived Stress Scale 460 7.17 3 5 7 9 12 0 16
Notes: Consumption and savings measured with a seven-day recall. Appendix 2.B provides details on survey
protocols and the measurement of control variables.
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Table .E: Savings and Present Bias as Continuous Variable (Regression Coefficient Es-
timates and Robust Standard Errors)
Savings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit
Baseline β̂i 44.68 75.95 26.97 -42.95
(101.285) (170.208) (91.115) (111.177)
Baseline δ̂i 168.5 274.4 35.05 -322.1
(490.736) (288.374) (197.700) (298.173)
Survey wave dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Enumerator dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Personal characteristics No No No Yes Yes Yes
Baseline liquidity No No No Yes Yes Yes
Cognitive control No No No Yes Yes Yes
Non-cognitive ability and stress No No No Yes Yes Yes
N 1890 1803 1901 1814 1832 1734
Notes: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at individual
level. Time preference parameters trimmed at 5th and 95th percentile. Controls for personal characteristics
are age, marital status, religion, mother tongue, education, number of children, whether or not respondent
moved from a rural area, whether respondent has a working spouse. Controls for baseline liquidity are amount
of savings held when starting employment and easy of obtaining credit assessed on a 4 point Likert scale.
Control for cognitive control is the final score achieved in the baseline Stroop task. Controls for non-cognitive
control and stress are baseline score on the General Self-Efficacy scale, baseline locus of control index, and
baseline score on the Perceived Stress Scale (PSS-4). Appendix 2.B provides details on survey protocols and
the measurement of control variables.
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Table .E: Temptation Good Expenditures and Present Bias as Continuous Variable (Re-
gression Coefficient Estimates and Robust Standard Errors)
Temptation goods expenditure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit
Baseline β̂i -4.541 -19.30 20.72 7.973
(37.355) (47.697) (40.736) (52.269)
Baseline δ̂i -1.786 -67.42 -37.85 -90.08
(86.102) (123.162) (96.017) (134.853)
Survey wave dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Enumerator dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Personal characteristics No No No Yes Yes Yes
Baseline liquidity No No No Yes Yes Yes
Cognitive control No No No Yes Yes Yes
Non-cognitive ability and stress No No No Yes Yes Yes
N 2090 2102 1995 2009 2028 1921
Notes: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at individual
level. Time preference parameters trimmed at 5th and 95th percentile. Controls for personal characteristics
are age, marital status, religion, mother tongue, education, number of children, whether or not respondent
moved from a rural area, whether respondent has a working spouse. Controls for baseline liquidity are amount
of savings held when starting employment and easy of obtaining credit assessed on a 4 point Likert scale.
Control for cognitive control is the final score achieved in the baseline Stroop task. Controls for non-cognitive
control and stress are baseline score on the General Self-Efficacy scale, baseline locus of control index, and
baseline score on the Perceived Stress Scale (PSS-4). Appendix 2.B provides details on survey protocols and
the measurement of control variables.
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Table .E: Savings and Temptation Goods at Extensive Margin and Present Bias (Esti-
mated Average Marginal Effects and Robust Standard Errors)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Savings Savings Tempt. Tempt.
Probit Probit Probit Probit
Baseline β̂i < 1 -0.0351 -0.0192 0.0506∗ 0.0308
(0.031) (0.030) (0.029) (0.030)
Baseline δ̂i 0.108 0.00367 -0.0855 -0.131
(0.173) (0.166) (0.157) (0.171)
Survey wave dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Enumerator dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Personal characteristics No Yes No Yes
Baseline liquidity No Yes No Yes
Cognitive control No Yes No Yes
Non-cognitive ability and stress No Yes No Yes
N 2093 2019 2098 1996
Log likelihood
Notes: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at individual
level. Time preference parameters trimmed at 5th and 95th percentile. Controls for personal characteristics are
age, marital status, religion, mother tongue, education, number of children, whether or not respondent moved
from a rural area, whether respondent has a working spouse. Controls for baseline liquidity are amount of
savings held when starting employment and easy of obtaining credit assessed on a 4 point Likert scale. Control
for cognitive control is the final score achieved in the baseline Stroop task. Controls for non-cognitive control
and stress are baseline score on theGeneral Self-Efficacy scale, baseline locus of control index, and baseline score
on the Perceived Stress Scale (PSS-4). Appendix 2.B provides details on survey protocols and the measurement
of control variables.
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Table .E: Job Search Effort and Present Bias as Continuous Variable (Regression Coef-
ficient Estimates and Robust Standard Errors)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Calls Calls Calls Hours Hours Hours
Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit
Baseline β̂i 0.817 3.992∗ 0.566 6.640∗
(1.985) (2.268) (3.212) (3.965)
Baseline δ̂i 6.599∗ 12.72∗∗ 10.32 24.64∗∗
(3.988) (5.290) (7.914) (9.950)
Survey wave dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Enumerator dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Personal characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Baseline liquidity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cognitive control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Non-cognitive ability and stress Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1919 1939 1833 1919 1939 1833
Log likelihood -1194 -1176 -1140 -1510 -1480 -1453
Notes: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at individual
level. Time preference parameters trimmed at 5th and 95th percentile. Controls for personal characteristics
are age, marital status, religion, mother tongue, education, number of children, whether or not respondent
moved from a rural area, whether respondent has a working spouse. Controls for baseline liquidity are amount
of savings held when starting employment and easy of obtaining credit assessed on a 4 point Likert scale.
Control for cognitive control is the final score achieved in the baseline Stroop task. Controls for non-cognitive
control and stress are baseline score on the General Self-Efficacy scale, baseline locus of control index, and
baseline score on the Perceived Stress Scale (PSS-4). Appendix 2.B provides details on survey protocols and
the measurement of control variables.
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Table .E: Job Search Decision and Present Bias (Estimated Average Marginal Effects




Baseline β̂i < 1 -0.0706∗∗ -0.0879∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.030)
Baseline δ̂i 0.339∗∗ 0.325∗∗
(0.151) (0.137)
Survey wave dummies Yes Yes
Enumerator dummies Yes Yes
Personal characteristics No Yes
Baseline liquidity No Yes
Cognitive control No Yes
Non-cognitive ability and stress No Yes
N 2004 1919
Notes: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at individual
level. Time preference parameters trimmed at 5th and 95th percentile. Controls for personal characteristics are
age, marital status, religion, mother tongue, education, number of children, whether or not respondent moved
from a rural area, whether respondent has a working spouse. Controls for baseline liquidity are amount of
savings held when starting employment and easy of obtaining credit assessed on a 4 point Likert scale. Control
for cognitive control is the final score achieved in the baseline Stroop task. Controls for non-cognitive control
and stress are baseline score on theGeneral Self-Efficacy scale, baseline locus of control index, and baseline score
on the Perceived Stress Scale (PSS-4). Appendix 2.B provides details on survey protocols and the measurement
of control variables.
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Table .E: Job Search Outcomes, Search Effort, and Present Bias (Incidence-Rate Ratios
and Average Marginal Effects with Robust Standard Errors)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
# offers in t # offers in t Vol dep in t Vol dep in t
Poisson Poisson Probit Probit
Baseline β̂i < 1 0.442 0.385∗ -0.0257∗ -0.189∗∗∗
(0.260) (0.219) (0.013) (0.036)
Baseline δ̂i 178.6∗∗ 243.2∗∗ 0.0497 0.803∗∗∗
(400.895) (522.120) (0.065) (0.274)
Job search effort (hours) in t 0.989 0.00473∗∗
(0.026) (0.002)
Job search effort (# calls) in t 1.001 0.0113∗∗
(0.048) (0.005)
Job search effort (intensively) in t 1.350 -0.0550
(0.600) (0.046)
Job search effort (very intensively) in t 2.129 -0.00128
(1.148) (0.065)
Survey wave dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Enumerator dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Personal characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Baseline liquidity Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cognitive control Yes Yes Yes Yes
Non-cognitive ability Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 320 320 1946 235
Log likelihood -112 -110
Notes: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at individual
level. Columns 1 and 2 report incidence-rate ratios from the poisson coefficient estimates while columns 3 and
4 report average marginal effects from probit coefficient estimates. Time preference parameters trimmed at
5th and 95th percentile. Controls for personal characteristics are age, marital status, religion, mother tongue,
education, number of children, whether or not respondent moved from a rural area, whether respondent has a
working spouse. Controls for baseline liquidity are amount of savings held when starting employment and easy
of obtaining credit assessed on a 4 point Likert scale. Control for cognitive control is the final score achieved
in the baseline Stroop task. Controls for non-cognitive control and stress are baseline score on the General
Self-Efficacy scale, baseline locus of control index, and baseline score on the Perceived Stress Scale (PSS-4).
Appendix 2.B provides details on survey protocols and the measurement of control variables.
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Table .E: Measured Baseline Present Bias and Observable Characteristics (Regression
Coefficient Estimates and Robust Standard Errors)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1{β̂i<1} 1{β̂i<1} 1{β̂i<1} β̂i β̂i β̂i
Probit Probit Probit OLS OLS OLS
Panel (a) Personal characterstics and human capital
Age 0.0263 0.0284 0.0333 -0.00923∗∗ -0.00956∗∗ -0.0104∗∗
(0.028) (0.029) (0.030) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Married (=1) 0.0871 0.0851 0.0839 -0.0439 -0.0415 -0.0409
(0.185) (0.187) (0.193) (0.031) (0.032) (0.033)
Kids (=1) 0.0831 0.0787 0.0824 -0.0340 -0.0342 -0.0342
(0.285) (0.287) (0.287) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050)
Ethiopian Orthodox faith (=1) 0.347 0.363 0.350 -0.0112 -0.0162 -0.0186
(0.244) (0.247) (0.254) (0.040) (0.041) (0.041)
Muslim faith (=1) 0.142 0.179 0.167 -0.000415 -0.0162 -0.0167
(0.301) (0.308) (0.313) (0.048) (0.049) (0.049)
Amharic mother tongue (=1) -0.394∗ -0.391∗ -0.415∗ -0.0112 -0.0123 -0.0103
(0.233) (0.234) (0.239) (0.044) (0.044) (0.045)
Oromiffa mother tongue (=1) 0.177 0.162 0.139 -0.101∗∗ -0.0941∗ -0.0905∗
(0.249) (0.251) (0.253) (0.047) (0.048) (0.048)
Rural-urban migrant (=1) -0.0178 -0.0256 -0.0801 -0.00642 -0.00428 0.00325
(0.164) (0.164) (0.169) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030)
8th grade education completed (=1) 0.210 0.215 0.153 -0.0421 -0.0437 -0.0358
(0.180) (0.179) (0.184) (0.031) (0.030) (0.031)
Previous formal work experience (=1) -0.0130 -0.00174 -0.0959 -0.000846 -0.00377 0.00719
(0.150) (0.152) (0.157) (0.025) (0.026) (0.027)
Panel (b) Liquidity and access to finance
Has bank account (=1) 0.0219 0.0468 -0.0192 -0.0225
(0.159) (0.159) (0.027) (0.027)
Easy to obtain credit (=1) -0.118 -0.0885 0.0418 0.0426
(0.156) (0.166) (0.027) (0.029)
Panel (c) Cognitive control, self-regulation, stress
Cognitive control score -1.050∗∗ 0.150∗
(0.494) (0.080)
Self-efficacy score -0.0362∗ 0.00503
(0.022) (0.003)
Locus of control score -0.00893 -0.00115
(0.037) (0.006)
Stress score 0.00813 0.000494
(0.025) (0.005)
Panel (d) Other
Constant -0.657 -0.668 1.207 1.255∗∗∗ 1.257∗∗∗ 1.025∗∗∗
(0.673) (0.674) (1.026) (0.106) (0.106) (0.177)
Enumerator dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 366 366 366 366 366 366
Notes: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at individual
level. Dependent variable in columns (1) to (3) is an indicator variable for present bias while the dependent
variable in columns (4) to (6) is the untransformed present bias parameter estimate. Appendix 2.B provides
details on survey protocols and the measurement of control variables.
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Table .E: Measured Endline Present Bias and Cash Drop (Regression Coefficient Es-
timates and Robust Standard Errors)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1{β̂i<1} 1{β̂i<1} β̂i β̂i
Probit Probit OLS OLS
Won coin payoff at baseline (=1) -0.274 -0.246 0.0113 0.00306
(0.218) (0.217) (0.033) (0.031)
Enumerator dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Personal characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Baseline liquidity No Yes No Yes
Cognitive ability No Yes No Yes
Non-cognitive ability and stress No Yes No Yes
N 194 194 198 198
Notes: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at individual
level. Dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is an indicator variable for present bias estimated in the
endline CTB experiment while the dependent variable in columns (3) and (4) is the untransformed present
bias parameter estimate at endline. Appendix 2.B provides details on survey protocols and the measurement of
control variables.
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No Yes Diff p-val
Panel (a) Personal characteristics
Age 21.41 21.37 21.45 0.735
(0.117) (0.186) (0.149)
Married (=1) 0.19 0.21 0.17 0.340
(0.018) (0.029) (0.024)
Kids (=1) 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.369
(0.011) (0.019) (0.014)
Ethiopian Orthodox faith (=1) 0.73 0.70 0.76 0.149
(0.021) (0.033) (0.027)
Amharic mother tongue (=1) 0.67 0.69 0.66 0.427
(0.022) (0.033) (0.030)
Oromiffa mother tongue (=1) 0.20 0.15 0.23 0.039
(0.019) (0.026) (0.026)
Ethiopian Orthodox faith (=1) 0.73 0.70 0.76 0.149
(0.021) (0.033) (0.027)
Muslim faith (=1) 0.15 0.17 0.12 0.128
(0.016) (0.027) (0.020)
Rural-urban migrant (=1) 0.73 0.74 0.72 0.581
(0.021) (0.031) (0.028)
8th grade education completed (=1) 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.929
(0.017) (0.027) (0.023)
Previous formal work experience (=1) 0.60 0.59 0.60 0.890
(0.023) (0.035) (0.031)
Panel (b) Liquidity and access to finance
Has bank account (=1) 0.70 0.69 0.72 0.463
(0.021) (0.033) (0.028)
Easy to obtain credit (=1) 0.67 0.68 0.65 0.513
(0.022) (0.033) (0.030)
Panel (c) Cognitive control, self-regulation, stress
Cognitive control score 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.943
(0.007) (0.011) (0.010)
Self-efficacy score 34.50 34.34 34.62 0.446
(0.182) (0.260) (0.252)
Locus of control score 15.59 15.53 15.64 0.605
(0.109) (0.159) (0.149)
Stress score 7.17 7.30 7.07 0.405
(0.138) (0.213) (0.182)
N 460 201 259
Notes: Experimental payouts are determined by a coin flip at the end of the experiment. “Diff. p-val” refers to
the p-value of an t-test for equality of means between subjects who won the coin flip and subjects who did not.
Appendix 2.B provides details on survey protocols and the measurement of control variables.
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Table .E: Job Search Effort and Present Bias Controlling for Experimental Payouts
(Regression Coefficient Estimates and Robust Standard Errors)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Calls Calls Calls Calls Hours Hours Hours Hours
Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit
Baseline β̂i < 1 -2.287∗∗ -2.370∗∗ -2.963∗∗∗ -3.138∗∗∗ -4.479∗∗ -4.615∗∗ -6.130∗∗∗ -6.337∗∗∗
(1.016) (1.007) (0.950) (0.947) (1.965) (1.948) (1.894) (1.894)
Baseline δ̂i 12.22∗∗ 10.84∗∗ 12.41∗∗∗ 11.46∗∗∗ 22.12∗∗ 19.11∗∗ 22.28∗∗∗ 19.56∗∗
(5.067) (4.901) (4.216) (4.102) (9.621) (9.057) (8.593) (8.118)
Won experimental payout (=1) -2.049∗∗ -2.128∗∗∗ -3.502∗∗ -3.763∗∗
(0.851) (0.764) (1.658) (1.627)
Survey wave dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Enumerator dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Personal characteristics No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Baseline liquidity No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Cognitive ability No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Non-cognitive ability and stress No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
N 2008 2008 1939 1939 2008 2008 1939 1939
Log likelihood -1263 -1257 -1166 -1159 -1555 -1549 -1467 -1460
Notes: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at individual
level. Time preference parameters trimmed at 5th and 95th percentile. Controls for personal characteristics
are age, marital status, religion, mother tongue, education, number of children, whether or not respondent
moved from a rural area, whether respondent has a working spouse. Controls for baseline liquidity are amount
of savings held when starting employment and easy of obtaining credit assessed on a 4 point Likert scale.
Control for cognitive control is the final score achieved in the baseline Stroop task. Controls for non-cognitive
control and stress are baseline score on the General Self-Efficacy scale, baseline locus of control index, and
baseline score on the Perceived Stress Scale (PSS-4). Appendix 2.B provides details on survey protocols and
the measurement of control variables.
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Table .E: Job Search Effort and Human Capital (Regression Coefficient Estimates
with Robust Standard Errors)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Calls Calls Calls Hours Hours Hours
Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit
Age 0.506∗∗∗ 0.508∗∗∗ 0.493∗∗∗ 0.812∗∗∗ 0.809∗∗ 0.771∗∗
(0.170) (0.172) (0.169) (0.315) (0.314) (0.304)
Formal work experience (=1) -0.415 -0.423 -0.294 -1.992 -1.980 -1.786
(0.856) (0.857) (0.857) (1.634) (1.625) (1.636)
Education level completed (=1)
(Omitted: Grade 5 or less)
Grade 6 1.652 1.656 1.476 3.548 3.540 3.343
(1.672) (1.672) (1.684) (3.219) (3.216) (3.189)
Grade 7 -0.605 -0.594 -0.489 -1.320 -1.342 -1.249
(1.628) (1.632) (1.662) (3.211) (3.210) (3.270)
Grade 8 1.476 1.480 1.643 3.498 3.490 3.797
(1.590) (1.591) (1.623) (3.156) (3.160) (3.237)
Grade 9 2.350 2.364 2.471 2.185 2.164 2.145
(2.186) (2.191) (2.249) (3.397) (3.395) (3.428)
Grade 10 0.189 0.205 -0.0109 2.827 2.799 2.502
(1.467) (1.473) (1.495) (2.874) (2.862) (2.865)
More than Grade 10 3.252∗ 3.280∗ 3.013 6.571∗ 6.525∗ 6.107∗
(1.913) (1.952) (1.881) (3.368) (3.420) (3.333)
Cognitive control -0.376 -0.509 0.568 0.344
(2.831) (2.819) (5.466) (5.520)
Self-efficacy 0.122 0.136
(0.126) (0.255)
Locus of control 0.184 0.488
(0.223) (0.410)
Personal characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Enumerator dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Survey wave dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2215 2215 2215 2215 2215 2215
Log likelihood -1347 -1347 -1343 -1594 -1594 -1590
Notes: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at individual
level. Controls for personal characteristics are age, marital status, religion, mother tongue, number of children,
whether or not respondent moved from a rural area, whether respondent has a working spouse. Appendix 2.B
provides details on survey protocols and the measurement of control variables.
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2.E. Appendix: Additional Tables
Table .E: Log Reservation Wage and Time Preference Parameters (OLS Regression
Coefficient Estimates with Robust Standard Errors)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Baseline β̂i < 1 0.969 0.971 0.975 0.977
(0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.028)
Baseline δ̂i 0.983 0.980 0.984 0.993
(0.149) (0.147) (0.146) (0.147)
Survey wave dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Enumerator dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Personal characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Baseline liquidity No Yes Yes Yes
Cognitive control No No Yes Yes
Non-cognitive ability No No No Yes
N 2423 2423 2423 2423
R2 0.404 0.406 0.407 0.409
Time preference parameters trimmed at 5th and 95th percentile.
Robust standard errors clustered at individual level
Notes: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at individual
level. Appendix 2.B provides details on survey protocols and the measurement of control variables.
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3.1 Introduction
Many public goods rely on voluntary private contributions. Millions of people every year
spend their time working as volunteers in their communities, give money to charity, or
donate their own blood, organs, and other tissue. For charities seeking volunteers or money
and for health care providers seeking blood donations, it is important to understand how to
encourage this prosocial behavior.
An often-used way is to provide extrinsic incentives. The economics literature has found
mixed evidence on the effects of monetary and non-monetary incentives on giving (Bowles
& Polania-Reyes, 2012; Frey & Oberholzer-Gee, 1997). Although a positive effect of ex-
trinsic incentives is in line with standard economic theory, it goes against a considerable
literature in psychology and economics, which argues that they can backfire by either crowd-
ing out the intrinsic motivation to give (Deci, 1971, 1975; Titmuss, 1971), or ruining the
reputation of donors who could be regarded as greedy (Benabou & Tirole, 2006; Exley,
2017). Field experiments have found evidence for extrinsic incentives to have both nega-
tive effects on volunteer work (Frey & Goette, 1999) as well as positive effects on organ
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(Lacetera, Macis, & Stith, 2014) and blood donations (Lacetera, Macis, & Slonim, 2012,
2014).1
While the role of incentives has been analyzed in a wide range of domains, they have
been mostly studied in isolation and contrasted to the absence of incentives. In this chapter,
we study a setting where different incentives coexist. In this environment, agents can turn
down an extrinsic incentive to donate. This lets them reveal and signal their individual
preferences through their actions.
Our setting is motivated by the market for human whole blood donations in Germany.2
In most high-income countries, the concern that incentives could backfire is reflected in
tight regulation of how blood donations can be collected. Regulations typically do not
allow for monetary payments to donors (Council of Europe, 1995; The Lancet, 2005; World
Health Organization, 2009). In many regions of Germany, however, monetary and non-
monetary incentives appear to coexist in a “dual market” in which different blood collectors
offer different incentives and prospective donors can choose where to donate. Donations at
theDeutsches Rotes Kreuz [German RedCross] (DRK) are always unpaid, while donations
at hospitals or commercial blood banks are compensated with 20 to 30 euro.
Very little is known about the features of such “dual markets” for the collection of chari-
table contributions. Does this system of collection increase donations compared to a single
market in which either everyone is unpaid or everyone is paid? What are the determinants
of the share of unpaid donations in a dual market? In this chapter we focus on two channels
that could help explain sorting into unpaid donations in a dual collection system: altruism
and social image concerns.
To guide our analysis, we use a model of charitable giving in which prospective donors
are motivated to give by intrinsic incentives, extrinsic incentives, and image concerns. We
build on the framework by Benabou and Tirole (2006), but introduce two modifications:
first, we change the payoff structure so that a potential compensation for the donation is
paid out of the value that is generated by the donation. This tension between private and
public benefit of the donation introduces a channel through which extrinsic incentives can
crowd out intrinsic motivation. Second, we assume that donors do not differ in how much
they value extrinsic incentives. This lets us make clear predictions, but comes at the cost of
ruling out “reputational crowding out”, that is we rule out that donors can have a negative
response to the introduction of extrinsic incentives out of concern for appearing greedy. We
derive three testable behavioral hypotheses from this model.
1Aside from the question of effectiveness, incentives to donate human tissue might be seen as controversial
on moral grounds. Only limited incentives appear to be morally acceptable among a sample of people surveyed
in the United States (Boulware, Troll, Wang, & Powe, 2006). Becker and Elias (2007) provide a compelling
argument in favor of allowing incentives for organ donations. Lacetera (2016) summarizes the debate. In this
chapter, we will abstract from the matter of the morality of incentives.
2Themost common type of human blood donation is a “whole blood” donation, in which approximately one
pint of blood is collected over a period of about ten minutes. Men can donate up to six times per year, women
up to four times per year. Red blood cells from whole blood donations are typically used for transfusions to
other patients and are most commonly seen as motivated by altruistic preferences (Niessen-Ruenzi, Weber, &
Becker, 2015). Other types of blood donations include platelet and plasma donations, which take much longer




The first testable hypothesis states that the availability of compensation to donate should
increase donations. We call this the “incentive effect”. The second hypothesis states that
irrespective of whether compensation is available, making actions visible should increase
donations. We call this the “social image effect”. Our third and novel hypothesis states
that in a dual market, where agents can turn down compensation, a positive share of agents
will choose to remain unpaid and that this share is larger when actions are taken in pub-
lic. We call this “sorting”, based on the idea that a dual market can bring about efficiency
gains in the collection similar to those deriving from self-selection in second-degree price
discrimination.
We test these three hypotheses in a laboratory experiment with 329 student subjects.
For three rounds, each subject is confronted with the decision to participate in a real effort
task. This task generates value for a charity under one of three market designs: donors
receive no compensation for the donation (single marketNOTPAID), donors always receive
a compensation for the donation (single market PAID), and donors can choose whether they
want to receive compensation for the donation (dual market CHOOSE). Like for the case
of blood collection, any compensation paid out to donors reduces the social value of the
donation. This is objectively measured in our controlled setup by the amount of money
that goes to charity. We also vary the visibility of actions (PRIVATE vs. PUBLIC). The
combination of market design treatments and visibility treatments in a full 3 × 2 design
produces six distinct treatments, which we run between subjects.
The experimental results mostly support our behavioral hypotheses. We find clear ev-
idence for the incentive effect. In the dual market, the availability of incentives does not
crowd out intrinsic motivations of donors, irrespective of whether actions are observable.
Moving from a single unpaid market to a dual market significantly increases the number of
donations of our experimental subjects.
We also find evidence of strong social image effects. Making actions observable signif-
icantly increases donations in all three incentive schemes. Finally, we find support of our
sorting hypothesis: when given the option to turn down compensation, a significant share
of donors chooses to do so, though we do not find a significant difference between actions
taken in private and in public.
Interestingly, and in contrast to similar studies that analyze the effectiveness of con-
ditional and unconditional incentives to act prosocially (Ariely, Bracha, & Meier, 2009;
Carpenter & Myers, 2010), we do not find that social image effects attenuate incentive ef-
fects. We differ from Ariely et al. (2009) in that subjects decide to donate in the presence of
an outside option. Our results suggest that when incentives are small and only partly offset
the costs of donating, social image effects and incentive effects need not crowd each other
out. In addition, we find heterogeneous effects of social image on contributions that we
attribute to gender-specific preferences over signaling. Overall, our findings suggest novel
ways to improve mechanisms for the collection of charitable donations by leveraging hetero-
geneity in individual preferences. Applied to the collection of blood donations, our results
may inform the design and regulation of systems that use monetary incentives.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: Appendix 3.2 fixes ideas in a sim-
ple theoretical framework and presents testable behavioral hypotheses. Appendix 3.3 details
experimental design and procedures. Appendix 3.4 presents the results. Appendix 3.5 con-
cludes with a discussion of the implications of our findings for the market for blood that
initially motivated our research.
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3.2 Theoretical Framework
In the model by Benabou and Tirole (2006) (BT), being compensated to donate can crowd
out donations by spoiling the image of donors. Moreover, any compensation is paid from
resources that are exogenous to the economy and is given to donors without affecting the
social value of their donation. BT show that whether donors can turn down compensation
should not matter, because neither image-indifferent nor image-concerned agents would
want to do so. For image-indifferent agents, it would be a dominated strategy to turn down
compensation that does not affect the social value of their donation. Image-concerned
agents would be worried that their motivation is questioned: turning down incentives could
reveal that they are not acting out of altruism, but just to appear as altruistic while in fact
(on average) they are not.
For a dual market like in Germany, where prospective donors can choose from a menu
of options, the model would thus predict that no one should turn down compensation. Yet
we observe that a considerable share of donors chooses to remain unpaid when they have
the choice between donating with a 20 to 30 euro compensation or donating without any
compensation. Informational frictions and transportation costs may explain part of this
outcome, though these do not appear to be empirically significant.
We suggest that a different payoff structure than the one by BT better fits the case of
blood donations and many other charitable activities and could explain why prospective
donors would choose to turn down incentives. In our version of the model, any potential
compensation for the donation is paid out of the value that is generated by the donation.
The collector of donations is a charitable organization that transforms collected donations
into social value. To increase donations, the collector may find it optimal to pay donors a
dividend from their donation as compensation. Increasing private returns from the donation
comes at the expense of the value that the donation generates for the rest of the society.
This feature of our setup introduces an additional channel through which incentives could
potentially crowd out donations: a crowding out of intrinsic motivation. This channel is
consistent with an earlier literature stemming from Deci (1971, 1975).
To formulate testable predictions that are directly relevant to our research question, we
will substantially simplify the original model by BT.One key simplification is that we assume
agents to be homogeneous in their taste for extrinsic incentives. When this is the case, there
is no scope for signaling greediness (or a lack thereof ). Despite being a common assumption
in economics, a potential drawback of making this simplification is that it prevents the
reputational crowding out from BT, i.e. a situation where extrinsic incentives reduce the
donations of agents who seek to avoid signaling greediness through their actions.
3.2.1 Simple Model
The model economy is characterized by a unit mass of agents indexed by i = {1, ...,∞}
and one collector of donations. This economy is analyzed under two different institutional
settings. We refer to a single market when the collector is bound to pay an exogenously-set
compensation y = ỹ ∈ R+. We refer to a dual market when agents are allowed to choose
remuneration y = {0, ỹ}.
The collector takes donation d from each agent that decides to contribute and transforms
it into social value B ∈ R+. For each contribution, the collector pays remuneration y < B.
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Agents differ along two dimensions: the degree of altruism ai ∼ F (·) with positive
bounded support, and the concern for image xi, which we treat as binary with xi taking
value 1 with probability q (and 0 with probability 1− q). Both ai and xi are independently
distributed random variables. Agents make a decision to contribute d = {0, 1} in exchange
for remuneration y while facing a private cost c. Image concern matters for agents when
actions are taken in public (v = 1) and is irrelevant when actions are taken in private (v = 0).
The utility of agent i can be written as follows:
Ui(d, y) = (1− vxi)[ai(B − y) + y − c]d+ vxiE(a|d, y) (3.1)
where E(a|d, y) is the image that other agents have of agent i given her actions.
From this theoretical setting we derive two propositions that underpin our analysis:
Proposition 3.2.1 (Price discrimination) A dual market for donations increases contributions
compared to a single market where no compensation is available. Compared to a single market
where compensation cannot be turned down, allowing agents to turn down compensation reduces
the cost of collection without affecting the number of donations.
The proof is presented in Appendix 3.A.
The proposition characterizes the effect of various compensation schemes on donations.
It applies when actions are taken in private and in public. Introducing extrinsic incentives
to donate increases donations, irrespective of whether these incentives can be turned down.
Allowing people to turn down incentives, introduces another margin for people to either
express or signal their altruism. Highly altruistic agents donate and choose to turn down
the compensation.
As a result, when incentives can be turned down, average cost of collection decreases
without compromising supply of donations. These two results illustrate how a dual market,
where agents are allowed to choose a remuneration, can bring about efficiency gains in the
collection similar to those deriving from self-selection in second-degree price discrimina-
tion.
The following proposition is directly linked to the previous and highlights the interac-
tion of image effects with price discrimination.
Proposition 3.2.2 (Image effect) The visibility of actions (i) increases participation in the single
as well as in the dual market, and (ii) lowers the average cost of collection in the dual market.
The proof of (ii) follows directly from the observation that the objective of image-concerned
agents who are sufficiently altruistic to donate in private, but not altruistic enough to turn
down compensation y = ỹ, changes when acting in public. In order to improve their social
image, these agents want to pool with the most altruistic agents, who turn down incentives.3
Part (i) is due to the fact that image-concerned agents only care about their image when
acting in public. As a result, even the least-altruistic of these decide to contribute in public
in order to avoid the stigma of looking like the selfish segment of the population.
3This signaling game may not have an equilibrium in pure strategy if the share of image-indifferent agents
who are altruistic enough to turn down the incentives is positive but small compared to the share of image-
concerned agents.
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3.2.2 Behavioral Hypotheses
We re-organize the predictions contained in the two propositions above into three testable
hypotheses. The incentive effect and social image effect hypotheses immediately derive from
propositions 1 and 2, respectively. The sorting hypothesis consolidates predictions from both
proposition to summarize the interaction of social image effects and incentive effects in the
dual market for charitable giving.
Hypothesis 3.2.3 (Incentive Effect) Irrespective of whether actions are visible, the availability
of incentives increases donations.
Hypothesis 3.2.4 (Social Image Effect) Irrespective ofwhether compensation is available, mak-
ing actions visible increases donations.
Hypothesis 3.2.5 (Sorting) In a dual market, a positive share of agents chooses to be not paid.
This share is larger when actions are taken in public.
The incentive effect is consistent with an empirical literature on incentives for donating
blood (Lacetera et al., 2012; Lacetera, Macis, & Slonim, 2013; Mellstrom & Johannesson,
2008; Niessen-Ruenzi et al., 2015). Maybe most closely related to ours is the work by Mell-
strom and Johannesson (2008), who conduct an experiment that offers monetary payments
to prospective blood donors. Their findings suggest that for women (but not for men), mon-
etary incentives can lead to a net crowding out of donations – thought it is difficult to say
whether the results are driven by social signaling or by the fact that incentives lead to a
shift in the perception of the incomplete contract, similar to the finding of Gneezy and
Rustichini (2000). Moreover, they find that letting women turn down the compensation
in favor of a donation to charity fully counteracts this crowding out. Our theoretical setup
can partly explain this counteracting effect, in that for the most altruistic donors (ai > 1)
introducing incentives for charitable giving causes a net utility loss. Such utility loss can
be undone when incentives can be turned down in the dual market. In related work, Chao
(2017) suggests that even opt-in gifts could crowd out donations if they shift attention away
from the intrinsic motivation. In our framework, we abstract from attention as a potential
channel for crowding out. The social image effect is consistent with a growing empirical lit-
erature on the effect of social image or social pressure on charitable actions in particular and
economic behavior more generally (Ariely et al., 2009; Bursztyn & Jensen, 2017; Carpenter
& Myers, 2010; Filiz-Ozbay & Ozbay, 2014; Lacetera & Macis, 2010). Our theoretical
setup predicts that, no matter the incentive scheme, making actions visible should increase
donations. Consistent with our prediction, Landry, Lange, List, Price, and Rupp (2006)
find that both when a charity donation entitles to a lottery ticket and when it does not,
social image concerns do increase monetary donations in a door-to-door fundraiser. They
also find pronounced gender differences, where men are more likely to contribute to a char-
ity when visited by physically attractive female solicitors. The finding that men are more
willing to engage in costly signaling of generosity is consistent with costly signaling the-
ory in evolutionary biology (Gintis, Smith, & Bowles, 2001; Smith & Bird, 2000), which
posits that prosocial behavior can be instrumental in signaling good character and attrac-
tiveness as a potential match. In particular, there is evidence that women in their mating
decision place emphasis on signals indicating resource provision (as opposed to just physical
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attractiveness), which in turn induces men to strategically signal generosity (Barclay, 2010;
Boehm & Regner, 2013; Eagly & Crowley, 1986; Iredale, Van Vugt, & Dunbar, 2008).
Van Vugt and Iredale (2013) call men’s public good contributions the “human equivalent
of a peacock’s tail”. Although our theoretical setup is silent on gender differences, we are
going to investigate these empirically.
Finally, we are not aware of any empirical evidence on the sorting hypothesis as for-
mulated above. It is not obvious whether prospective donors should increase donations
when the choice set is augmented in a way to allow signaling of prosocial orientation ei-
ther through increased donations or by turning down incentives to donate. A large body
of evidence on pure and impure altruism suggests that even when donations are completely
private, a positive share of prospective donors presented with the possibility to contribute
time and effort – with or without compensation – would choose to donate not paid.4 Signal-
ing motives should increase the latent utility of acting prosocially. Increasing the visibility
of actions could strengthen the signaling motive, potentially increasing the share of unpaid
donations. The theory of Benabou and Tirole (2006) accommodates sorting as described
above, but is hard to test empirically. In our theoretical framework, we chose to make sub-
stantial simplifications in order to derive testable hypothesis. We take our experiment as
a first step to validate this simplified framework and to test simple hypotheses that could
guide the field and inform policy on the properties of dual collection systems for charitable
donations.
3.3 Experimental Design and Procedures
3.3.1 General Setup
We test our hypotheses in a laboratory experiment. In our experiment, subjects generate
value for a charity by participating in a real-effort task. For the experimental task, we build
on the “click for charity” design by Ariely et al. (2009). Different from Ariely et al. (2009),
subjects in our framework can choose between participating in the donation task or skipping
the task and taking a fixed payoff as outside option.5 This outside option introduces an
homogeneous private cost of donating on top of the individual cost of exerting effort. If
subjects choose to participate, they can generate a donation by sequentially entering 400 key
sequences on a computer keyboard. One sequence constitutes of four key presses (“w”, “e”, “e”,
“return”). On their screen, subjects see a bar indicating progress towards the required number
of sequences. We chose this task because it is not inherently meaningful or intrinsically
rewarding, and allows us to focus on motivation to exert effort for a charity. Other tasks,
particularly ones that are more gamified, may be differentially appealing to subjects and
thus increase noise and confounds (Charness, Gneezy, & Henderson, 2018). Donations
generated with this real-effort task are paid out to a charity chosen by each subject.f
4See Ottoni-Wilhelm, Vesterlund, and Xie (2014) for a review of the pure and impure altruism literature.
5Without the outside option, the marginal cost of participating in the task could be low enough for lab
subjects to be indifferent between exerting effort and waiting while others exert effort. The outside option
increases the costs of participating in the donation task, so that subjects that are not altruistic and not concerned
about social image should not participate in the task – as predicted by the model.
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We employ a full 3×2 between-subject design where we systematically vary the type of
incentives offered to engage in the donation task (PAID, NOTPAID,CHOOSE) and the vis-
ibility of actions (PUBLIC and PRIVATE). Visibility is randomly varied across experimental
sessions while the incentives offered are randomly varied across all subjects. Table 3.1 sum-
marizes the design.6






y ∈ {0, ỹ}
Private Action
v = 0
n = 46 n = 48 n = 60
Public Action
v = 1
n = 47 n = 62 n = 66
Notes: Rows list visibility treatments, columns list incentive treatments.
n refers to number of subjects in each treatment cell (total of 329 subjects).
y refers to the incentive provided, v to the visibility of actions.
After being assigned to one of six treatments, subjects independently engage in the
donation task. After the first round, subjects learn that there will be two more rounds of
this task. This lets us test our hypotheses both on the extensive and the intensive margin.
Irrespective of the treatment, in each of the three rounds can choose between participating
in the donation task or skipping. Throughout the experiment, we use tokens as experimental
currency. One token is worth 0.04 euro.
3.3.2 Treatments
Along the first dimension of the 3×2 between-subject design we vary the market design, i.e.
the availability of incentives to participate in the donation task. In the first two treatments,
we either provide monetary incentives to participate in the donation task (single market
PAID treatment) or no monetary incentives (single market NOT PAID treatment). In the
third treatment (dual market CHOOSE treatment), subjects are presented with both the
options of a not paid and a paid donation.
The payoffs are set such that donating generates more value for the charity (100 tokens)
than the outside option for the subject (75 tokens). When subjects donate and receive mon-
6We conducted a pilot study of our experimental design online on Amazon Mechanical Turk (N = 408) to
inform the choice between a within-subject and a between-subject design. To address concerns that a crowding-
out effect of incentives may arise either only in an environment where incentives are introduced as a policy
change (within-subject) or only in a market design where people are unaware of alternative institutional en-
vironments, we also considered an experimental design that allowed us to study the transition from a single
market NOT PAID or single market PAID market design to a dual market CHOOSE market design. In this
alternative design, we introduced the dual market to subjects after a first round in the single market design. We
did not find evidence that the single market design has any persistent effects. Between- and within-subject
designs led to qualitatively similar results. We conclude that the initial treatment has no impact on the effec-
tiveness of the CHOOSE treatment. For the current project, we opt for a between-subject design to minimize
potential confounders and demand effects (Charness, Gneezy, & Kuhn, 2012). Appendix 3.E summarizes the
pilot.
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etary incentives for their donation (50 tokens), those reduce the value to charity (from 100
to 50 tokens). Note that the monetary incentives are always smaller than the outside op-
tion. Table 3.2 summarizes the choice set in each of the three treatments and the associated
monetary payoffs in tokens.
Table .: Payoffs to Subject and Benefits to Charity, by Treatment and Subject Choice
Treatment Action space Payoff to subject Benefit to charity
NOT PAID Donate not paid 0 100
Skip 75 0
PAID Donate paid 50 50
Skip 75 0
CHOOSE Donate not paid 0 100
Donate paid 50 50
Skip 75 0
Notes: Experimental Currency: “tokens”, 1 token = 0.04 euro
Along the second dimension of the 3× 2 between-subject design we vary the visibility
of subject actions to make public image salient. In the PRIVATE treatment, subjects are in-
formed that their actions will remain anonymous. Subjects are seated at desktop computers
separated by divider walls and curtains. To maximize anonymity and to rule out that sub-
jects hear each other type while working on the real-effort task, we play a white noise sound
using loudspeakers in the laboratory. We verified that the white noise indeed makes it im-
possible to hear typing from other workstations. We did not receive any complaints from
subjects about this measure. In the PUBLIC treatment, before beginning the donation task,
we inform subjects that they will be asked to reveal their actions in this task in front of all
other subjects in this session. Social image effects thus reflect the full decision environment,
including the incentive choice in the dual market CHOOSE treatment, that each subject
is in. After completing all three rounds we ask subjects to publicly report the number of
donations they made.7 Subjects do so by standing up next to their computer in front of the
divider walls. There is no explicit requirement to truthfully report this information.8 Note,
however, that reporting takes place after all decisions have been made.
3.3.3 Procedures
Our theoretical framework asserts that more altruistic individuals are, ceteris paribus, more
likely to donate to charity. To check that individual levels of altruism are balanced across
treatments, we let all subjects play a simple dictator game before beginning the main ex-
7The intention behind not having subjects reveal the incentives under which they donated was to avoid
confusion from learning about other treatments.
8As an alternative design, we could have publicly announced actual subject choices at the end of the experi-
ment. We decided against this design to stay closer to the theoretical framework of Benabou and Tirole (2006),
where the desire to signal altruism has both instrumental and hedonic origins. We allow for both motivations
by letting subjects state their own actions. To maintain the ecological validity of revealing a prosocial action,
we do not force subjects to say the truth.
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perimental task that lets subjects donate to charity.9 In this dictator game, each subject
is randomly and anonymously paired with another subject and chooses to split 20 tokens
between herself and the anonymous partner. After testing for subject comprehensions, we
let both subjects of the pair play the game as the dictator. At the end of the experiment, the
experimental software randomly determines which of the two subjects determines payoffs
and the game is resolved.
We then introduce a menu of four charities. Three of those charities are chosen be-
cause they are assumed to be well-known among subjects: Doctors Without Borders, the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and the World Wildlife Fund (WWF).
We additionally included the Against Malaria Foundation, which is rated as one of the most
effective charities by the independent charity evaluator GiveWell. Subjects are given a short
description of each charity. We then let each subject choose the charity that they prefer to
donate to throughout the experiment. We do this to reduce potential noise from heteroge-
neous taste for donations to a specific charity. In order to verify balance across treatments,
we ask subjects to rate how they perceive each of the charities and how likely they would be
to donate money to each of them. Finally, we let subjects practice the donation task before
engaging in it for three rounds. In the PUBLIC treatment, subjects publicly report their
actions after the third round of the donation task. Figure 3.1 summarizes the sequence of
tasks in the experiment.
















Treatment kept constant across all three rounds of donation task
At the end of the experiment, we collect demographic data. After each session, we
confidentially pay out the show-up fee and any earnings that subjects have generated for
themselves in the dictator game and the donation task. We also inform subjects about the
amount of money donated to charity on their behalf and provide information on how to
obtain a confirmation of the donation on their behalf.
We implement the computerized experiment in oTree with our own modifications writ-
ten in Python and JavaScript (Chen, Schonger, & Wickens, 2016). A total of 18 exper-
imental sessions were conducted in German at the BonnEconLab in Bonn, Germany, in
April 2017 (n = 329). Sessions included 20 to 24 subjects and lasted approximately 40
minutes. All subjects are students from various majors at the University of Bonn. They
are on average 22 years old, 61 percent are female. Table 3.3 summarizes the sample. On
average, participants earned 10.70 euro for themselves and generated 4 euro for charity.10
9While giving in the dictator game is a well-established measure of generosity vis-à-vis others, it is likely
confounded by perceived social norms. As a result, we only rely on our measure of altruism as a balance check,
but not to establish key empirical results or to analyze heterogeneous treatment effects.
10Subjects from the pool of the BonnEconLab were invited using hroot (Bock, Baetge, & Nicklisch, 2014).
Invitations were restricted to students of the University of Bonn, aged 18–25, with no more than one no-show
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We can verify that the sample is balanced on observable characteristics, including our
measure of altruism measured by the dictator game and preference for the chosen charity.
Using a nonparametric one-way ANOVA on ranks (Kruskal-Wallis) test, we fail to reject
the null hypothesis that the subject pool exhibits the same characteristics across all treatment
groups at the 95 percent level (Table 3.3, column 8).
Table .: Summary Statistics of Observable Characteristics, Full Sample and by Treat-




valueNot paid Paid Choose Not paid Paid Choose
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
a) Measured before treatment
DG: Tokens kept 15.365 14.891 15.271 15.250 15.021 15.677 15.818 0.848
(0.214) (0.621) (0.558) (0.507) (0.618) (0.501) (0.411)
Charity rating 4.602 4.783 4.604 4.583 4.660 4.532 4.515 0.131
(0.043) (0.087) (0.129) (0.072) (0.102) (0.123) (0.100)
b) Socioeconomic characteristics, measured after treatment
Age 21.544 21.630 21.708 21.717 21.511 21.210 21.545 0.499
(0.091) (0.263) (0.223) (0.213) (0.263) (0.184) (0.207)
Female 0.611 0.630 0.521 0.717 0.574 0.613 0.591 0.429
(0.027) (0.072) (0.073) (0.059) (0.073) (0.062) (0.061)
College major 4.398 4.239 4.417 4.400 4.383 4.661 4.258 0.814
(0.100) (0.277) (0.258) (0.224) (0.273) (0.236) (0.221)
Observations 329 46 48 60 47 62 66
Notes: p-value in column (8) is for a one-way ANOVA on ranks (Kruskal-Wallis) test comparing the six treatment groups
in columns (2) to (7). DG refers to the dictator game, in which we gave 20 experimental tokens to participants and asked
them how many they would like to keep. Charity rating refers to the rating that subjects gave to the charity that they chose
to donate to. We asked subjects to agree to the statement “I like the idea of donating money to [chosen charity]” on a
5-point Likert scale where 1 is “strongly disagree” and 5 is “strongly agree”. College major is a categorical variable that
summarizes the departmental affiliation of our student subjects.
3.4 Results
Recall that in each of the three rounds of the donation task, subjects can decide to participate
in or skip the task. In our discussion of results, we consider each participation in the task
as one “donation” (all subjects who choose to participate in the donation task complete it).
Participation in the first round of the donation task lets us measure the extensive margin of
the donation decision. By summing the number of donations across all three rounds, we
can additionally analyze an intensive margin of the decision to donate.
Table 3.4 summarizes those measures and gives an overview of donation behavior across
treatments. Panel I presents the fraction of subjects who decide to participate in each round
while panel II sums the number of rounds that subjects decide to participate in the dona-
tion task. For subjects in the dual market CHOOSE treatment, columns (4) and (5) report
in prior experiments.
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whether subjects choose to be paid. In line with our theoretical predictions, donation be-
havior in the single market PAID and the dual market CHOOSE treatments is statistically
indistinguishable (column 6), both on the extensive margin and the intensive margin.
Table .: Summary Statistics of Behavior in Donation Task (Fractions and
Means, Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Incentive Treatment Incentive Choice p-value
Not paid Paid Choose Not paid Paid H0: Paid=Choose
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
I. Fraction of subjects that participated in the task
a) PRIVATE treatment
Round 1 0.609 0.604 0.667 0.083 0.583 0.504
(0.072) (0.071) (0.061) (0.036) (0.064)
Round 2 0.174 0.396 0.467 0.083 0.383 0.463
(0.056) (0.071) (0.065) (0.036) (0.063)
Round 3 0.348 0.313 0.383 0.067 0.317 0.446
(0.070) (0.067) (0.063) (0.032) (0.061)
Observations 46 48 60 60 60
b) PUBLIC treatment
Round 1 0.766 0.806 0.818 0.136 0.682 0.866
(0.062) (0.050) (0.048) (0.043) (0.058)
Round 2 0.383 0.565 0.591 0.136 0.455 0.763
(0.071) (0.063) (0.061) (0.043) (0.062)
Round 3 0.362 0.484 0.530 0.136 0.394 0.601
(0.070) (0.064) (0.062) (0.043) (0.061)
Observations 47 62 66 66 66
II. Average total number of rounds participated in the task
a) PRIVATE treatment
Sum of all 3 rounds 1.130 1.313 1.517 0.233 1.283 0.290
(0.129) (0.142) (0.135) (0.072) (0.132)
Observations 46 48 60 60 60
b) PUBLIC treatment
Sum of all 3 rounds 1.511 1.855 1.939 0.409 1.530 0.545
(0.124) (0.121) (0.127) (0.105) (0.136)
Observations 47 62 66 66 66
c) Aggregating over both visibility treatments
Sum of all 3 rounds 1.323 1.618 1.738 0.325 1.413 0.348
(0.092) (0.095) (0.094) (0.066) (0.096)
Observations 93 110 126 126 126
Notes: Total sample size is 329 subjects. Subjects can always choose between participating in the donation task
or skipping. P-value in column (6) is for two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test comparing the
outcomes for PAID treatment in column (2) and the CHOOSE treatment in column (3).
In the rest of this section, we pool together observations from PAID and CHOOSE
treatments to estimate the effects of the availability of incentives on donations behavior.
We use this pooled data to provide parametric tests of Hypotheses 1 and 2 on the intensive
margin. Appendix 3.C establishes the same results using non-parametric tests. We then use
data from the dual market CHOOSE treatment to test Hypothesis 3, again on the intensive
margin. We test our three hypotheses on the intensive margin due to better statistical power.
Results are qualitatively similar on extensive margin based on the first round of the donation
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task. In addition to tests of our theoretical hypotheses, we discuss the potential interaction
between incentive and visibility effects and analyze heterogeneous treatment effects across
genders.
3.4.1 Incentive Effects, Social Image Effects, and Sorting
We test our first two hypotheses in a regression framework. Given the count nature of the
outcome variable we use maximum likelihood to estimate the following Poisson regression:
Donationsi = α+ β1PAID&CHOOSEi + β2PUBLICi+
β3PAID&CHOOSEi × PUBLICi +Xiγ + ψi (3.2)
whereDonations is the total number of donations by subject i over all three rounds of
the donation task, PAID&CHOOSE is a dummy for the pooled single market PAID treat-
ment and the dual market CHOOSE treatment, PUBLIC is a dummy for the treatment
in which subjects have to reveal their actions to other participants, X is a vector of con-
trols, and ψ is a Poisson-distributed error term. Table 3.5 presents average marginal effect
estimates while Appendix Table 3.B1 presents the full set of estimated semi-elasticities.
Our results confirm our first behavioral hypothesis, which says that irrespective of whether
actions are visible, the availability of incentives increases donations. We find that compared
to the single market NOT PAID treatment, the availability of incentives does not induce
lower participation in the donation task. This is true irrespective of the visibility of actions.
The estimated average marginal effect in our specification without any other controls indi-
cates that making incentives available leads to an increase of 0.364 donations over all three
rounds (relative to a mean of 1.32 donations in the single market UNPAID treatment). The
effect size is robust to various sets of controls. Introducing the number of tokens kept in the
dictator game as an additional control (Table 3.5, columns 3 to 5) reveals that this measure
of altruism is a strong predictor of participation in the donation task.
Result 3.4.1 (Incentive Effect) Irrespective of whether actions are visible, the availability of
incentives increases donations.
We also find support for our second hypothesis of social image effects. Using the same
Poisson regression in Equation (3.2), we find that irrespective of the incentive treatment,
making actions visible significantly increases the number of donations over all three rounds.
The effect of visibility is of similar magnitude to the incentive effect and is similarly robust
to various sets of controls.
Result 3.4.2 (Social Image Effect) Irrespective of whether compensation is available, making
actions visible increases donations.
We can use our experimental design to assess the potential interaction between incentive
and visibility effects. A prominent result in the literature on charitable giving is that incen-
tive effects negatively interact with image effects (Ariely et al., 2009). In our framework, in
contrast, we do not find a negative interaction between image effects and incentive effects.
In the presence of a salient outside option, small incentives to donate do not appear to spoil
the image of donors. Appendix Table 3.B1 presents semi-elasticities estimated from Equa-
tion (3.2), including for the interaction-term. We estimate a zero interaction effect that is
robust across specifications.
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Table .: Poisson Regression for Total Donations: Average Marginal Effects (Coeffi-
cient Estimates and Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Dependent variable: # of donations over the three rounds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
a) Treatments
PAID&CHOOSE (Baseline: NOT PAID) 0.364∗∗∗ 0.360∗∗∗ 0.432∗∗∗ 0.430∗∗∗ 0.456∗∗∗
(0.124) (0.124) (0.117) (0.117) (0.117)
PUBLIC (Baseline: PRIVATE) 0.454∗∗∗ 0.462∗∗∗ 0.498∗∗∗ 0.499∗∗∗ 0.494∗∗∗
(0.112) (0.111) (0.103) (0.102) (0.102)
b) Controls
Female 0.238∗∗ 0.075 0.030
(0.116) (0.110) (0.110)
DG: Tokens kept -0.099∗∗∗ -0.097∗∗∗ -0.090∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014)
Other Controls No No No No Yes
Observations 329 329 329 329 329
∗p < 0.10; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at individual level. NOT PAID is the base market design treatment. PRIVATE is
the base visibility treatment. DG refers to the dictator game, in which we gave 20 experimental tokens to subjects and
asked them how many they would like to keep. Other controls are age, chosen charity, and individual rating of chosen
charity. Note that due to the presentation of average marginal effects, the interaction (which cannot vary independently)
is omitted.
Finally, our third behavioral hypothesis states that in a dual market, a positive fraction
of donors chooses to be not paid, and that this fraction is larger when actions are observable.
We can test this hypothesis by looking at all subjects in the dual marketCHOOSE treatment.
In each of the three rounds and in each visibility treatment, the fraction of subjects
deciding to not be paid for their donation is significantly larger than zero (Figure 3.2). Ag-
gregating over the three rounds, subjects choose to make 0.23 donations without being paid
in PRIVATE and 0.41 donations without being paid in PUBLIC (Table 3.4, panel II, col-
umn 4). This confirms the first part of our third hypothesis.
Result 3.4.3 (Sorting Into Unpaid) In a dual market, a positive share of agents chooses to be not
paid.
In order to analyze sorting into unpaid donations in the dual market CHOOSE treat-
ment across visibility conditions, we estimate the following multinomial logit random effect
model for the donation decision and the chosen incentive scheme. Each subject i takes de-
cision di ∈ {no participation, unpaid participation, paid participation}:
di,t = α+ βPUBLICi +Xiγ + vi,t (3.3)
where for each subject i and round t, PUBLIC is a dummy for the treatment in which
subjects have to reveal their actions, X is a vector of controls, and vi,t = ci + ui,t is the
error term of the random effect model. Treatment assignment is permanent, but exogenous.
While time invariance of treatment assignment makes the fixed effect model unidentifiable,
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Notes: Bars indicate 95 percent confidence intervals. Standard errors clustered at the individual level.
exogenous treatment assignment meets the random effect assumption and makes this model
specification the natural choice.11
The multinomial logit random effect model provides estimates for the relative probabil-
ity of observing not paid rather than paid donations in the CHOOSE treatments. In the
regression specification without controls, the relative probability increases by 77.3 percent
when actions are visible, and the effect size is fairly stable in specifications with controls
(see Table 3.B2). While this confirms qualitatively the pattern from Figure 3.2, this in-
crease is not statistically significant. We are not powered to detect a relative risk ratio that
is significantly different from unity at any conventional confidence level.
3.4.2 Heterogenous Social Image Effects Across Genders
We find gender-specific effects in the PUBLIC treatment that suggest a differential will-
ingness to engage in costly signaling: Making actions visible increases participation in the
donation task significantly among men in the NOT PAID and CHOOSE treatment. For
women, we find the inverse in that the increase is only significant in the PAID treatment.
Paralleling the analysis above, we use maximum likelihood estimates of a Poisson regres-
11Any specification of the regression equation that includes individual characteristics is prone to bias and
would require testing of the random effects assumption.
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sion. For each incentive treatment, we separately estimate a model of the form:
Donationsi = α+ β1FEMALE + β2PUBLIC
+ β3(FEMALE × PUBLIC) + β4DG+ ψi (3.4)
where for each subject i,Donationsi is a count variable for number of individual donations
over the three rounds of the donation task, and DG is the number of tokens kept in the
dictator game. Table 3.B3 presents estimates of the semi-elasticities, which reveal that
the social image is significantly different across genders only in the dual market CHOOSE
treatments. Figure 3.3 provides graphical illustration of the interaction effect by plotting the
predicted participation in the donation task for each subsample. The heterogeneous effect
of public image is particularly salient in the dual market CHOOSE treatment.
Figure .: Gender-Specific Effects of Visibility Treatment, by Incentive Treatment (Lin-

































































































Notes: Bars indicate 95 percent confidence intervals. Standard errors clustered at the individual level.
We take this as suggestive evidence that men are more willing than women to engage in
costly signaling. Recall that in our framework, choosing to participate in the donation task
represents a signal that is differentially costly across the three donation treatments. Choos-
ing to participate without being paid (either in the NOT PAID or CHOOSE treatments)
carries the largest reputational gains, since subjects who engage in the real effort task incur
the highest opportunity cost by leaving all value to the charity (i.e. they forego the outside
option). In the PAID treatment, subjects can signal their altruism at a lower opportunity
cost (i.e. they forego the outside option minus the individual compensation).
3.5 Discussion and Conclusion
Motivated by the market for blood donations in Germany, where different incentives for
altruism coexist and donors can effectively turn down monetary incentives to donate, we set
out to study a “dual market” for the collection of charitable donations. While incentives
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for prosocial behavior have mostly been studied in isolation and contrast to the absence of
incentives, we explicitly allow agents to turn down a compensation for their donation.
In the case of blood donations in Germany, different blood collectors offer different
incentives and prospective donors can choose where to donate. Donations at the Red Cross
are always unpaid, while donations at hospitals or commercial blood banks are compensated
with 20 to 30 euro. Everyone who lives in one of the 50 largest communities in Germany
can reach an unpaid donation point of the Red Cross within 30 minutes time driving or on
public transport. This compares to about 62 percent of the population who can reach a paid
donation point within 30 minutes time using the same means of transport (see Table 3.D2
for details and and Figure 3.D2 for the spatial distribution of blood collection centers). In
Meyer and Tripodi (2018), Chapter 3 of this dissertation, we survey knowledge of various
institutions to donate blood in the city of Bonn and find awareness for paid and unpaid
options to be similar (Table 3.D3).12 While donors appear to be able to choose whether
or not they want to be paid, unpaid donations still represent more than 70 percent of all
donations in Germany (Paul-Ehrlich-Institut, 2018). Incidentally, the German market also
has the highest per capita rate of donations among all 172 countries that report to the WHO
and comparatively low wholesale prices for human blood. Germany has the highest number
of donations at 57.3 per 1,000 people, compared to 49.2 in Sweden and 43.7 in the United
States. The cost of one blood unit on the German wholesale market is among the lowest in
the world at about $110, compared to $190 in Sweden and Switzerland (Trimborn, 2009)
and about $211 in the United States (Toner et al., 2012).13 Appendix 3.D provides more
details on the German market for whole blood donations.
We study such a dual market in a stylized environment. The results from our laboratory
experiment support our three behavioral hypotheses. We confirm our first hypothesis, which
predicts that introducing a compensation for a donation should increase giving. In the
dual market, the availability of extrinsic incentives does not crowd out intrinsic motivations
of donors. In fact, giving significantly increases compared to the market design in which
donations are not paid. These findings stand in contrast with the influential work of Titmuss
(1971), who argued that paid blood donations could crowd out the intrinsic motivation to
donate and lead to a net drop in donations.
For a simple illustration of the effect size, we can use the average marginal effects from
the Poisson regression of the number of individual donations over the three rounds on treat-
ment indicators, a gender dummy, and the number of tokens kept in the dictator game
(Table 3.B4, column 5). Holding everything else constant, the predicted number of dona-
tions in a dual market is 0.473 standard deviations larger than in the single market where
donations are not paid. This is equivalent to the estimated effect of moving from the 20th
percentile to the 60th percentile in the distribution of “generosity” of subjects as measured
by the dictator game, again holding everything else constant.
12Meyer and Tripodi (2018) interview about 1,000 randomly sampled customers of the municipal service
center in Bonn, a mid-sized city in the west of Germany. Although the data is not representative for Germany,
we take awareness of both paid and unpaid collection centers, for a rich set of demographic groups in an urban
area, as confirmation that the choice between incentives for donating blood is indeed salient for a non-negligible
share of the population.
13We calculate per capita donations based on the total number of whole blood donations collected in the
years 2011 to 2013 (World Health Organization, 2017). We use the latest year available for all countries that
report to the WHO. Population data comes from the World Bank World Development Indicator database.
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Offering a compensation and letting agents turn down the compensation lets the col-
lection system leverage the heterogeneity in individual preferences. This enables efficiency
gains in the collection similar to those deriving from self-selection in second-degree price
discrimination. Our sorting hypothesis states that in a dual market, a positive fraction of
donors chooses to be not paid and that this fraction is bigger when actions are taken in
public. We find that when given the option to turn down the compensation, a significant
fraction of donors choose to do so, though we find only weak evidence that donors turn
down incentives more in public than in private.
This result complements the findings of Lacetera, Macis, and Slonim (2014), who con-
duct a field experiment in which the American Red Cross offers gift cards as incentive to
donate blood. They report that after donating, virtually none (2 percent) of the offered
cards were turned down. In their setting, the ability to turn down incentives is not salient
to prospective donors in their decision to come to the donation drive. Moreover, there is
no clear signaling motive for turning down the gift card. In our setting, the two incen-
tive schemes carry different utility in terms of private benefit and signaling value. With
this choice between the two different incentives schemes, our dual market should be more
effective at leveraging heterogeneity in individual preferences.
Even though we cannot provide strong evidence that sorting operates through social
image concerns, we do find robust support of our second hypothesis, which states that visi-
bility of actions increases donations irrespective of the type of available incentives. We can
again use the average marginal effects from Poisson regression (Table 3.B4, column 4) to il-
lustrate the effect size of social image. Making actions observable while holding everything
else constant increases the predicted number of donations by 0.493 standard deviations. This
is slightly larger than the estimated effect of moving from the 20th percentile to the 60th
percentile in the distribution of “generosity” of subjects as measured by the dictator game,
again holding everything else constant.
The single market PAID and NOT PAID treatments allow us to compare our findings to
the existing literature. In contrast to previous work, we do not find that social image effects
attenuate incentive effects (Ariely et al., 2009; Carpenter & Myers, 2010). Individuals in
our experiment have an outside option that is larger than the monetary incentives to donate,
so that homo economicus would never choose to donate. Both our work and Ariely et al.
(2009) are based on the theoretical framework of Benabou and Tirole (2006).
Our findings suggest that in this framework, a salient outside option makes incentivized
donations more likely to signal altruism and less likely to signal greed. This attenuates the
image-spoiling effects of incentives that can bring about a negative interaction between
incentive and image effects.
Our findings also suggest a gender-specific willingness to engage in costly signaling
that could be interpreted as consistent with gender-specific aversion to standing out (Jones
& Linardi, 2014) as well as with costly signaling theory in evolutionary biology (Gintis et
al., 2001; Smith & Bird, 2000) and strategic signalling of generosity among men (Barclay,
2010; Boehm & Regner, 2013; Eagly & Crowley, 1986; Iredale et al., 2008).
Our findings have implications for the design of mechanisms for the collection of char-
itable donations. Applied to the collection of whole blood donations, our results could
inform the design and regulation of systems that use monetary incentives. Because volun-
tary provision of blood donations is often insufficient (Whitaker, Rajbhandary, Kleinman,
Harris, & Kamani, 2016), demand for blood is likely increasing in the future (Greinacher,
Fendrich, Brzenska, Kiefel, & Hoffmann, 2011), and modern screening technologies ap-
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pear sufficiently safe to counter adverse selection (Offergeld, Faensen, Ritter, & Hamouda,
2005), several countries are now re-evaluating partial reliance on incentivized or paid do-
nations (Lacetera et al., 2013). Even small efficiency gains in these collection systems can
imply economicallymeaningful savings for public health budgets. In theUnites States alone,
about 13.6 million blood units are collected every year at a total value of more than USD 3
billion.14
Our results suggest that having different institutions provide distinct incentive schemes
can improve the efficiency of the market compared to the case of all institutions offering
the same incentives. In such a market, collectors may be able to increase donations by
making image concerns more salient. In the case of Germany, the institution that offers
unremunerated donations and has most to gain from making donations visible – the Red
Cross – in fact largely relies on highly visible mobile drives for its collection.
Our results point to various avenues for future research. First, it would be good to
better understand the mechanisms through which sorting into unpaid donations operates
both in theGerman bloodmarket and in general. While our theoretical framework suggests
that social image effects should play a key role, our experimental data provides only weak
evidence to support this hypothesis. Second, our setting does not appear to suffer from the
negative interaction of social image effects and incentive effects that has been found in the
previous literature. Empirical studies to determine if and when incentives spoil image utility
constitute fruitful avenue for future research. Third, we cannot rule out that specific features
of our experimental task undermine the external validity of our findings. While we used a
task that is popular in the literature because it is not inherently meaningful and lends itself to
a test of subject motivation, there is scope for future work in less stylized settings. Finally, we
hope this work stimulates theoretical efforts on the characterization of competitive aspects of
dual markets that would allow us to better understand the endogenous formation and social
welfare implications of such institutional arrangements–important matters from which we
largely abstract in this chapter.
14Back-of-the-envelope calculation based on 2007 US data from Toner et al. (2012).
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3.A Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
The proposition is composed of two statements. First statement: “A dual market for
donations increases contributions compared to a single market where no incentives are available.”
When actions are private, the utility of any agent i can be re-written as
Ui(d, y) =
{
[ai(B − y) + y − c]d, Dual Market: y ∈ {0, ỹ}
[aiB − c]d, Single Market - No Incentives y = 0
Availability of incentives ỹ > 0 does not affect donation behavior of highly altruistic
agents (ai > 1), who can choose to turn down the incentive, gaining utility
aiB − c > ai(B − ỹ) + ỹ − c.
At the same time, the availability of incentives get agents for whom
aiB − c < 0 < ai(B − ỹ) + ỹ − c
involved in the donation.
When actions take place in public, the same as above applies for image-indifferent
agents. Image-concerned agents will now focus instead on taking the action that sends
the best possible signal about their degree of altruism. Independence in the distribution of
the degree of altruism and image concern implies that image-concerned agents would never
refrain from donating, as doing so would send the worst possible signal about their degree
of altruism.
Second statement: “Compared to a single market where conditional incentives are automatic
and cannot be turned down, allowing to turn down incentives reduces the cost of collection without
affecting the number of donations.”
When actions are private, the utility of any agent i can be re-written as
Ui(d, y) =
{
[ai(B − y) + y − c]d, Dual Market: y ∈ {0, ỹ}
[ai(B − ỹ) + ỹ − c]d, Single Market - with Incentives
Define the share of highly altruistic agents as s(a) = Pr(ai > 1). Because B >
c, a s(a) share of agents would donate irrespective of the availability of incentives, even
though their intrinsic motivation to donate is partially crowded out in a single market with
incentives. Allowing agents, in a dual market, to sort out of incentives un-does the described
crowding out of intrinsic motivation to donate and reduces the average cost of collection.
When actions take place in public, the same as in private applies for image-indifferent
agents. For image concerned agents, we need to show that participation is unaffected by
the possibility of turning down incentives. Therefore, we need to show that in neither a
single incentivized market nor in a dual market image concerned agents want to abstein
from donating. The proof goes by contradiction.
In a dual market, suppose there exists a pure strategy equilibrium in which all image
concerned agents were to not donate. Any one of these agents could deviate from the
equilibrium by donating and turning down the compensation to mimic the most altruistic
image indifferent agents. Such deviation would improve the reputation of this agent, hence
her utility. A contradiction.
Similarly, in the single incentivized market the profitable deviation is represented by the
reputational gain of donating with incentives.
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Table .B: Poisson Regression for Total Individual Donations: Semi-
Elasticities (Coefficient Estimates and Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Dependent variable: # of donations over the three rounds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
a) Treatments
Paid&Choose (baseline: Not Paid) 0.232∗ 0.232∗ 0.261∗∗ 0.260∗∗ 0.294∗∗
(0.133) (0.132) (0.121) (0.121) (0.120)
Public (baseline: Private) 0.290∗∗ 0.298∗∗ 0.299∗∗ 0.301∗∗ 0.320∗∗
(0.141) (0.140) (0.132) (0.131) (0.129)
Paid&Choose × Public -0.004 -0.008 0.021 0.020 -0.010
(0.163) (0.162) (0.152) (0.152) (0.150)
b) Controls
Female 0.151∗∗ 0.048 0.019
(0.075) (0.070) (0.070)
DG: Dictator kept -0.062∗∗∗ -0.061∗∗∗ -0.057∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Other controls No No No No Yes
Observations 329 329 329 329 329
∗p < 0.10; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at individual level. NOT PAID is the base market design treatment.
PRIVATE is the base visibility treatment. Other controls include age, chosen charity, and individual rating of
chosen charity.
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Table .B: Random Effects Regressions: Relative Risk Ratios
(Coefficient Estimates and Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Dependent variable: Incentive Choice
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
a) Treatment
Public 1.747 1.652 1.862 1.705 2.229
(1.278) (1.155) (1.439) (1.257) (1.585)
b) Controls
Female 0.719 0.552 0.601
(0.531) (0.420) (0.456)
DG: Tokens kept 0.928 0.915 0.934
(0.104) (0.102) (0.104)
Other controls No No No No Yes
Observations 378 378 378 378 378
∗p < 0.10; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01 for relative risk ratios different from unity.
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. PRIVATE is the base visibil-
ity treatment. The incentive choice dependent variable only applies to the 126 subjects
in CHOOSE treatment over three rounds. Incentive choice takes value ”0” if subject
skips, ”1” if participates unpaid, and ”2” if participates paid to the donation task in a
given round. The table reports relative risk ratio for outcome ”1” unpaid participation
and base outcome ”2” paid participation.
Table .B: Poisson Regression for Total In-
dividual Donations: Semi-Elasticities (Coeffi-
cient Estimates and Standard Errors in Paren-
theses)
Incentive Treatment Subsamples
Not paid Paid Choose
(1) (2) (3)
a) Gender dummy× visibility treatment
Public 0.483∗ 0.342 0.713∗∗∗
(0.253) (0.210) (0.268)
Female 0.230 0.086 0.357
(0.242) (0.196) (0.258)
Public × Female -0.285 0.026 -0.584∗
(0.293) (0.251) (0.315)
b) Controls
DG: Tokens kept -0.050∗∗∗ -0.053∗∗∗ -0.083∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.015) (0.019)
Observations 93 110 126
∗p < 0.10; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at individual level. NOT
PAID is the base market design treatment. PRIVATE is the base
visibility treatment. DG refers to the dictator game, in which
we gave 20 experimental tokens to subjects and asked them how
many they would like to keep.
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Table .B: Poisson Regression for Total Individual Donations (Coefficient Es-
timates and Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Dependent variable: # of donations over the three rounds
Semi-elasticities Average marginal effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
a) Treatments
Paid 0.149 0.183 0.205 0.268∗∗ 0.322∗∗∗ 0.333∗∗∗
(0.157) (0.142) (0.140) (0.129) (0.121) (0.118)
Choose 0.294∗∗ 0.318∗∗ 0.363∗∗∗ 0.409∗∗∗ 0.476∗∗∗ 0.512∗∗∗
(0.145) (0.131) (0.131) (0.128) (0.117) (0.118)
Public 0.290∗∗ 0.301∗∗ 0.320∗∗ 0.451∗∗∗ 0.496∗∗∗ 0.492∗∗∗
(0.141) (0.131) (0.129) (0.107) (0.098) (0.097)
Paid × Public 0.056 0.065 0.043
(0.189) (0.175) (0.172)
Choose × Public -0.044 -0.008 -0.043
(0.179) (0.165) (0.163)
b) Controls
Female 0.040 0.010 0.064 0.016
(0.069) (0.070) (0.109) (0.111)
DG: Tokens kept -0.062∗∗∗ -0.057∗∗∗ -0.097∗∗∗ -0.091∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.013) (0.013)
Other controls No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 329 329 329 329 329 329
∗p < 0.10; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at individual level. NOT PAID is the base market design treatment.
PRIVATE is the base visibility treatment. DG refers to the dictator game, in which we gave 20 experimental
tokens to subjects and asked them how many they would like to keep. Other controls include age, chosen
charity, and individual rating of chosen charity.
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3.C Appendix: Non-Parametric Tests of Hypotheses 1 and 2
Given that treatment assignment is random and experimental subjects are balanced on ob-
servables across treatments, we can use non-parametric tests as an additional robustness
check to our main results.
Non-parametric analysis confirms the first behavioral hypothesis, which says that ir-
respective of whether actions are visible, the availability of incentives increases donations.
When actions are taken in PRIVATE, the average number of donations increases from 1.13
inNOTPAID to 1.43 in PAID&CHOOSE. When actions are taken in PUBLIC, the average
number of donations increases from 1.51 in NOT PAID to 1.9 in PAID&CHOOSE.
Pairwise two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) tests confirm that making
incentives available increases the number of donations both in PRIVATE (z = −1.680,
p = 0.093) and in PUBLIC (z = −2.520, p = 0.012).
We also find support for our second hypothesis of social image effects. Irrespective of the
incentive treatment, making actions visible significantly increases the number of donations
over all three rounds. In the NOT PAID treatment, making actions visible increases the
total number of donations from 1.13 in PRIVATE to 1.51 in PUBLIC. In PAID&CHOOSE,
making actions visible increases donations from 1.43 to 1.9.
Pairwise two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum tests (Table 3.C1 columns 3 and 4) reject equal
distributions of donations between PRIVATE and PUBLIC treatments both in NOT PAID
(z = −2.247, p = 0.025) and in PAID&CHOOSE (z = −3.512, p < 0.001) market
designs. Table 3.C1 below summarizes these test results.
Table .C: Incentive and Social Image Effects: Non-Parametric Analysis
Not Paid vs. Paid&Choose Private vs. Public
Private Public Not Paid Paid&Choose
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Difference in average donations 0.295 0.388 0.380 0.473
z-score -1.680 -2.520 -2.247 -3.512
p-value 0.093 0.012 0.025 0.000
N 154 175 93 236
Notes: Test statistics are for the total number of rounds participated in the donation task based on a
two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum test.
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3.D Appendix: Germany’s Market for Whole Blood Donations
Our model and experiment is motivated by possible sorting of blood donors in Germany.
In this section we provide further details on the German market for whole blood donations.
We first provide general institutional backgroound, then summarise a mapping exercise to
better understand the possible role of transportation costs in this market, and finally provide
survey evidence to shed light on potential informational frictions.
3.D.1 Institutional Background
With a total of 7.2 million donations or 89 donations per 1,000 people, Germany is the fifth-
largest blood supplier in the world. Of the 4.4 million whole blood donations collected in
2014, about 71 percent of whole blood donations were collected by the German Red Cross,
which generally never pays its donors. The remaining 29 percent represent the military,
private donors, and larger hospitals (Paul-Ehrlich-Institut, 2018). Figure 3.D1 plots the
share of different whole blood collectors from 2000 to 2017 and illustrates that the share of
the German Red Cross has been roughly stable over the past two decades.







2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
German Red Cross
Public sector, hospitals, other 
non-profit organizations, army
Private sector
Source: Paul-Ehrlich-Institut (2018). Notes: German Red Cross donations are always unpaid.
Hospitals and the private sector commonly pay their whole blood donors, sometimes
up to USD 30 per donation.15 TheGerman legal framework (Transfusionsgesetz §10) recom-
mends unpaid donations but provides for an unspecifiedmonetary “compensation” (Aufwand-
sentschädigung). It is interesting to note that the German Red Cross, as quasi-monopolist,
has unsuccessfully taken legal action to stop remunerated donations. Most recently in
2012, the Higher Administrative Court of Rhineland-Palatinate (Oberverwaltungsgericht
15It is difficult to estimate exact numbers because the German government does not publish data on blood
donations by type of remuneration, while the relevant WHO database on blood donations is not nationally
representative.
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Rheinland-Pfalz) dismissed legal action of the German Red Cross against the university
hospital in Mainz, who regularly pays its donors. The court found the payment to be lawful.
See also Oberverwaltungsgericht Rheinland-Pfalz (2013).
3.D.2 Transportation Costs
To better understand if prospective donors can indeed choose between different options or
if the market is simply geographically segmented into different incentive schemes, we map
donation points and calculate average travel time to paid and to unpaid donation points for
a significant share of the German population. This gives us an idea of how easy or difficult
it is to donate at paid and unpaid donation points.
We collect address data for all 35 locations of Germany’s largest commercial blood bank
(Haema AG), all 36 locations of German university hospitals that have their own blood
collection services, and all 30 fixed donation points of the German Red Cross. We also
scrape the website of the German Red Cross to obtain locations of all mobile donation
drives from November 2016 to early January 2017.
We geocode all 9,306 locations using the Google Maps API (Figure 3.D2). For the 50
largest communities in terms of population in Germany (politisch selbstständige Gemeinden),
representing about 27 percent of the population, we again use Google Maps API to find
all donation sites that are either 30 minutes away from the community midpoint on public
transport or 30 minutes away from the midpoint when driving under traffic conditions on
October 17, 2016 at 9am. We limit ourselves to the 50 largest communities in order to
make the distance calculations and geocoding of addresses more feasible. Similarly, we set
an arbitrary 30 minute limit on travel time away from the community midpoint to make
computations more feasible.
We find that it is not significantly more difficult to reach a paid donation site than it is
to reach an unpaid donation site. In the 50 largest communities, it takes about 2.5 minutes
longer to reach a paid donation point than it takes to reach an unpaid donation point on
public transport or driving. Restricting the analysis to public transport, it takes about 5
minutes longer to reach a paid donation point (Table 3.D1). Put differently, everyone who
lives in one of the 50 largest communities in Germany can reach an unpaid (Red Cross)
donation point within 30 minutes time driving or on public transport. This compares to
about 62 percent of the population who can reach a paid (hospital or Haema AG) donation
point within 30 minutes time using the same means of transport (Table 3.D2).
These calculations make numerous simplifying assumptions and should thus be seen
as merely indicative. Most importantly, we do not discount the fact that most Red Cross
locations in our analysis are temporary (mobile) donation drives that often only collect do-
nations on a specific day. This stands in contrast to the paid donation points that are all
fixed and have regular opening hours. The travel times above can thus be seen as a lower
bound on how long it takes to reach an unpaid donation site.
3.D.3 Survey Evidence on Awareness of Different Institutions
In Chapter 3 of this dissertation (Meyer & Tripodi, 2018), we conduct a field experiment
in Bonn, Germany, to study how social pressure affects pledges to give blood. As part of
this experiment, we also assessed individuals’ awareness of different institutions to donate
blood.
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Figure .D: Map of Germany with Fixed Blood Donation Locations and Density of Red
Cross Mobile Donation Drives
Source: Own compilation, Google Maps API, CARTO. Map tiles by Stamen Design, used under CC BY 3.0
license. Map data Openstreetmap, used under ODbL license. Notes: German Red Cross locations of mobile
donation drives from November 2016 to early January 2017 are presented.
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Table .D: Travel Time to Nearest Blood Donation Point in 50 Largest
German Communities, by Incentive Offered and Mode of Transport (Min-
utes)
Driving Public transport
Distance from community geographic midpoint Not paid Paid Not paid Paid
<30 min driving 7.2 11.7 - -
<30 min public transport or driving 7.8 10.3 8.5 13.4
Sources: Own compilation, Google Maps API, Statistisches Bundesamt (2016).
Notes: Sample consists of the 50 largest communities (politisch selbständige Gemeinden) in
Germany, dated March 31, 2016. No monetary incentives refers to 9,236 donation centers
and mobile donation drives of the German Red Cross. Monetary incentives refers to 35
commercial donation centers of Haema and 36 university hospitals with blood donation units.
Travel distances calculated using Google Maps API for traffic conditions on October 17,
2016 at 9am. See text for detailed description of methodology.
Table .D: Share of Population with Access to Blood Donation Points in 50 Largest
German Communities, by Incentive Offered
Distance to community geographic midpoint Access to unpaid donation Access to paid donation
Less than 30 min driving 1.00 0.69
Less than 30 minutes by public transport or driving 1.00 0.62
Sources: Own compilation, Google Maps API, Statistisches Bundesamt (2016).
Notes: Sample consists of the 50 largest communities (politisch selbständige Gemeinden) in Germany, dated
March 31, 2016. No monetary incentives refers to 9,236 donation centers and mobile donation drives of
the German Red Cross. Monetary incentives refers to 35 commercial donation centers of Haema and 36
university hospitals with blood donation units. Travel distances calculated using Google Maps API for
traffic conditions on October 17, 2016 at 9am.
We recruit subjects using an intercept survey among customers of the service centre
of the Bonn municipal government. The service centre, centrally located in the city hall,
provides a wide range of in-person administrative services such as applications for official
documents, driver’s licenses, registration of motor vehicles, and payments for city services.
Customers arrive at the service centre for appointments that they have previously scheduled
online or via telephone. We administer our survey while customers wait for their appoint-
ment in a designated waiting area. Participation in the survey is particularly high consid-
ering the lack of incentives. About 75 percent of the 1,675 subjects approached agreed to
participate and 57 percent completed the survey before being called up for an appointment.
For each blood collecting institution, Table 3.D3 presents the share of interviewed sub-
jects declaring to be aware of the blood collection activity in the city of Bonn. Over the
whole sample, 86.5 percent is aware of the German Red Cross, while 72.9 percent are aware
of at least one of the paying institutions (among Haema and the Bonn University Hospi-
tal).16 We also break down the share of aware subjects by gender and age group: women
16We are aware of other smaller institutions collecting blood in the country. These do not constitute a
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seem to be generally more aware than men, and older people slightly more aware than the
younger. Over all categories, people seem to be more aware of the unpaid option but not
dramatically so. We take this data as suggestive evidence of a dual market for blood in the
city of Bonn.
Table .D: Market Awareness in Bonn (Shares and Standard Errors in
Parentheses)
Incentive scheme Paid
Not paid (DRK) Paid (Haema/Uni) Haema Uni N
Whole sample 0.865 0.729 0.147 0.706 941(0.011) (0.014) (0.012) (0.015)
by gender
Female 0.900 0.784 0.184 0.753 490(0.014) (0.019) (0.018) (0.020)
Male 0.827 0.670 0.106 0.654 451(0.018) (0.022) (0.015) (0.022)
by age group
18 to 24 0.869 0.777 0.153 0.742 229(0.022) (0.028) (0.024) (0.029)
25 to 34 0.847 0.731 0.197 0.703 320(0.020) (0.025) (0.022) (0.026)
35 to 44 0.850 0.647 0.087 0.642 173(0.027) (0.036) (0.021) (0.037)
45 to 54 0.895 0.737 0.117 0.725 171(0.024) (0.034) (0.025) (0.034)
55 to 64 0.917 0.750 0.104 0.708 48(0.040) (0.063) (0.045) (0.066)
Source: Meyer and Tripodi (2018)
Notes: Data based on a random sample of 941 subjects interviewed in the waiting area of the
Bonn city hall.
relevant market share in the city of Bonn and we did not include them in our survey.
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3.E Appendix: Online Pilot Study
We conducted a pilot study of our experimental design online on Amazon Mechanical Turk.
In the online experiment, we take advantage of the high degree of anonymity to implement
only the PRIVATE treatment. Instead of the 3× 2 between-subject design of our main lab-
oratory experiment, we considered an alternative within-subject design that introduces the
dual market treatment after the first donation round. This design lets us study the transition
from a single market treatment to a dual market, accounting for potential carryover effects.
3.E.1 Experimental Design and Procedures
Paralleling the laboratory experiment, three treatments determine the incentive scheme un-
der which subjects can perform the real effort task. In addition, subjects can always skip
participation and take an outside option of 75 tokens. We provide either monetary incen-
tives to donate (PAID; 50 tokens to subject, 50 tokens to charity), or no monetary incentives
(NOT PAID; 100 tokens to charity), or we let subjects choose among one of the two incen-
tive schemes (CHOOSE).
Subjects engage in the real effort task for three rounds. In the first round, we administer
the three treatments in a between-subject design. After the first round we introduce the
CHOOSE treatment for subjects that were PAID in the first round and for a random sub-
sample of subjects that were in the NOT PAID treatment in the first round. This results in
four distinct treatments.
A total of 408 subjects were recruited for seven session between May and October 2016.
Most subjects are from the United States (81.1 percent), have completed college degrees
(70.3 percent), and are mostly male (57.1 percent). The average subject is 33 years old.
Double participation is ruled out. We pay a show-up fee for completing the experiment
of $0.40. 1 token is worth $0.04. On average, subjects earned $1.04 for themselves and
generated $0.37 for charity. Sessions lasted circa 20 minutes.
3.E.2 Results
Table 3.E1 summarises treatment assignment and results for each treatment and round,
Figure 3.E1 illustrates the share of subjects participating in the donation task and the share
of subjects choosing to not be paid.
Consistent with findings from the lab, we do not find that introducing monetary incen-
tives crowds out participation in the donation task. In the dual market CHOOSE treatment,
subjects are significantly more likely to participate in the donation task than in the single
market NOT PAID treatment. Among subjects in the NOT PAID treatment in the first
round, those that are randomised into CHOOSE in the second round are significantly more
likely to participate in the donation. We take this as suggestive evidence that transitioning
from a single market design where no one is paid to a dual market design in which donors
can choose to be paid to give can increase donations.
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Table .E: Distribution of Treatments, Subject Participation, and Subject
Incentive Choice in Online Experiment (Number of Subjects)
Treatment Total Participation choice Incentive choice
Skip Participate Not paid Paid
Round 1
Round 1 NOT PAID, then CHOOSE 97 65 32 32 -
Round 1 PAID, then CHOOSE 100 47 53 - 53
Always CHOOSE 110 45 65 8 57
Always NOT PAID 101 64 37 37 -
Round 2
Round 1 NOT PAID, then CHOOSE 97 50 47 14 33
Round 1 PAID, then CHOOSE 100 52 48 10 38
Always CHOOSE 110 59 51 8 43
Always NOT PAID 101 76 25 25 -
Round 3
Round 1 NOT PAID, then CHOOSE 97 57 40 11 29
Round 1 PAID, then CHOOSE 100 60 40 13 27
Always CHOOSE 110 62 48 6 42
Always NOT PAID 101 73 28 28 -
Notes: 408 subjects. Last two columns refer to subjects not skipping the donation task.
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Round 1 NOT PAID, then CHOOSE
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Always NOT PAID
(b) Participation in NOT PAID
Notes: Bars indicate 95 percent confidence intervals. In panel (b), the share of subjects participating not paid
is conditional on not skipping the donation task.
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4.1 Introduction
Eliciting human tissue donations is a constant challenge for healthcare providers and blood
banks. Explicitly or implicitly appealing to image concerns of prospective donors is a com-
monly used tool to elicit such donations. We want to be seen by the people around us as
doing good, as being generous and altruistic. Costly prosocial behavior such as donations of
time, money, or body tissue, can act as a signal to others that demonstrates such generosity
(Benabou&Tirole, 2006). Although people do not always welcome such signaling opportu-
nities (Andreoni, Rao, & Trachtman, 2017; DellaVigna, List, & Malmendier, 2012), social
image concerns can be leveraged to induce individuals to behave in socially desirable ways,
including giving to charity (Ariely, Bracha, & Meier, 2009; Meyer & Tripodi, 2017), vot-
ing (Gerber, Green, & Larimer, 2008), and participating in energy conservation programs
(Yoeli, Hoffman, Rand, & Nowak, 2013).
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In many settings, however, prosocial actions themselves cannot be made public. One
way for individuals to still benefit from public recognition of their prosocial activities is to
demonstrate proof of contribution ex-post, for example by wearing a lapel pin for blood
donors or sharing a picture of volunteer activity on social media. Charities often recognize
donors on publicly-visible plaques or donor walls. Ex-ante, social pressure can be leveraged
by encouraging public pledges to act charitably in the future. Such pledges are used to rally
individuals to contribute to future charitable activities, for example through public calls for
action in online and offline social networks.1 These pledges are the focus of our study.
Two steps are involved for a pledge to increase contributions to a charitable activity:
First, individuals need to take up the initial commitment. Second, individuals need to
follow through and fulfill their pledge. In this chapter, we set out to study how social image
concerns affect both of these steps.
In the first step, an observable promise to do good – similar to an observable act of
doing good – can be used to signal generosity to others.2 This signaling process will be the
focus of our field experiment. Building on a simple theoretical framework, we study three
channels through which social image effects can affect the uptake of pledges: the degree
to which an individual cares about being seen by others as “doing good” by taking a pledge,
the expectation that an individual has over how socially-desirable others around her perceive
her pledge, and the ability of others to update their beliefs about an individual, given her
pledge.
In the second step, various mechanisms can explain why individuals would renege or
follow through. A pledge can produce an internal commitment that individuals with pref-
erences for moral consistency (Cialdini & Trost, 1998; Cioffi & Garner, 1996) or promise-
keeping (Charness & Dufwenberg, 2006) might not want to break.3 Increasing the psycho-
logical costs of reneging could then increase follow up (Andreoni & Serra-Garcia, 2017).
Given the challenges of disentangling these mechanisms in our context, we study the second
step empirically.
We conduct a field experiment in a the mid-sized German city where various organiza-
tions compete for prospective blood donors. In the service center of the municipal govern-
ment located in the city hall, we approach customers waiting for their appointment with a
1A well known example is The Giving Pledge (givingpledge.org), which encourages wealthy people to
contribute a majority of their wealth to philanthropic causes. In the domain of human tissue donations, the
pharmaceutical company Abbott has been conducting a global media campaign to promote blood donations.
The campaign features celebrities in YouTube clips and encourages individuals to “make a pledge and BE THE
1 [to save a life]”, with the hope that these individuals fulfill their pledge (“Pledging is only the first step in
the BE THE 1 campaign. Now that you’ve made your pledge, keep your promise by finding your donation
center and scheduling an appointment to donate blood and plasma”). It also encourages sharing of this pledge
on social media (bethe1donor.com/join).
2Andreoni and Serra-Garcia (2017) provide an alternative explanation and illustrate how people may want
to substitute immediate donations with pledges to donate to help overcome pressure to give (Andreoni et
al., 2017; DellaVigna et al., 2012) and time inconsistency in their preferences for giving (Dreber, Fudenberg,
Levine, & Rand, 2016; Saito, 2015).
3Vanberg (2008) points out that behavioral accounts that can explain why people stick to a promise include
both a social preference of guilt aversion (Ellingsen & Johannesson, 2004; Ostrom, Walker, & Gardner, 1992)
and a social norm of promise keeping (Battigalli & Dufwenberg, 2007; Dufwenberg & Gneezy, 2000), and
provides evidence for the latter as primary motive for people to stick to pledges.
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short questionnaire and an offer to sign up for blood drives scheduled in the city over the
following weeks.
The experiment randomly varies treatments over two dimensions: In the first dimen-
sion, we vary the organization holding the blood drive. We work with the German Red
Cross, which generally never pays its donors, and a private commercial blood bank, which
remunerates donors with 20 euro per donation. In the second dimension, we vary whether
the sign-up is offered in private on a tablet computer only visible to our subject, or in public
by our enumerator. Other customers as well as friends and family members coming along
to the appointment serve as a natural “audience” for the public pledge. The sign-up is not
binding, but represents a pledge vis-à-vis the blood collector. In the months after the survey,
we observe whether our subjects indeed choose to donate by matching their names with the
databases of the two collectors.
The share of subjects who sign up to donate blood at the German Red Cross increases
by about 30 percent when the pledge is observed by the natural audience in the city hall
waiting room, compared to a baseline rate 23.2 percent of pledges made in private. This
effect is entirely driven by individuals that visit the municipal service center with friends or
family: their pledging rate increases from 23.6 percent in private to 44.8 percent in public.
On the other hand, people visiting the service center alone and people for whom we elicit
a pledge to donate blood at the commercial blood bank are not affected by the visibility
manipulation.
We interpret this evidence as consistent with our theoretical framework in which image
returns from prosocial actions are highest when these are unambiguously prosocial and ob-
served by people we care about.4 Turning to actual blood donations from individuals in our
study, we find that less than 1 percent fulfilled their pledges. This strikingly low rate makes
it hard to investigate how our treatment manipulations affected donations. We discuss po-
tential explanations for this finding. While our experimental design aimed to be minimally
invasive and closely resemble a real-world blood drive, we also discuss potential extensions
that could shed more light on the low fulfillment.
This chapter makes at least three contributions to the literature. First, it contributes to a
burgeoning literature in psychology and economics concerned with the effect of social image
concerns on individual behavior (Bursztyn & Jensen, 2017). We show that image concerns
can be leveraged to get people to commit to charitable pledges and that image concerns are
likely stronger when the audience of prosocial actions is more closely related to the agent.
Second, with the use of charitable pledges, we contribute to a literature on soft commitment
devices (Bryan, Karlan, & Nelson, 2010).5
This literature most commonly studies how such devices can help avoid temptations.
Our study uses a soft commitment device that leverages the immediate temptation to give,
which alone may not necessarily translate into future giving behavior (Andreoni & Serra-
Garcia, 2017). The third contribution is methodological. Our field experiment combines
an intercept survey, commonly used in an older marketing literature (Bush & Hair, 1985),
with experimental manipulations more commonly used in the modern laboratory. This
4Blood donations at the commercial blood bank may not be perceived as unambiguously prosocial because
of the monetary incentive associated to the donation of blood.
5Bryan et al. (2010) define hard commitment devices to impose both material and psychological costs from
deviation while soft commitment devices only impose psychological costs.
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approach increases ecological validity by letting us (i) approach a sample of vastly hetero-
geneous individuals (ii) from a narrowly-targeted geographical area and by (iii) exploiting
natural conditions of the venue of intercept for the identification of behavioral mechanisms.
While our reasoning extends to other forms of costly prosocial behavior, we see our
results as particularly relevant in the domain of human tissue donations. In light of aging
and thus shrinking donor pools and likely increases in the demand for blood due to medical
procedures (Greinacher, Fendrich, Brzenska, Kiefel, &Hoffmann, 2011), medical providers
and blood banks are constantly aiming to recruit new donors. Approaching new prospective
donors on the street is one such recruitment tool. We closely cooperated with the two blood
collectors in this study tomaintain high ecological validity and to draw conclusions for donor
recruitment. With our focus on human tissue donations, we speak to an emerging literature
at the intersection of behavioral economics and health economics (Galizzi & Wiesen, 2018).
4.2 Theoretical Framework
To fix ideas for our empirical analysis of how social image concerns can affect the act to
pledge a later donation, we rely on the theoretical framework by Benabou and Tirole (2006),
in which the decisions of agents to participate in some prosocial activity carry reputational
costs and benefits.6 We abstract from any direct payoffs from intrinsic and extrinsic moti-
vations that agents might have to participate in the prosocial activity to focus on the impli-
cations of visibility. We restrict our attention to social image concerns using the simplified
framework provided by Bursztyn and Jensen (2017).
Formally, each agent i in our environment can undertake a binary action, say a pledge
to donate, pi ∈ {0, 1}. This action may be visible to a reference group j. Taking the action
is informative about the type of agent σi ∈ {l, h}, where to her reference group j type h is
seen as more socially-desirable by others than type l. Utility from social image to agent i is
then
Si = λi,j Ei [ωj ] Pri(σi = h|pi) (4.1)
where λi,j is the degree to which the agent cares about being perceived as socially desirable
in her reference group j. Ei [ωj ] is the expectation that agent i has about how socially-
desirable it is to be seen as a high type by other agents in her reference group j, measured
by ωj > 0. Finally, Pri(σi = h|pi) is the probability that taking action pi reveals agent i to
be of type h to others in the reference group.
Following this framework, we can empirically detect social image effects in at least three
ways. First, and maybe most obviously, social image concerns depend on whether other
agents can update their beliefs about the type of agent i, Pri(σi = h|pi). When pledges are
not observable, agents in the reference group cannot update their beliefs and social image
concerns vanish. Conversely, the easier it is for agents in the reference group to observe the
actions of agent i, the more salient social image concerns become. Most of the literature
has tested for social image concerns by exogenously varying whether actions are observable
6This theoretical framework builds on theories of esteem (Bernheim, 1994) and self-signaling (Bodner &
Prelec, 2003), and provides a unifying theory to explain prosocial behavior in the presence of incentives.
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(Ariely et al., 2009; DellaVigna et al., 2012; DellaVigna, List, Malmendier, & Rao, 2017),
we vary the visibility of the pledge to donate.
Second, the degree to which an agent i cares to be perceived in a positive light by others
in a reference group j, λi,j , amplifies the effect of any social image concerns that might
be operative. A test for social image concerns that exogenously varies visibility should thus
find a greater effect in when the agent cares more about being perceived in a positive light in
group j, i.e. when λi,j is bigger. This can be due to personal preference, the setting in which
actions are taken, or the composition of the reference group. We might, for example, care
more about how our actions are perceived when reference group consists of close friends and
family and more generally to people with whom we prospect future interactions as opposed
to complete strangers. Funk (2010) finds evidence that social pressure to vote in Swiss
elections is stronger in smaller and more close-kit communities.
Third, the expectation of agent i about social desirability in the reference group j of
taking an action and being seen as the high type, Ei [ωj ]. Similar to concern for being
perceived in a positive light by the reference group, the expectation about social desirability
amplifies any social image effects that might be at work. Social desirability depends both
on the underlying value that the group attaches to being a high type, and the agent’s ex-
pectations thereof. The former could differ, for example, for different charities. The latter
could be affected by social norms. Ariely et al. (2009) manipulate the nature of the cause
that subjects of a lab experiment can donate to and show that donations for a “bad cause”,
in their case the National Rifle Association, are not significantly different in public and in
private. We are not aware of any other empirical tests of how the social desirability of taking
an action shapes the effect of social image concerns.
4.3 Experimental Design and Procedures
Our experimental setup lets us study the three factors that shape social image concerns in a
natural setting. Our experiment uses a 2×2 between-subject design. In the first dimension,
we randomly vary the visibility of actions (PUBLIC or PRIVATE). In the second dimension,
we randomly vary the organization that agents can pledge to donate to (CHARITABLE or
COMMERCIAL).7 The two organizations that we work with, a well-known charity and a
commercial blood bank that pays its donors for giving blood, are likely perceived differently
in terms of social desirability in the sample of people in our study. We offer donations to
each of these organizations to separate, random subsamples of subjects.
Within this 2× 2 design, we have natural variation in the reference groups of prospec-
tive donors, which should by construction be orthogonal to our treatments. This variation
informs how a change in how much agents care about the opinions of others may shape
social image effects.
7The initial design had a third treatment in which agents could chose between a charitable pledge and a
commercial pledge to donate. The data for this treatment is made available upon request from the authors, but
we do not present it in this chapter due to various differences between the collecting institutions that make this
treatment uninformative and difficult to interpret.
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4.3.1 Local Context and Partner Organizations
We conduct our field experiment in Germany, which stands out among high-income coun-
tries in that a sizable share of human whole blood donations are incentivized with cash
payments. Germany is the fifth-largest blood supplier in the world (Paul Ehrlich Institut,
2015) and has the highest per capita rate of donations among all countries reporting to the
World Health Organization (World Health Organization, 2017). Of the 4.4 million whole
blood donations collected in 2014, about 71 percent were collected by the German Red
Cross, which never pays its donors. The remaining 29 percent represent the military, private
donors, and larger hospitals. The latter two groups commonly pay their donors, sometimes
up to about EUR 30 euro per donation.8 The German legal framework (Transfusionsgesetz
§10) recommends unpaid donations but allows for an unspecified monetary “compensation”
(Aufwandsentschädigung).9
The fact that paid and unpaid incentive schemes coexist in Germany’s market for blood
enables us to vary incentives to donate blood in a natural setting. We conduct our field
experiment in Bonn, a city of about 310,000 people in the populous Rhine-Ruhr region in
the west of Germany. We chose Bonn for its competition among various blood collectors
in a well-defined geographic area.10 In Bonn, prospective donors can donate blood in three
different ways: First, in frequent mobile donation drives of the German Red Cross held in
public squares in the city center. The German Red Cross never pays its donors. Second,
during fixed business hours at a commercial blood bank in the city center, which pays 20
euro per donation. Third, during fixed business hours at Bonn University Hospital located
about 6 kilometers outside the city. The hospital pays 25 euro per donation. Figure 4.1
shows the location of all donation points on a map. The Red Cross locations represent
mobile donation drives during the period of the field experiment (April to May 2017).
We exclude Bonn University Hospital for three reasons. First, it takes about 30 min-
utes to reach the hospital using public transport from the city center. In comparison, the
commercial blood bank and the Red Cross donation drives are all in walking distance of the
city hall.11 Second, the comparison between the German Red Cross, a well-known charity,
and a commercial blood bank presents a starker contrast in terms of social desirability of the
donation. This is less clear for the University Hospital, which is in public ownership. Third,
our enumerators were clearly identifiable as affiliates of the University of Bonn. Including
blood drives at the university-owned hospital could have induced significant experimenter
demand effects for those offers.
8It is difficult to estimate exact numbers because the German government does not publish data on blood
donations by type of remuneration, while the relevant WHO database on blood donations is not nationally
representative.
9It is interesting to note that the German Red Cross, as quasi-monopolist, has unsuccessfully taken legal
action to stop remunerated donations. Most recently in 2012, the Higher Administrative Court of Rhineland-
Palatinate (Oberverwaltungsgericht Rheinland-Pfalz) dismissed legal action of the German Red Cross against
the university hospital in Mainz, who regularly pays its donors. The court found the payment to be lawful. See
also Oberverwaltungsgericht Rheinland-Pfalz (2013).
10The authors considered various German cities and chose Bonn after studying local competition and after
conversations with various actors in the market for blood.
11We use the Google Maps Distance Matrix API to calculate travel times from the city hall at 8am on a
Tuesday morning.
130
4.3. Experimental Design and Procedures
Figure .: Map of Blood Collection Points in Bonn, Germany
Esri, HERE, DeLorme, MapmyIndia, © OpenStreetMap
contributors, and the GIS user community
¯
# University Hospital
" Commercial blood bank
! German Red Cross0 1 2 3 40.5
Kilometers
Sources: Esri, DeLorme, HERE, OpenStreetMap contributors.
Notes: German RedCross locations represent mobile donation drives during the period of the experiment (April
and May 2017). The University Hospital (green triangle) is not part of this experiment.
Before the experiment, we reached agreements with the regional chapter of the German
Red Cross and the commercial blood bank to cooperate in advertising and data sharing.
Subjects are informed that we formally cooperate with both organizations. Accordingly, the
survey consent form reflects legal requirements of both organizations. The survey software
and the “thank you” notes given to subjects use the official logos of our partners.
We recruit subjects among customers of the service center of the Bonn municipal gov-
ernment. The service center, centrally located in the city hall, provides a wide range of in-
person administrative services such as applications for official documents, driver’s licenses,
registration ofmotor vehicles, and payments for city services. Customers arrive at the service
center for appointments that they have previously scheduled online or via telephone. After
signing in with the front desk, they wait for their appointment in a designated waiting area.
On an average day, the service center handles about 1,300 appointments during 10 business
hours from 8am to 6pm. The average wait time between arrival at the service center and
appointment is about 4.5 minutes.
We choose to conduct the experiment in the municipal service center for three reasons:
First and most importantly, the population that we can sample from is highly diverse and
relevant to study the behavior of potential blood donors. Second, the service center lends
itself to an intercept survey because almost all customers have to wait for a few minutes,
often with little to do. Third, the physical space of the waiting area with many other people
standing and sitting around provides a natural “audience” that we can use to make social
image concerns salient. Before the experiment, we agreed with the municipal government
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on suitable time periods and procedures. Staff of the service center was briefed on our
experiment.
4.3.2 Experimental Procedures
Subjects for our experiment are recruited using an intercept survey in the waiting area of
the municipal service center. Throughout the operating hours of the service center, our enu-
merators wait for new customers to arrive in the waiting area. Given the large number of
appointments, it was not feasible to interview all customers arriving for appointments. In-
stead, we opted for a procedure in which our enumerators are instructed to always approach
the first new customer to arrive as soon as they have finished with the previous subject. This
approach avoids that subjects are influenced by observing other interviews and maximizes
the likelihood that our enumerators can complete the interview before subjects are called
for their appointment. We restrict our sample to customers that have an appointment, are
between 18 and 65 years of age, and are able to speak and read German.
We use CAPI with a tablet computer. Each enumerator uses a 10.1” Android tablet
running the Qualtrics Offline Surveys app. Surveys are programmed online in Qualtrics
and then downloaded to the tablets for offline use. Tablets are operated in a kiosk mode
that does not permit operations other than answering the survey. Responses are stored on
the tablet and regularly transmitted to the Qualtrics server using an encrypted connection
over a WLAN network in the city hall.
Enumerators can read instructions off the screen of their tablet. When approaching
new customers using a rehearsed script, enumerators verbally ask for an initial consent to
participate in a short survey. If customers agree, enumerators hand over the tablet to let
customers read background information on the survey, a privacy notice, and to let them
complete a written informed consent form. Once customers have completed the consent
form with their personal details, we treat them as subjects.
Subjects then use the tablet to complete a short self-administered questionnaire about
prosocial behavior, perceptions and preferences related to donating blood, awareness of vari-
ous ways to donate in Bonn, and number of years lived in Bonn. Finally, the survey software
administers one of four treatments (see detailed description below). The order of questions
is not randomized and the offer to sign up for a donation is always the last element of the
survey. Answer choices for categorical questions are displayed on screen in a random order.
When beginning the survey, subjects do not know that they will be offered to sign up for a
donation at the end.
Throughout the self-administered survey, enumerators stand by to guide and assist sub-
jects in operating the tablet computer. Every time an enumerator approaches a customer of
the service center, irrespective of whether the customer gives consent or completes the sur-
vey, the enumerator completes a short questionnaire designed to capture observable charac-
teristics and environmental conditions. These include estimated age range, gender, whether
customers came in a group, potential problems to complete the questionnaire, how crowded
the waiting area was, and reasons for aborting the survey. This information serves to un-
derstand potential selection effects in our sample. Figure 4.2 summarizes the sequence of
events in the experiment.
We recruited two student research assistants at the University of Bonn as enumerators.
We require both enumerators to wear a visible photo ID badge that clearly identifies them as
working for the University of Bonn, a large and well-known public university. We conduct
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Approximately 5 minute interview at the city hall service center, March–April 2017 April–May 2017
a detailed training of enumerators to make sure that the procedures are implemented as
described above. In addition to the tablet computer, “thank you” notes, and randomization
protocol, enumerators carry a copy of the survey protocols that they can refer to. Surveys
were conducted in the municipal service center for 92 hours, spread out over 18 workdays
in four weeks in March and April 2017.
4.3.2.1 Treatments
Our experiment offers to sign subjects up to donate blood with one of our partner organi-
zations. We cannot legally require subjects to follow through on their pledge. Instead we
explain that we pass on sign-up confirmations for a donation drive to the relevant partner
organization, thus emphasizing that the sign-up represents a pledge vis-à-vis the partner
organization.12
We use a 2 × 2 between-subject design that varies the sign-up process over two di-
mensions: Along the first dimension, we vary the organization that subjects can pledge
to donate to. This lets us manipulate incentives to donate in a natural way. In the first
treatment, subjects can sign up for a donation with the local chapter of the German Red
Cross, a well-known charity that does not provide monetary compensation for donations
(CHARITABLE treatment).
In the second treatment, subjects can sign up for a donation with a commercial blood
bank, which provides a monetary compensation of 20 euro per donation (COMMERCIAL
treatment). Subjects are informed about the compensation (or lack thereof ) in their treat-
ment but they do not learn about the other option to donate. Figure 4.3 illustrates the tablet
screens for both treatments.
Along the second dimension of the 2× 2 between-subject design, we vary the visibility
of the offer and sign-up process. In the PRIVATE treatment, subjects are presented with
the offer to sign up privately on the screen of the tablet. After having completed the survey
on altruism and preferences to donate blood, the software presents the offer to sign up for
a donation as an additional, last screen. Subjects accept or decline using buttons on the
screen. In the PUBLIC treatment, the software asks subjects to return the tablet computer
12The exact phrasing is as follows: “We invite you to donate blood with [partner organization, depending
on treatment, with further explanation]. If you are interested in donating, we would like to sign you up for a
donation in [the next two months]. For this sign-up, we work with [partner organization]. Are you interested?”.
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Figure .: Illustration of Tablet Screens with Donation Offer, by TreatmentCHARITY treatment COMMERCIAL treatment
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This is just an invitation. Your participation is 
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Notes: This figure is an illustration that approximates the layout of the tablet screens, with instructions
translated from German.
to the enumerator after the survey has been completed. The enumerator then advances to
a hidden next screen and reads out loud the same offer that in the PRIVATE treatment is
presented on the screen. Instead of using buttons on the screen, subjects in the PUBLIC
treatment are required to say out loud whether they would like to sign up for a donation.
Other customers waiting in the service center and any friends and family who might be
accompanying the subject serve as an “audience” for the public commitment.
All subjects who sign up for a donation receive a “thank you” card for the organization
that they signed up with. The cards are printed on high-quality paper and are meant as
a token of appreciation to remind subjects of their pledge to donate vis-à-vis the partner
organization. They also provide information on where and when they can donate with the
relevant partner. Figure 4.4 presents the card design for the German Red Cross (i.e. the
card that is given out in the CHARITABLE treatment). In the PRIVATE treatment, the
enumerator learns about the subject choice when the tablet computer is returned to the
enumerator. The survey software shows a small graphic at the top of the screen that enables
the enumerator to quickly recognize whether the subject chose to sign up.
The type of donation offer was randomized at the hourly level, i.e. over the 92 hours that
enumerators were present in the municipal service center. We chose the hourly treatment
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Figure .: “Thank You” Card for Red Cross Sign-Up
Vielen Dank für Ihre Teilnahme!
Wir haben Sie für eine Blutspende in den nächsten vier 
Wochen beim DRK-Blutspendedienst West vorgemerkt.
Wo und wann Sie spenden können beschreiben wir auf der 
Rückseite dieser Karte. Wir freuen uns auf Ihre Spende.
(a) Front
Wir erwarten Sie zu Ihrer Spende in den nächsten 
Wochen bei einem unserer Termine in Bonn!
Freitag 07.04.2017
13:30 Uhr bis 18 Uhr
Friedensplatz
Donnerstag 20.04.2017
13:30 Uhr bis 18 Uhr
Bottlerplatz
Freitag 21.04.2017
12:30 Uhr bis 17 Uhr
Rathaus Beuel
Freitag 12.05.2017
13:30 Uhr bis 18 Uhr
Friedensplatz
Freitag 19.05.2017





Kartendaten © 2017 HERE, CARTO
(b) Back
Notes: Front reads: “Thank you for your participation. We signed you up for a donation with the [local blood
donation service of the German Red Cross]. You can find out where and when to donate on the back of this
card. We are looking forward to your donation”. Back reads “We expect you at one of our donation drives in
Bonn over the next few weeks”.
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assignment because it minimized the chance that subjects would see our enumerators offer
donations with a different organization to later subjects (and thus potentially cause inquiries)
and because it simplified administration of the survey, in particular the handling of “thank
you” cards, for our enumerators. Randomization of donation offers was done before the start
of the experiment using Microsoft Excel. The visibility of the offer was randomly allocated
between all subjects by our survey software during the experiment.
4.3.3 Donation Drives and Tracking of Subjects
Our study design allows tracking of subjects from the municipal service center to blood
drives of our two partner organizations in a period of two months after the initial inter-
views were conducted. Subject consent and personal information collected during the survey
lets us match individual-level data for all subjects, irrespective of treatment, with donation
records. For this purpose, the consent form included waivers of medical confidentiality so
that both of our partner organizations could report donation behavior (but no other personal
or medical information) back to us.
Our two partners pursue different strategies to collect donations. The Red Cross does
not have a fixed donation center in Bonn, but offers widely-publicized mobile donation
drives in public squares in the city center. The commercial blood bank has regular business
hours every day during which it accepts walk-in donors. For the purpose of our experiment,
we agreed with our partners on five fixed dates and times that were the same between both
partners and that were highlighted on the “thank you” card.13
While we specifically invited subjects to come to one of these time slots (“we expect to
see you at one of these donation drives”), our data also allows us to track subjects who chose
to donate at other times or in other donation drives in the region.
4.4 Empirical Analysis
4.4.1 Sample Characteristics and Balance Across Treatments
Given the random sampling protocol adopted by our enumerators, we would expect our
sample to be representative of the population of customers of the municipal service center.
Over the four weeks of the study, our enumerators approached a total of 1,072 individuals.
From this random sample, 264 refused to participate and 194 dropped out during the survey.
Our final sample of completed surveys consists of 614 responses and selects our population
of interest by over-representing women, younger individuals, non-immigrants, and individ-
uals who come alone to visit the offices of the city-hall. Compared to the population of the
City of Bonn, our final sample has the same gender composition as the city average, but
is younger and includes fewer immigrants (Appendix Table 4.A1). Older people appear to
have dropped out disproportionately due to difficulties of handling the tablet computer. For
immigrants, language difficulties appeared to have been the most common reason for not
participating or completing the survey.
13The times were 12.30pm to 5pm on April 7, April 20, April 21, May 12, and May 19, 2017. Three of




Among the 194 subjects that abort the survey, just 7 abort after treatment assignment
with no differential abortion rates across treatment groups. Our sample is mostly balanced
on observables. Table 4.1 presents summary statistics for the final sample of 614 individuals
across treatment assignments. We use a one-way ANOVA on ranks (Kruskal-Wallis) to
compare observable characteristics, reported by subjects before treatment and measured by
the enumerators after the treatment. We document imbalance in pre-treatment measure of
awareness of the commercial blood bank in Bonn and in the gender of subjects (as reported
by enumerators). In our discussion of results below, we use parametric estimates that include
controls for observable characteristics.
4.4.2 Take-up of Pledges in City Hall Experiment
In this section, we study how social image effects shape the take-up of pledges to donate
blood. We use the conceptual framework by Bursztyn and Jensen (2017), outlined above,
to guide our analysis. Recall that our experimental design randomly varies whether survey
respondents were offered to pledge a blood donation publicly in front of a natural audience,
or privately on a tablet computer. We also vary randomly the organization that subjects can
pledge to donate to. If subjects perceive these organizations to be different in their social
desirability, this should change the strength of the social image effect. We then exploit
the fact that a considerable share (30 percent in our sample) of customers of the municipal
service center are accompanied by one or more friends or family members. We assume that
surveyed subjects care to be seen in a positive light by these people. Through this design
we are able to first identify social image effects in front of the natural audience, and then
test the additional implication of the social signaling model, which predicts a stronger social
image effect around people whose opinion matters more to the agent and for actions that
are perceived to be more socially-desirable.
Figure 4.5 illustrates the descriptive evidence on the take-up of pledges. We wish to
highlight two main patterns: First, we do not observe a strong visibility effect for pledges in
the CHARITABLE treatment. Second, we observe a strong visibility effect for pledges in
the CHARITABLE treatment. This effect is largely driven by individuals that visit the city
hall with friends and family. Table 4.1 (panel b) lists donation rates. In the remainder of
this section, we test the statistical significance of these patterns using parametric analysis.
For each of the two treatments that vary the offer under which the pledge is elicited e
(CHARITABLE, or COMMERCIAL), we estimate a separate logit model with following
specification:
Pe,i = αe + βePublice,i + X′e,iδe + εe,i (4.2)
where Pe,i is a binary variable indicating whether subject i pledged to donate under treat-
ment e, Publice,i denotes the binary variable taking value 0 if i was asked to pledge a blood
donation privately on a tablet and 1 if i was asked to pledge a blood donation out loud from
the enumerator in front of the natural audience of the waiting area in the municipal service
center. X′e,i is a vector of controls for individual characteristics.
Table 4.2 (columns 1, 2, 5, and 6) presents the average marginal effects from logit esti-
mation of Equation 4.2. We find that varying the visibility of the pledge has no detectable
effect on uptake in either of the two subsamples. In our simple theoretical framework, all
three factors can explain this null result: (i) it could be that the probability that others can
update their assessment of the subject’s generosity based on the pledge is very small, i.e.
that the signal is not effective, (ii) it could be that subjects do not care to be perceived in
137
. Image Concerns in Pledges to Give Blood: Evidence from a Field Experiment
Table .: Summary Statistics for Participating Subjects, by Treatment Assignment
(Means and Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Full sample Charitable Commercial P-value
Private Public Private Public
a) Self-reported before treatment
Frequency of altruistic activity 3.059 3.086 3.019 3.067 3.056 0.922
(0.037) (0.064) (0.078) (0.076) (0.082)
Importance of donating blood 4.007 4.030 3.955 3.881 4.169 0.089
(0.043) (0.076) (0.083) (0.095) (0.093)
Perception of blood donors as altruists 4.153 4.157 4.242 4.074 4.121 0.551
(0.036) (0.064) (0.065) (0.082) (0.081)
Awareness of institutions: DRK 0.855 0.833 0.892 0.815 0.887 0.155
(0.014) (0.027) (0.025) (0.034) (0.029)
Where would you go to donate: DRK 0.412 0.409 0.427 0.422 0.387 0.914
(0.020) (0.035) (0.040) (0.043) (0.044)
Awareness of institutions: Commercial 0.132 0.157 0.089 0.185 0.089 0.031
(0.014) (0.026) (0.023) (0.034) (0.026)
Where would you go to donate: Commercial 0.029 0.030 0.000 0.044 0.048 0.060
(0.007) (0.012) (0.000) (0.018) (0.019)
Awareness of institutions: University 0.705 0.667 0.752 0.741 0.669 0.202
(0.018) (0.034) (0.035) (0.038) (0.042)
Where would you go to donate: University 0.559 0.561 0.533 0.565 0.573 0.918
(0.020) (0.035) (0.040) (0.043) (0.045)
Respondent age 34.415 33.556 34.312 35.807 34.403 0.359
(0.480) (0.827) (0.966) (1.034) (1.075)
Respondent years lived in Bonn 5.666 5.657 5.675 5.689 5.645 0.992
(0.150) (0.268) (0.291) (0.327) (0.327)
b) Uptake of pledges after treatment
Subject pledged to donate 0.238 0.232 0.299 0.200 0.210 0.179
(0.017) (0.030) (0.037) (0.035) (0.037)
c) Measured by enumerator in post-survey questionnaire
Male 0.489 0.424 0.459 0.519 0.597 0.018
(0.020) (0.035) (0.040) (0.043) (0.044)
Respondent came in group 0.300 0.364 0.255 0.304 0.250 0.205
(0.026) (0.049) (0.051) (0.056) (0.047)
Respondent immigrant 0.130 0.131 0.127 0.126 0.137 0.993
(0.014) (0.024) (0.027) (0.029) (0.031)
Intensity of social image concern 3.438 3.212 3.618 3.489 3.516 0.004
(0.045) (0.081) (0.085) (0.097) (0.101)
Ability to complete survey 4.203 4.141 4.128 4.348 4.242 0.008
(0.029) (0.052) (0.049) (0.061) (0.071)
Observations 614 198 157 135 124
Notes: Frequency of altruistic activity asked interviewed subjects how often they engage in altruistic
activities, on a 5-point Likert scale where 1 is “never” and 5 is “very often”. Importance of donating
blood asked interviewed subjects how important they consider donating blood, on a 5-point Likert scale
where 1 is “not important” and 5 is “important”. Perception of blood donors as altruists asked interviewed
subjects to what extent they think is true that a friend or family member is altruistic for donating blood,
on a 5-point Likert scale where 1 is “not true” and 5 is “true”. Intensity of social image concern asked
enumerators to record their perceived intensity of social image, on a 5-point Likert scale where 1 is “very
weak” and 5 is “very strong”, based on how crowded and how quiet the waiting area was. P-value is for
a one-way ANOVA on ranks (Kruskal-Wallis) test comparing the four groups.
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Figure .: Share of Subjects Pledging a Blood Donation Across Treatments, Split by















Alone, Private Alone, Public Group, Private Group, Public
Commercial Pledge
Notes: “Public” and “private” are randomly assigned treatments while “alone” and “group” are based on whether
or not the subject is accompanied by one or more friends or family members. Error bars indicate standard error
of the mean.
a positive light by the group of people in the waiting area, or (iii) it could be that subjects
believe that pledging to donate by either of the collectors is not seen as socially desirable by
the group of people in the waiting area. We now discuss each of these factors in turn.
Our survey data provides suggestive evidence that (iii) alone is unlikely to explain why
social image effects are not operational. When we ask subjects pre-treatment whether they
agree or disagree that blood donors are perceived as altruists, we find that 41 percent of
subjects strongly agree and another 40 percent agree (overall mean of 4.15 on a 5-point
Likert scale).
Turning to (ii), we can explore how the composition of the reference group affects indi-
vidual propensity to pledge a blood donation by studying heterogeneous treatment effects
of the visibility treatment for interviewed subjects who come to the municipal service center
alone and those that come in a group. Therefore we extend Equation 4.2 as follows:
Pe,i = αe + βe (Publice,i ×Groupe,i) + X′e,iδe + εe,i (4.3)
where Groupe,i is an indicator variable for whether individual i came to the city hall alone
(Groupe,i = 0) or in a group (Groupe,i = 1).
Table 4.2 (columns 3, 4, 7, 8) presents average marginal effects. We find that the com-
position of the reference group indeed shapes social image effects in the uptake of donation
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Table .: Logit for Heterogeneous Social Image Effects on Pledge to Donate Blood
(Average Marginal Effect Estimates and Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Charitable Commercial
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treatments (baseline: Private× Alone)
Public 0.070 0.073 0.034 0.035
(0.047) (0.047) (0.056) (0.055)
Private × Group -0.051 -0.063 -0.055 -0.061
(0.068) (0.067) (0.085) (0.083)
Public × Alone 0.016 0.014 0.009 0.005
(0.054) (0.054) (0.063) (0.062)
Public × Group 0.210∗∗ 0.217∗∗ 0.078 0.090
(0.103) (0.102) (0.111) (0.112)
Control variables
Male -0.035 -0.042 -0.038 -0.047 0.039 0.031 0.030 0.020
(0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059)
Group 0.040 0.036 -0.001 0.002
(0.057) (0.057) (0.069) (0.069)
Donor at DRK 0.075 0.081 0.059 0.064 -0.015 -0.017 -0.011 -0.011
(0.091) (0.091) (0.089) (0.089) (0.091) (0.093) (0.092) (0.093)
Donor at commercial bank -0.044 0.014 -0.053 0.010 0.322∗ 0.214 0.304∗ 0.191
(0.188) (0.220) (0.181) (0.216) (0.176) (0.195) (0.177) (0.193)
Personal characteristics Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Awareness blood market N Y N Y N Y N Y
Image effect: Group vs Alone
Difference (p-value) 0.047 0.029 0.379 0.302
Observations 355 355 355 355 259 259 259 259
∗p < 0.10; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01
Notes: Binary variable indicating pledge to donate blood is the dependent variable in all regression models from
(1) to (4). Models (1) to (4) estimate regression for pledge to chariable blood donation, (5) to (8) for pledge
to commercial blood donation. “Personal characteristics” include age group, migration background, charitable
behavior (stated intensity on a 1 to 5 Likert scale), perceived relevance of donating blood (stated intensity on a
1 to 5 Likert scale), and perceived altruism of people donating blood (stated intensity on a 1 to 5 Likert scale).
“Awareness blood market” include binary variables indicating awareness of DRK, awareness of the commercial
blood bank, and awareness of the Bonn university hospital blood collection center.
pledges. When people are asked to pledge a donation with the German Red Cross, mak-
ing the request public increases willingness to pledge among people who came in a group
(p < 0.05) without affecting people coming alone. This effect is consistent with the theoret-
ical mechanism: individuals care more to signal altruism to a socially connected audience.14
Interestingly, social image effects for the COMMERCIAL treatment are generally much
weaker and are not detectable at any conventional level of confidence, both for people com-
ing alone, as well as for people coming in groups. We interpret the stronger effect for the
CHARITABLE treatment as consistent with the theoretical framework, in that the strength
14A related interpretation of theory and evidence is that respondents that visit the city hall with friends or
family are systematically more concerned about how others perceive their actions.
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of the social image effect should be an increasing function of the perceived social desirability
of the action.
Finally, turning to (i), we cannot rule out that our manipulation of visibility failed to
increase the probability that others could update their assessment of the subject’s generosity
based on the pledge.
Pledges are inherently different from actual prosocial behavior because they depend on
later fulfillment. It could be that public image concerns are not operational because a refer-
ence group of strangers in the municipal service center cannot hold subjects accountable to
fulfill the pledge later. This would be consistent with our finding that social image concerns
are indeed only operational for subjects who are accompanied by other people.
In addition to these three explanations based on our theoretical framework, we now
assess whether our results could be driven by systematic attrition or by competing explana-
tions. We first consider attrition. On the one hand, attrition after treatment assignment
is negligible. Of the 194 subjects who dropped out after consenting to participate, only
seven did so after the treatment was administered, with no significant difference between
treatments.
This suggests that internal validity of our study is not affected by attrition. However,
because subjects who drop out before treatment are relatively more likely to have come to
the city hall with friends or family, the effect of visibility on pledges for the random draw
of people intercepted in groups may be either over- or under-estimated depending on how
selection interacts with visibility treatment.
Finally, we consider a competing interpretation of our results. It could be that individ-
uals pledge more frequently when they come in a group because they can learn about the
costs and benefits of donating from whoever accompanies them. Under this competing
interpretation, we would expect that less-informed subjects drive the visibility effects.
To assess this alternative explanation, we can use the data that we collect prior to treat-
ment. We ask each subject whether they are aware of various organizations collecting blood
donations in the area. Subjects who do not know that the DRK is collecting donations in
the area are presumably less informed about the costs and benefits of donating blood with
this organization. We find no evidence that the visibility effect is driven by these individuals.
Appendix Table 4.A2 replicates the analysis of visibility effects but excludes subjects who
do not know about the DRK.
4.4.2.1 Fulfillment of Pledges at Blood Drives
Our experiment is designed to investigate the effect of making the choice to commit to a
blood donation visible on stated willingness to donate. Because of our partnership with two
blood banks, we can also study how social image concerns affect fulfillment rates of pledges,
hence actual donations.
We find that the conversion rate of pledges into actual donations is strikingly low. From
the initial sample of 614 interviewed subjects we discard 18 observations for which we did
not obtain full names to match to our partners’ records. Of the 596 remaining observa-
tions 141 (23.66 percent) pledged to make a blood donation in April or May 2017. Of
those subjects, only one subject donated during the suggested period. Surprisingly, of the
455 subjects who did not pledge to donate, four subjects donated during the same period
following our survey (See Table 4.3 for a summary of actual donations across treatments).
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These conversion rates are low in comparison to another study that similarly elicits pledges
to donate blood among university students (Stutzer, Goette, & Zehnder, 2011).15
Among all 596 subjects in our sample who provided a complete name, 65 had previously
donated either at the German Red Cross or at the commercial blood bank, with no signif-
icant differences between treatment assignment. While the number of actual donations is
too small for a statistically meaningful comparison, it appears that subjects who have previ-
ously donated blood were slightly more likely to donate following our interview. Among the
65 subjects that had previously donated, 3 subjects (4.6 percent) donated again following
the interview. Among the 531 subjects that had not previously donated, 2 subjects (0.38
percent) donated again following the interview.
We can benchmark these numbers to a series of experiments from Goette, Stutzer,
Yavuzcan, and Frey (2009), in which a summer blood donation elicitation campaign lead to
a conversion rate of approaches over donation of about 0.6 percent for Zurich citizens who
had not previously donated and 45.3 percent of registered donors of the Swiss Red Cross
in Zurich. Comparatively, our campaign was ineffective at inducing donations particularly
among subjects that have previously donated.
We can also benchmark our donation numbers to the national donation rates in Ger-
many. Over the whole year of 2017, the rate of donations in the population was about 4.8
percent (Paul-Ehrlich-Institut, 2018). This rate is higher than the donation rate among
first time and previous donors in our study, though we note that subjects in our survey only
had a time window of approximately two months after the survey to donate with one of our
partner organizations.
Table .: Fulfillment of Pledges at Partner Blood Drives, by Treatment Assignment
(Number of Subjects)
Whole sample Charitable Commerical
Private Public Private Public
a) Name matching and donor status of study subjects
All subjects 614 198 157 135 124
of which matched with donor databases 596 193 151 131 121
of which donated with either blood collector 65 18 16 14 17
b) Pledges and donations
Pledged a donation in study 141 44 45 26 26
of which donated 1 1 0 0 0
Did not pledge a donation in study 455 149 106 105 95
of which donated 4 3 0 0 1
4.5 Discussion and Conclusion
Although pledges to donate are widely used by organizations to encourage contributions,
particularly human tissue donations, there is little evidence on their efficacy in changing
15Stutzer et al. (2011) document a conversion rate of about 54 percent for pledges over blood donations that
take place on the same day.
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behavior. In this paper, we aim to shed light on social image concern as an underlying
mechanism. Using the real-world setting and a research design with high ecological validity,
we set out to study how social image concerns affect both the uptake and the fulfillment of
pledges to donate blood.
The results of our field experiment show that the uptake of pledges is consistent with
a theoretical framework in which social image concerns are amplified when subjects care
more about being perceived favorably by a reference group of people and when pledging to
donate to amore socially-desirable organization. We find evidence for social image concerns
when subjects are asked in public whether they would like to pledge a donation with the
Red Cross.16 When subjects are accompanied by friends and family members, public offers
significantly increase the likelihood of pledging to come to a donation drive. When subjects
are not accompanied by anyone, but just surrounded by other customers waiting in the
municipal service center, we do not find significant differences between public and private
offers. Similarly, social image concerns do not appear to play a role when subjects are offered
to sign up for a remunerated donation with a commercial blood bank.
These findings contribute to the growing academic literature on the role played by social
image considerations in economic behavior. We document that pledging behavior is con-
sistent with a simple model of social image concerns even when the act of doing good itself
is not observable to others.
At the same time, pledges in our particular context do not appear to induce any addi-
tional blood donations. Almost all subjects renege on their pledge, with no detectable dif-
ferences between treatments. This result is in line with Lacetera, Macis, and Mele (2016),
who collaborate with a firm that runs fundraising campaigns in an online social network.
They provide evidence that individuals may broadcast pledges to donate money in order to
signal generosity. While broadcasting appears to be correlated with donations, they show
in a separate field experiment that stated support and explicit pledges to donate largely fail
translate into actual donations. Our paper can be seen as important complementary evi-
dence to Lacetera et al. (2016) for identifying the effect of an exogenous manipulation of
the visibility of pledges, and for providing evidence that pledges are reneged even in the ab-
sence of intermediation fees that potentially hamper the effectiveness of donations (Gneezy,
Keenan, & Gneezy, 2014) or act as excuses not to give (Exley, 2018). 17
We see the lack of fulfillment in our experiment as an important starting point for further
academic and policy-oriented work:
From an academic perspective, variousmechanisms could explain why individuals would
renege or follow through on their pledges. While our experiment was not designed to
disentangle them, future field experiments could systematically vary the psychological costs
of reneging on pledges, for example by varying the time lag between pledge and donation or
by varying the framing of the initial pledge. Additional laboratory-based work could help
shed light of the relative importance of moral consistency (Cialdini & Trost, 1998; Cioffi &
16Consistent with this finding, recent experimental evidence (Karing, 2018) indicates that social image
effects on child immunization decisions are stronger for vaccines that are perceived to be more socially desirable.
17Similarly, Exley and Naecker (2016) find that hard commitment devices for workshop attendance can be
used to engage in social signaling. Although their test is likely underpowered, they also find that providing the
commitment device has no effect on workshop attendance.
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Garner, 1996) and promise-keeping (Charness & Dufwenberg, 2006) as underlying reasons
for not wanting to break a promise to donate.
From a policy perspective, we take our findings as a reminder that simple, behaviorally-
informed strategies designed to promote desirable behaviors can have their limits. While
such “nudges” can steer people to perform one specific action, they may not have a sustained
impact beyond a specific moment, location, or context. Organizations looking to harness
pledges should thus consider them in tandem with other strategies to increase conversion
rates. One simple strategy can be to reduce the temporal or spatial gap between pledge and
donation. When the pledge to donate and the actual donation have to remain separate in
time or space, another strategy could involve reminding individuals of their pledge. An-
dreoni and Serra-Garcia (2017) show that sending ‘thank you’ cards before the decision to
donate can be highly effective in reducing reneging on the pledge.
Compared to simple nudges such as defaults, the efficacy of pledges as a tool to change
behavior likely depends on a more complex set of psychological and economic mechanisms.
Far more research is needed to understand them.
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4.A Appendix: Additional Tables
Table .A: Summary Statistics for City Population and Potential Study Population,





of which: of which: of which: (3)=(4)=(5)
participated aborted no consent p-value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Age 41.8 n/a 34.4 56.0 n/a
(0.384) (0.776)
Age group n/a 3.982 3.480 5.804 3.811 0.000
(0.046) (0.050) (0.093) (0.076)
Male 0.483 0.519 0.489 0.521 0.587 0.028
(0.015) (0.020) (0.036) (0.030)
Immigration background 0.288 0.254 0.130 0.253 0.542 0.003
(0.013) (0.014) (0.031) (0.031)
Respondent came in group 0.329 0.300 0.412 0.337 0.000
(0.019) (0.026) (0.043) (0.039)
N 327,919 1,072 614 194 264
Source: Data for Bonn taken from Bonn City Government Statistical Office 2017 population statistics.
Notes: Respondent age groups: 1 “under 18” 2 “18 to 24” 3 “25 to 34” 4 “35 to 44” 5 “45 to 54” 6 “55 to
64” 7 “64 or older”. We report data for average age separately because could not reconstruct our survey age
groups from the publicly available population data. P-value is for a one-way ANOVA on ranks (Kruskal-
Wallis) test comparing columns (3), (4), and (5).
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Table .A: Logit for Heterogeneous Social Image Effects on Pledge to Donate Blood
From Subsample Aware of DRK as Blood Collection Agency (Average Marginal Effect
Estimates and Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Charitable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatments (baseline: Private× Alone)
Public 0.083 0.083
(0.051) (0.051)
Private × Group -0.058 -0.068
(0.075) (0.074)
Public × Alone 0.029 0.026
(0.058) (0.058)
Public × Group 0.232∗∗ 0.235∗∗
(0.111) (0.111)
Control variables
Male -0.071 -0.076 -0.079 -0.085
(0.054) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053)
Group 0.043 0.040
(0.063) (0.062)
Donor at DRK 0.105 0.113 0.087 0.094
(0.096) (0.096) (0.095) (0.095)
Commercial blood bank donor -0.042 0.017 -0.046 0.019
(0.190) (0.223) (0.186) (0.221)
Personal characteristics Y Y Y Y
Awareness rest of the blood market N Y N Y
Social image effect: Group vs Alone
Difference (p-value) 0.055 0.040
Observations 302 302 302 302
∗p < 0.10; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01
Notes: Binary variable indicating pledge of a charitable blood donation is the
dependent variable in all regression models from (1) to (4). “Personal charac-
teristics” include age group, migration background, charitable behavior (stated
intensity on a 1 to 5 Likert scale), perceived relevance of donating blood (stated
intensity on a 1 to 5 Likert scale), and perceived altruism of people donating
blood (stated intensity on a 1 to 5 Likert scale). “Awareness rest of the blood
market” include binary variables indicating awareness of the commercial blood
bank and awareness of the Bonn university hospital blood collection center.
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